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THE THEOLOGY OF THE REAL

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THE THEOLOGY OF THE REAL

BY

R. GORDON MILBURN

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PREFACE

The immediate purpose of this book is indicated in the Introduction. It tries to meet that demand for greater depth and adequacy in religious thought which has been so characteristic of this century, and which finds expression in repeated attempts at a "Reconstruction of Belief." I do not claim that this present attempt has succeeded in reaching depth or adequacy. But I do claim that it has been written, not in the spirit of an apologist, whose aim is to persuade, but in that of an investigator who desires the real truth, whatever it may be, convinced that if the truth can be fairly stated it will prevail.

Private letters of criticism will be welcomed.

R. Gordon Milburn.

The Authors' Club,
2 Whitehall Court,
1st November, 1924.

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INTRODUCTION

I HOPE that this book may fairly be described as a contribution to the study of objectivity in theology.

I have endeavoured to gain objectivity in my starting point by a preliminary setting aside of doctrines which rest solely upon an emotional and subjectivist basis. Theology must be a branch of reality-thinking, not of phantasy-thinking. Nor is objectivity to be gained by placing the collective idiosyncrasies and subjectivism of Churches in place of those of the individual. The appeal to the authority of the Church is generally but an appeal to the organized phantasies of a group. A Church can represent objectivity only when its methods of thought are objective.

On the other hand no objectivity can be reached by evading the point at issue—the validity of the religious standpoint. This is evaded when the question as to the reality of intercourse between God and man is shirked.

What is needed is not the substitution of science for faith in the sphere of religion, but the substitution of scientific for unscientific methods in theology.

The objectivity at which theology has to aim is of several distinct kinds. Each of these can be tested separately. The first of these is that objectivity which characterizes both natural science and practical life. It consists in the determination of thought by causal inferences drawn independently of feeling. The passional element which so largely sways practical life and which is far from being inoperative in natural science need not disturb us, because it does not constitute the whole basis either of common life or of science; in addition to the influence of prejudice there

is amply sufficient reality-thinking to give objectivity both to science and to practical life, and that objectivity consists of logical inferences based upon the principle of uniform causation. What, in its ultimate analysis, causality is does not here concern us. It is in any case something upon the basis of which objectivity is possible. We may call this "practical and scientific objectivity." Is it possible for theology?

It is a tendency, I think a vice, of many theological writers to leap from crude traditionalism to critical metaphysics without paying any regard whatever to the demands of even the most elementary practical and scientific objectivity such as even a schoolchild could appreciate. Every child knows that there are reasons for supposing that the world is round, reasons which hold good for everyone, and which it can itself to some extent understand. Here, then, is a definite issue for theology; does practical and scientific objectivity hold good within its sphere at all?

If it does, we hereby assert the causal agency of God, of the Supernatural, of Spirit. And if we may define a miracle as an event which implies spiritual causation the scientific objectivity of theology implies an established tendency, under requisite conditions, for miracles to happen. The use of this unpopular and ambiguous word need not be pressed. But it must be borne in mind that the causality into which we are to inquire in this branch of our subject is not a metaphysical causality which expresses itself in natural law as such, but the particular causal connexion between a phenomenal antecedent (such as a prayer or prayers) and a phenomenal consequent (such as improvement in health or character).

We ought not to permit ourselves to be deterred by the expectation of failure to establish the truth of any such causation, for we are not mere advocates or apologists, and failure itself may become an elucidation of truth, albeit not the truth which we should wish.

The next kind of objectivity is perceptual or æsthetic. It is not a question of inference, but of the reliableness of these or those impressions. If the aspects of the spiritual world, as reported by religious persons, are sufficiently coherent a certain general character will emerge and the impressions of one person can be checked by those of another. The process is in some respects analogous to the discovery of the uniformity of Nature. The religious experiences of one person can be compared with those of another and all can then be synthesized, or colligated, by means of the right concept to express them all. It will thus be true of the spiritual world, as of the natural, that, in Mill's language, " we make experience its own test." So far as such attempts succeed our vision of God acquires objective character; so far as they break down (and there is no reason to suspect that we have been led astray by the associations, or other defects, of our terminology) there is reason to doubt the objective reality of the religious object.

Ethical objectivity is to be sought in taking adequate account of the concrete facts of experience and of psychological law. The tendency of ecclesiastical ethics has been towards an emphasis upon the aspirations of saintliness supplemented by a practical accommodation to the moral standards of worldly convention. In this accommodation it is not the higher ideals of secularism from which ecclesiasticism has borrowed, but from the more uninspired traditions of respectability. The resulting contradictions within the sphere of moral principle itself led to great unreality. Within the sphere of social ethics a healthy tendency towards self-criticism has recently become more marked, but systematic ethical study is still greatly needed.

The objectivity of metaphysical theology consists in its coherence with the particular facts of natural science and common experience. Formulas like the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, though they are sometimes called metaphysical, are not really metaphysical at all inasmuch

as they are the outcome, not of the attempts of the intellect to understand the universe, but of purely devotional interests. When the idea of God can be shown to illuminate any class of facts, other than those of a distinctively religious character, a certain objectivity, or partial independence of its emotional basis, can be claimed for it, and the more numerous and varied the classes of facts which it can illuminate the greater its objectivity.

In following out these four lines of thought—the practical and scientific (Chap. II), the mystical (Chap. III), the ethical (Chap. IV), and the metaphysical (Chap. V)—some endeavour will be made to avoid deserting the point of view of the particular discussion in progress. Thus when we discuss below certain points of medical theology the principle of proof through verifiable causation must be kept steadfastly in view and we must be content with a treatment of the subject which is emotionally unsatisfying. In perceptual theology, on the other hand, we must not turn aside more than is necessary to discuss psychological origins, since the particular kind of objectivity of which we shall then be in search is not dependent upon them.

These remarks are designed, not as a summary of the contents of the book, but as an indication of an underlying theme—the pursuit of objectivity in theology—common to all the varied discussions dealt with in its pages. What particular problems are discussed can be seen from the table of contents. They have been selected as representing the religious interests of the present day in circles more or less estranged from official Christendom. And if one or two of my conclusions appear to orthodox critics to be deserving of extreme malediction, I would beg them to consider the limitations which an attempt at objective method necessarily imposes. Wrong conclusions are less serious than wrong methods.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE REAL

CHAPTER I

MYTHOLOGICAL THEOLOGY

§ 1. Theology as a Science of Reality

(a) *Theology and Phantasy*

"There is now some very general measure of agreement that . . . the recent era of destruction must be followed by a period of reconstruction and reorganization, in which many of our systems, institutions, customs and beliefs must be tested and where necessary refashioned. . . . Biology, physiology, medicine, hygiene, economics, politics, law and education must all contribute their share to the solution of the great problem of reconstituting human society upon a satisfactory peace footing. Above all it is to the science of the human mind that we should most naturally turn." *

Not a word, be it noted, about either theology or metaphysics. Is it really true that religion, and theology as the reasoned expression of religion, are unworthy of a voice in the great reconstruction? Is the practical value of religion for an unenlightened age generously enough acknowledged by the writer just quoted, all that can be said for it?

The reasons why theology is ignored by the sciences are well enough known. The main charge against it may be roughly formulated thus: "Religion is simply a matter of feeling and imagination. The objects with which it is concerned possess no objective reality and therefore cannot

* J. C. Flügel, *The Psycho-analytic Study of the Family*, p. 1.

be made the subject-matter of a science. They are but the mental imagery in which the unsatisfied emotions of religious persons express themselves in highly symbolical form. Such imagery may have a certain value, but no science could regard it as *real*. For reality means that which exists independently of the feelings and idiosyncrasies of the observer; its manifestations follow laws which are universal and which are consequently amenable to the methods of logic. Science is the investigation of reality; religious thought, on the contrary, is more like poetry than science; the doctrines in which it results are, like poems, structures built up under the guidance of feeling in order to satisfy feeling. God, heaven, providence and salvation—what are they but phantasies? And what can the doctrines elaborated out of them—such as those of the Incarnation, Atonement, or Holy Trinity—be but phantasies likewise? Such things cannot form the subject-matter of a science—of an investigation into reality. As well might the Royal Geographical Society equip an expedition to map out the island-valley of Avilion."

There are several possible courses open to theology in the face of this criticism. The first is that of dogmatic theology which adheres to its conviction that in revelation it possesses a source of information (*i.e.* communicable propositions) which makes it independent of inductive logic.* This amounts to a flat denial of the charge against religion, but a denial of a kind so incapable of standing examination that for any person of average critical ability it merely substantiates it.

The second position is that of "Natural Religion." As object of religious interest Nature is taken by some writers instead of the Supernatural, and religion is identified with certain attitudes towards it.† The drawback to this position is that it is inconsistent with the evidence—with the data of religion—which shows that Nature can be a religious object only when it is regarded as the manifesta-

* For an example see below (c). † *E.g.* by J. R. Seeley.

tion or dwelling-place of a Supernatural, not as a substitute for it.

The third course is that of those empirical writers who describe the phenomena of religion and perhaps discuss their value, but avoid the question of their metaphysical truth and significance. But it is just this question of truth that theology is concerned with; if it is entirely avoided an admission of the charge is implied.

The fourth reply is: "It is true that the ideas of religion lack objectivity. But religion, like morality, involves a certain inward illumination which is independent of all science and metaphysics. It belongs to a different order of reality from that which science investigates, but it is a real order nevertheless." * What is unsatisfactory about this position is that it does not take sufficient account of the specific task of theology as distinct from religion. *Religion* is an inward reaction and illumination; that is right enough. But it expresses itself in certain ideas, and the question we all ask is as to whether those ideas are at all approximately true. It is not primarily a question as to the *structure* of religious belief, but of the truth of the propositions in which it finds expression. Let it be that the *process* of attaining truth is different in religion from what it is in science; the problem still remains as to how one can judge whether the *content* of the fundamental ideas of religion is true or not.

This fourth answer is often complemented by the further view that truth is not really a correspondence of thought with things, but something else, and that so religious ideas may be true after all, even though for natural science they remain mere fancies. We plain folk answer: "However truth, or knowledge, may be defined there is a distinction between it and illusion. If religion is to have any place in the civilization of the future it must be judged according to some rationally appreciable distinction between fancy and fact. If there are two orders of objective fact the higher

* Cf. *e.g.* A. Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion.*

order must be exhibited and shown to be really an objective order. When we ask whether there is a God, a Supernatural, a Beyond of any kind, do not answer with an infinite series of preliminary questions as to the nature of truth."

Fifthly, there are those whose interest lies not so much in religion as in philosophical idealism and in ethics. They will, independently of religion, prove the existence of a supreme mind and offer morality as the practical content of religion. This position is the reverse of those last considered. The latter offered us religion with no guarantee of truth; this gives us truth without religion. It knows nothing of any interaction between God and man. For all intents and purposes the universe of philosophical idealism and that of materialism are often exactly the same except that the former adds to the latter a speculative reduction of it to an ultimate mentalism that makes no difference at all to life.

Finally, the answer might be given : " Until the present century no consistent attempt has been made to apply scientific method to the determination of the truth of religious doctrine (as opposed, for instance, to subordinate studies such as Biblical criticism). It is not yet known how much might not be achieved in this way, and cannot be known until a systematic attempt in this direction has been made. It is not really known that results do not occur which indicate the real existence of some universal spiritual agency which we call God. It is not known that religion does not contain possibilities of a higher type of mentality than can be realized without it. Religion claims that it knows from experience that unseen forces do operate and that it knows a spiritual life impossible without its direct or indirect influence. The investigation of such problems cannot be prejudged merely by showing up the unspiritual elements which admittedly infect a great deal of religion, useful as such showing up certainly is. Nor can it be settled by an *a priori* epistemology which leaves evidence

out of account. There can be no more reasonable objection to the assumption of the existence of God than, for instance, to that of Jung's Collective Psyche. It all depends upon whether such an hypothesis really does sufficiently illuminate the facts. Instead, therefore, of shirking the main issue of the truth of real intercourse between heaven and earth, let us try to state it in a form which can become the basis alike of scientific inquiry and of a more fruitful religious experience."

There are three general levels of thought in matters which admit of truth—the symbolical, the scientific, and the philosophical. The present need is for an attempt to deal with religion upon the second of these levels, or upon a level as nearly that of science as possible. The level of science is that of thorough objectivity, and whether or not theology can receive recognition from the other sciences and exercise an influence in their common task of the refashioning of civilization depends upon the objectivity of the knowledge of God—or of something which operates as though it were God, or which appears to be God. Is there, or is there not, a possible sphere of reality in any way corresponding to religious beliefs of any kind? If there even *may be* such a sphere of being there is place for a systematic enquiry, and we cannot know that there can not be except as a result of such enquiry.

When, therefore, a philosopher or theologian points out the alogical elements in the categories with which science works, such as those of causality or uniformity, or demonstrates that science itself is based upon faith and authority, the plain man feels that the considerations adduced are not those which the situation requires. For human culture consists primarily of the lower rationalities of science and of progressive life rather than the higher rationalities of philosophy. And it is an increased measure of that lower rationality that religion to-day is in need of, whatever the objectivity so essential to it in its ultimate analysis may be. The philosophical idea of God as the unity of being and

knowing, of fact and value, of instinct and ideal, or however else it may be conceived, is not the point at issue for a religion which believes in a God who does particular things in answer to prayer. The conclusion for theology, surely, is that it must attempt a formulation of itself upon lines which shall possess the character of scientific rather than of philosophic knowledge to an extent sufficient to affiliate it to the general thought of the present age, however probable it may be that the attempt will end in failure. The exhibition, through failure, of the weakness of a bad case is a gain to truth.

What, then, we may ask, are those characteristics of natural science in virtue of which it may well serve as a model for theology at the present day? In the first place science is built up upon facts with which our daily life is concerned and therefore upon natural interests. In their higher development the sciences may get rather far removed from this basis, but this takes place through a widening of our natural interests rather than through the introduction of such exotic problems as those which the language of theology suggests that it is preoccupied with.

The second characteristic of natural science is that it operates with the category of causality. It is a system of causal inferences. What causality, in its ultimate analysis, really is does not immediately matter. In any case it is the category through which thought has been rationalized and systematized.

Thirdly, science provides illuminating syntheses, concepts which turn masses of meaningless facts into revelations of an unseen order and of unseen happenings. The strata of rocks and the mud of rivers become media of the revelation of an undreamt-of world of weird monsters and marvellous transformations. The prosaic facts that all individuals are not exactly alike and that a pigeon usually lays more than two eggs in the course of her existence provide the concept of natural selection which then becomes the revelation of a terrible law dominating all life. Every new

discovery means new vision, a seeing of things not seen before.

Next, even questions of right and wrong, of good and evil, are coming within the scope of science. Economics is modifying our ideas of the rights of property, psychology those relating the indulgence or control of instinct.

Lastly, science subsumes facts under facts, laws under laws, so that the world of thought and experience becomes more and more a unity, although the ruling principle of it all has not yet been found, or at least has not yet been established.

Here we have an ideal towards which modern theology must seek to approximate. It must exhibit its own system of causality, show that redemption, providence, and grace are facts, and make it clear on the basis of evidence with what antecedents they tend to be connected as consequents. It must lead to the vision of new worlds as real as the world of giant reptiles, to laws of life as sure as natural selection. It must function as a progressive and expansive force in the sphere of ethics, and finally must sum up and illuminate all existence through the idea of God.

I am, of course, aware that the usual apologetic for religion, other than revealed religion, is one which abandons the sphere of objectivity to science and (perhaps) philosophy and confines its defence of religion to pointing out that we may entertain reverent and trustful feelings as we contemplate the universe and that we may represent these feelings, if we will, by means of anthropomorphic symbols to which science cannot answer "nay." I am not, however, here concerned with religion, but with theology, with determinable fact and not with the aspects and values which faith and feeling may create. I am suggesting that such propositions as "God saves," "God guides," "God heals," "God provides," and the like, can be dealt with objectively and that our attitudes and feelings towards the universe must very largely be determined by the view which

we have previously come to upon such subjects as these. The question as to the divine agency in any particular occurrence logically precedes the formation of our world-view; cosmic emotions, if any, are subsequent to it. What, therefore, I am now urging is not that religious emotions are compatible with scientific conclusions, but that metempirical sciences which operate with concepts of what are virtually transcendental agencies are compatible with empirical sciences which ignore such agencies on principle, and that if there is any truth in religious beliefs theology should be capable of formulation as a science of the former class; while if, on the other hand, all attempts so to formulate it end in consistent failure it may be concluded that religious beliefs are irrational.

(b) *Theology and Rationalism*

Real theology, as we have seen, is necessarily compatible with natural science because it accepts all that natural science has to say so long as the latter still maintains the standpoint of science rather than that of cosmology. And science cannot lapse into cosmology, or other branches of metaphysics, without to that extent ceasing to be science. The harmony of science and religion is therefore anything but surprising. It does not prove that religion is rational or that science is religious, but merely that so long as each remains within its own sphere—*i.e.* so long as each remains itself—it has not the logical means for dealing with the conclusions arrived at by the other. But of course it is possible to accept those same doctrines of science and to interpret them in such a way as to draw conclusions from them negative to the whole religious position. This is popularly known as Rationalism, and among philosophers as Naturalism. But since the subject with which it is primarily concerned is the truth or falsehood of religious belief it might equally well be called Negative Theology, or Negative Real Theology.

The difference between theology (*i.e.* affirmative real theology) and rationalism is not, however, most fundamentally a difference as to methods or conclusions, but a difference as to working hypothesis. Broadly speaking this difference as to working hypothesis is this, that rationalism *assumes* that matter and inorganic forces, or diffuse vitalistic forces, can account for everything. Theology assumes that the key to evolution and to the structure of the human mind lies in the fact that the operations of Nature take place within a supreme Personality, the guide to the realization of which is to be found in the principles of Christian life. Neither the affirmative hypothesis of theology nor the negative hypothesis of rationalism is in principle a matter of faith or dogma; both can easily become so, but when this happens we are deserting the standpoint of theology for that of religion (or its opposite).

No science could progress unless working principles of a kind suited to it were admissible prior to proof. Thus we have the assumption of universal causality and the principle of the exclusion of regard for transcendental factors in natural science. (The latter principle is adhered to quite legitimately, but also quite regardless of the apparent drift of the evidence.) The theistic hypothesis is as legitimate in theology as these are in natural science or the atheistic hypothesis in rationalism. It is no more a dogma or a postulate than are these; it is not more dependent upon positive feeling than is the atheistic hypothesis upon negative. For, once more, we are not speaking of the tendencies of religious belief, but of a theology which is scientific before it is religious.

This guiding principle, or working hypothesis, may be expressed as follows : The transcendental factor apparent behind experience is real and significant—*i.e.* is neither a delusion nor a chance by-product of Nature; this factor is One—*i.e.* the transcendental factor in evolution, in the development of the individual, in the moral consciousness, in religion, in reason, in such experiences as providence,

pardon, redemption, etc., is one and the same; it possesses certain attributes in virtue of which we call it God; it is operative, interacting with Nature; it is most adequately conceived as a supreme personality immanent in creation.

This hypothesis must be tested in all the cases in which there is an apparent manifestation of the transcendental factor; if it completely dissolves under examination it is an illusion; if it synthesizes verified fact it is true, or at least possesses truth.

(c) *Revelation*

The cardinal idea of dogmatic theology is that of revelation. The term "revelation" may mean either of two things. It may mean "divinely imparted information" or it may mean "an impression of God." Anything may convey such an impression—

> a sunset-touch,
> A fancy from a flower-bell, some one's death,
> A chorus-ending from Euripides—

and the impression may vary in intensity from a vague sense of the grand Perhaps to a veritable, indubitable theophany. A theophany is a state of clarity of the soul, in which God is palpably felt as real, present, and active. But this empirical idea of theophany is not what mythology means by "revelation"; "revelation" for it is divinely imparted information from which further ideas can be spun by processes loosely called "deductive," but more accurately "choplogic" or "*Consequenzmacherei*."

The doctrine of revealed information as the basis of theology is as follows:

"Theology is characteristically deductive: that is to say, it is based . . . upon the manifestation of a historic life, accepted as Divine. Whatever may have led up to this acceptance in the history of the individual, theology begins as theology from the acceptance of this life as a Divine revelation; and its central work consists in the exploration and appreciation of the consequences. . . . The revela-

tion itself is not the revelation of a dead text, but of a living Person. . . . It will follow that theology. . . . must be built upon a hypothesis of certain truth. . . . There must be such a thing as an orthodoxy if there is to be a theology. . . . Theology without a deposit of truth. . . would not be theology at all. . . . Divine truth is the animating possession of a corporate Church; and the man who sets himself apart from the Body loses the inner touch of the life which illuminates and informs the members of the Body. . . . Do not be taken in by the shallow fancy . . . . that the *rôle* of all-tolerating indifference is possible to the Christian theologian." *

(A still cruder form of the doctrine formerly assumed that Jesus had taught the outlines of dogmatic theology to the Apostles during "the great forty days" (Acts i. 3) and that this teaching constituted the original "revelation.")

Is it necessary to point out the obvious fallacies in this quotation? That it presupposes a well-developed idea of God? That it ignores the whole epistemology of the case ("whatever may have led," etc.)? That the revelation of God in a person is a case of an impression—not of a proposition—and that the meaning of the terms used has to be illegitimately changed before it can be identified with a "deposit" of propositions from which other propositions can be deduced? That orthodoxy, or corporately approved deductions, is unwarrantably treated as equivalent to the original revelation itself? That Christian theology did not, as an historical matter of fact, begin in this way, but rested upon pre-Christian theology—the impression of God in Christ being only very partially the content of the earliest theology? That the impression of God in Christ, as pictured in the Gospels, is not to-day a datum, but something which can only be reached (when at all) after careful study? That there are two Christs in the gospels, the Synoptic and the Johannine? Were it

* R. C. Moberly, essay on "Reason and Theology," in his *Problems and Principles.*

not so muddle-headed such an orthodoxy would be almost dishonest.

It is characteristic of the present stage of orthodox Anglican theology that it secretly or unconsciously recognizes that there is no such thing as divinely imparted information, and so it endeavours to reconstruct a revelation out of any material that may be available. First there are the former infallibilities of the Bible, the Church, and the Creeds—not indeed taken quite rigidly, but as, so to speak, approximately revealed information; secondly there is the impression conveyed to some persons by the gospel-picture of Christ, thirdly there is an undefined "experience," upon which stress is being increasingly laid. Taken together, these sources of authority are treated as giving to traditional doctrine a character tantamount to that of a revelation. But we shall not fairly start afresh until we have, in so many words, explicitly recognized that there is no such thing as revealed doctrine. If that which Christian tradition tells us of the relation of the soul to God be true, God must be discoverable, since evidences of that relation will be forthcoming. Revelation, therefore, will be unnecessary.

(d) *Ecclesiasticism*

I have so far spoken of theology in its relation to rational culture generally—of the conditions to which it must be content to be subject if it is to receive *de jure* recognition as a pursuit of truth. But real theology has also a function to fulfil within the sphere of religion itself. The same tendency to substitute emotionally toned fancies for fact which makes popular religion so logically worthless and truthless often debases and corrupts it morally. Real theology will then provide a basis and stimulus for true reform movements. It will tend to the appreciation of real as opposed to sham spirituality and so pave the way for better things. It will help to make us realize how much of falsity there has been in our ideals themselves and to give

us better standards for self-criticism. It will, that is to say, promote not only real as opposed to sham knowledge, but also real as opposed to sham religion.

The term "religion" stands for two entirely different things. On the one hand it means a certain sensibility, a certain energy, a certain activity of the soul. It is essentially creative and inspired and essentially revolutionary, ceaselessly pushing forward towards unrealized ideals. This is primary religion, or religious inspiration. In its more intense manifestations it is called prophetism, or, in another form, mysticism. On the other hand we have the products of a by-gone religious activity which have come down to us as a system of institutions, dogmas, observances, and prohibitions, and the term "religion" is often used to denote a spiritual bondage to these; * or at least such a predilection for them as to hamper the free development of the soul. This is secondary religion, or ecclesiasticism. Ecclesiasticism is the transference of too much interest from the primary objects of religion to the institutions, dogmas, traditions and practices which nominally exist to promote it, until those institutions and traditions become ends in themselves and objects of too great an authority and affection. In other cases ecclesiastical interests may have nothing beyond a nominal connexion with religion. Ecclesiasticism always contains large elements of non-religious factors, such as national or other group-feeling, with all its accompaniments. It is thus liable to many undesirable tendencies which have no direct connexion with religion.

How much it were to be wished that we Church-people could see, not merely our own individual shortcomings, but our religion, our principles, our ideals, as others see them! The fact that our practice falls so short of our profession is not the main charge against us. The charge against us is

* Reinach gives, as his (extraordinarily bad) definition of religion "A sum of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties." —*Orpheus*, p. 3 (Eng. Trans.).

that our churchmanship itself makes us more hard-hearted and unloving, more insensible to the sufferings of others, more enslaved to unspiritual convention, than even we, with all our imperfections, would otherwise have been. Who, in the past, was foremost to oppose the freedom of the slave, the enlightenment of the ignorant, the emancipation of the socially oppressed? Who was most callous to the sufferings of unfortunate criminals, of prostitutes, of the victims of our commercial system or of our military achievements? The bishops, the Church! Such is the Church-imago in the minds of millions of those who care most for the things which as Christians one ought to care for.* There is something wrong not only with our doctrinal theories but with our spirit, our outlook, and our interests.

§ 2. Christian Mythology

(a) *The Epic of Salvation*

Until comparatively recent years the theoretical side of Christianity was represented by what was really an epic, or saga, of the history of the world. Epic Christianity in its pure, unsophisticated form is belief in a wonderful series of events, past and future, leading up to the great world-climax of the Day of Judgement. Only a few thousand years have passed since, in one all-wonderful week, God created the world. For man He created it, and furnished it with sun, moon, and stars, and with plants and with all kinds

* This paragraph is fortunately rather out of date. Since about last year (1923) the popular impression of the Church as a reactionary, Chauvinistic, obscurantist, institution engaged in petty, narrow interests regardless of the real needs of the hour, has, I think, to a perceptible extent subsided and its at least would-be Christian character has become more recognized. Nevertheless the fact remains true that in every denomination and in every religion there is a tendency for the more inspired form of religion to give place to a more or less debased substitute. That tendency and that substitute are sometimes called ecclesiasticism, and even when some particular form of ecclesiasticism is on the decline the general tendency to it will remain side by side with the more spiritual impulse.

of animals and creeping things that it might form the scene of human existence. Man was to live an immortal life on earth in glad obedience to the will of God. But the Devil brought about the Fall, and thence sprang all sin, and sickness, and pain, and death. And more terrible than all earthly woes, from that Fall there came the necessity for the damnation of the whole race. There was but one remedy; an equivalent for the damnation of man could be accepted if God Himself could satisfy His own law and rescue man. To this end the Second Person of the Godhead offered Himself as a sacrifice, and the gradual preparation for the redemption of the world began. God's aim was to predispose man's heart to faith in the coming Redeemer. Hence a series of providences designed to attach a certain Semitic tribe in devotion to Himself. Hence, too, the proclamation by inspired prophets of the coming Advent of a Deliverer. Hence, also, a sacrificial system, the object of which was to adumbrate the redemptive death of the Messiah as the all-efficacious offering for sin. At last He came, born of a Virgin, heralded by angels. In three wonderful years He manifested forth the glory of God by His miracles, revealed the Truth, founded His Church, died the sacrificial death, rose from the dead, and ascended into heaven. Man is now offered pardon and heaven if he will from his heart believe in the Atoning Sacrifice and accept in faith the doctrines of the Church and will also live according to its laws. For those doctrines themselves constitute the Divine Revelation, and those laws represent the will of God. After death the souls of men remain in a state of waiting until the Second Coming of Christ. Then there will be the General Resurrection of all bodies from their tombs, to be rejoined to their souls. Then comes the last dread Day. The Judgement will take place and men will be judged according to their works and to their beliefs. Those that have done good and believed aright will go into life everlasting and those that have done evil into everlasting fire. This faith is absolutely necessary to salvation. Faith

is belief in the truth of this great world-epic. Salvation is the winning of heaven at the Day of Judgement. God's attributes are those of the Supreme Ruler and Judge. Christ's attributes, or natures, are those which enable Him to be the world's Redeemer. Revelation is the imparting of this information to the Apostles by Christ, or to Biblical writers by the Holy Ghost.

This, apart from differences of Catholic and Protestant emphasis, is the story of Salvation in brief outline. It is essentially a great cosmic epic, or drama. The only really significant events in history are those which constitute steps in its progress. The eye of the believer is ever turned backward to the miracles of the past and forward to the Archangel's trump and the Day of Judgement. Meanwhile he has his duties.

It is now realized that, with the exception of a few historical facts, the Christian Saga is purely legendary. It may be replete with moral and mystical meanings of the highest value. But first, it *is* legend, and that, not only in a few "unessential" details, but in its main structure and in the greater number of the elements which constitute it. The stories of Creation as described in the book of Genesis, the wiles of a personal Enemy of man, the Fall, the counter-scheming of God, the Divine conversations with Abraham and Moses at which certain institutions, especially devised by God, were enunciated, the miracles of the Old Testament, the Virgin Birth, a considerable proportion of the New Testament miracles, including probably all the so-called "nature-miracles," the Physical Resurrection of Christ, the Second Advent, the Day of Judgement, even the beautiful and moving story of the second chapter of the Epistle to the Philippians, and therewith the great proof of the Love of God, that He "gave" or "gave up" His Only Son for us men and for our salvation – in all this we have before us epic, not literal fact.

It is not until one has reached this point that one is in a position even to face the problem of the modern Church.

Our trouble is, not that this or that Old Testament narrative is incredible, nor even that the basis upon which the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation, as set forth in the Athanasian Creed, were formulated, is cut away, but that we can no longer say, except after a very pallid fashion, "God so loved the world," or "Our Lord Jesus Christ, though He was rich, yet for your sakes became poor, that ye through His poverty might become rich," and that "the gospel of the Risen Christ" has lost more than half its power. We are left wondering how we can have held such a creed and have been so little moved by it.

(b) *Immortality*

The motive-interest or plot of the Epic of Salvation was the attainment of immortal life in heaven. Must we conclude that the doctrine of immortality is mythological? Not necessarily so. It may, that is to say, in some cases rest upon a basis quite other than those psychic processes upon which myths rest; it may, for instance, be the result of a critical study of the *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychical Research, or of such considerations as those to be found in Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 185. But it is *usually* mythological in structure. It is usually the product of phantasies, of wish-fulfilments of an essentially infantile character, and it is this aspect of the doctrine which makes it popular. Such a hymn, for instance, as "On the Resurrection morning" is sheer mythology. It is therefore a doctrine which, at the present stage of the religious development of the Church, tends to be linked on to the more regressive tendencies of the mind and to impart a reactionary, morally backward character to religion.

Ethically, the doctrine of immortality tends towards the withdrawal of moral interest from human relationships and its transference to transcendental realms. *Hymns Ancient and Modern* (apart from those for the young) exemplify this very clearly. This world with all its moral issues is

swallowed up by the next, and the influence of the doctrine of the future life tends to give an association of reckoning, or score-keeping, to all the Church's ethics. "For the great Day thyself prepare." All this diminishes our power of seeing the ideal in the real, the moral in the commonplace, heaven as a possibility of earth. It is not religion that does this; it is not belief in God. It is belief in immortality. Is it an accident that we find the social-ethical side of religion most marked in an Amos, a Hosea, a Micah, a Jeremiah? These were deeply religious men, but they looked for no resurrection of the dead, no life in a world to come.

It is not possible, in this place, to review the evidence in favour of survival. Different persons will estimate it very differently. But whatever be our view of existing evidence, it is evidence which must decide and neither positive dogma glorified as faith nor negative dogma glorified as science. It is not, strictly speaking, a matter for faith at all. An assumption may be called faith if it be the genuine outcome of the truest religious attitude of which a man is capable. Thus faith might prompt belief in personal survival on the ground of God's goodness. But when it is pointed out that our view of God's goodness ought not to be determined by narrowly egoistic interests and affections, that we have got to see things as they are and then judge them to be very good in spite of the smallness of our share in them—not, *vice versa*, first to argue that things are good, then interpret this egoistically, and finally conclude that our share is nothing less than bliss for evermore; that it may not be within the power of God to arrange for the eternal existence of the human personality; that it may be morally and spiritually far better to have to learn to regard our share in the life and work of God as our good and our portion to be realized here and now; that true resignation to the will of God, true seeking first the Kingdom of God, true moral choice, true sacrifice, does not demand a *quid pro quo*—when we realize these things the

postulate of immortality ceases to be faith. It ceases to be a prophecy of Spirit and becomes a mere desire sprung from the instincts of Nature.

Religion cannot, except upon the assumption of a quite untenable view of revelation, know whether there is such a thing as personal survival or not. It can only deal with our attitude towards the uncertainty. On the one hand we ought not to shut our minds to the wonderful possibilities which the universe may hold. There is a deeply spiritual side to the hope of immortality, and that hope should not be lightly abandoned. On the other, there is true Spirit in these words of St. Kate of Genoa :

" As to the annihilation of man which has to be made in God she spoke thus : Take a piece of bread and eat it. When you have eaten it its substance goes to nourish the body. . . . Now if that bread were to say to you, ' Why dost thou remove me from my being? if I could I would defend myself to conserve myself, an action natural to every creature,' you would answer, ' Bread, thy being was ordained for a support for my body, a body which is worth more than thou; and hence thou oughtest to be more content with thine end than with thy being. Live for thine end, and thou wilt not care about thy being.' " *

Thus the provisional rejection, or at least the ignoring, of the doctrine of immortality is a principle of *method* for any theology which aspires to the position of a science of realities. As such it must allow itself to be determined by evidence; its ideas of God, of man, of the purpose of life must be interpretations of facts actually given. But the tendency arising from an acceptance of the doctrine of immortality is to discount facts and to dispense with real inference and interpretation. We reach conclusion after

* Von Hügel, *The Mystical Element in Religion*, p. 270. All my references to St. Kate are taken from this book. This thinker of deep thoughts suffers from not being known by her own name, Kate (Caterinetta). There are so many St. Catherines that individuality is obscured, and the continual repetition of the words " of Genoa " is clumsy.

conclusion, and all without a scrap of evidence beyond unverifiable assumptions as to the next world. On the strength of wishes, sentiments, and of rather uncritical moral feelings we postulate immortality and then we use this postulate exactly as though it were a datum. This is manifestly unscientific. We must form our ideas of God and of his relation to man without making any assumptions as to a hereafter; we must "accept the universe," apparent personal annihilation included. Having framed a world-view on such a basis we may speculate as to a life to come, and if we are not morbid we shall hope that there may be one after all. But we cannot legitimately assume such a hope to be a fact and then utilize it, as though it were a known truth, in dealing with the problems of evil, judgement, redemption, salvation, and the like.

The question of immortality, for instance, makes but little difference to the doctrine of redemption, or indeed to any other well-grounded idea, except in that it provides a speculative completion to it. If redemptive processes are discoverable they can be described independently of the idea of immortality. If they cannot be described and their laws roughly indicated these redemptive processes are probably imaginary. The hereafter so introduced can be nothing but the here and now written large. If we are becoming progressively conscious of a deep harmony with the sources of our being, with the power and joy and peace which that involves, we may hope that the good work which has been begun in us may be carried to completion hereafter. If however we remain bound to the end in spite of all struggles and prayers the only conclusion which we can draw is that we are destined to eternal damnation. But such salvation and damnation are at best only pictures of the earthly success or failure magnified to infinitude, and if the enlargements are true to life it ought to be possible to produce the originals in proof. Inferences as to immortality may be based upon any knowledge which we may have with regard to redemption. But two doctrines,

if each of them is not otherwise established, cannot be rendered probable by inferring each from the other.

Perhaps the truth is that the soul of every man is a factor, facet, nucleus, centre, or growing point, in God. As such it is immortal with the immortality of God, holy with the Divine holiness, pure and untouched by sin because God is so. This is my self within my heart, greater than the heavens, greater than these worlds. This ages not with the aging of the body and dies not with its death. This is the Soul, averse from all evil, free from old age, from sickness and from death. In this sense St. Kate of Genoa, who bade us not to care for personal existence, could say, "My Me is God, nor know I other selfhood save in Him." Man's *soul* is therefore immortal. And each may have produced numberless transient personalities since this earth was formed, and may yet produce myriads more. But if by the soul we mean the conscious personality with memory, character, sense of self-identity, and the like, which are functions of the soul in contact with Nature, not the soul itself, then the doctrine of conscious survival is at least doubtful. True or false, its ethical influence at the present day is on the whole regrettable, and I think that the balance of argument is also against it.

In speaking thus I have no wish to argue against a belief, or "overbelief," in immortality. The overbeliefs of an individual represent his personal reaction to the ideas of his environment, and so long as these personal reactions are admitted to possess validity only for the individual they are legitimate and may happen to be true. But such overbeliefs are constructed out of hopes, impressions, tastes, feelings of many kinds. A belief so generated can obviously claim no objective validity unless it receive independent verification. As hopes or other feelings they may nevertheless have a certain rightness. And so is it, surely, in the case of the idea of immortality. This represents right hopes, right feelings, right longings. And these feelings may lead to the overbelief in immortality. But objective theology

cannot recognize such as valid doctrines. The idea of immortality belongs to the sphere of hope and love, but not to that of faith * or of knowledge.

(c) *The Idea of God*

The passing of mythology means more than the dropping of literal belief in the stories themselves. It involves the abandonment of the kind of ideas about God which find expression in them. A myth presents a story about God acting in some remarkable way. When it ceases to be believed the idea of the kind of being which God may be presumed to be if he exists at all may still remain and prevent the growth of any fresh and vital conception of him from taking root. The idea of God derived from the Epic of Salvation, commonly called "the popular idea of God," is that of a separate individual outside the universe, independent of it, and existent before it was created. He was regarded as standing in social relations with men, hearing their prayers, responding as he thought fit, blessing and punishing them from time to time, and interposing in the course of Nature by means of miracles. This idea of God is closely modelled upon relationships obtaining in human society, and just as in human society a man responds to the speech or actions of his fellow by means of some response directed specifically to the person who has addressed him, so God is regarded, according to the popular idea of him, as taking specific note of individuals and as answering their prayers by means of a specifically willed response. And now that the dramatic world-view of which the popular idea of God was a part is vanishing man must either have a new idea of God or none. W. James remarks:

* It seems to me that we should distinguish two kinds of personal constructs of a non-rational character. One kind is the product of the feelings and impressions of the individual as such. Following James, I have called these "overbeliefs." The other seems to be of a deeper kind and to spring from a higher and more universal element in man independent of his individual fortunes. The assurance of the reality of goodness is a reaction of this kind—the kind which alone should be called faith.

" Those of us who are sexagenarians have witnessed in our persons one of those gradual changes of intellectual climate due to innumerable influences, that make the thought of a past generation seem as foreign to its successor as the expression of a different race of men. The theological machinery that spoke so livingly to our ancestors, with its finite age of the world, its creation out of nothing, its juridical morality and eschatology, its relish for rewards and punishments, its treatment of God as an external contriver, an ' intelligent and moral governor,' sounds as odd to most of us as if it were some outlandish savage religion." *

We require, however, some provisional idea of God if we are to proceed on the basis of the affirmative hypothesis. From a practical standpoint also a new world-picture is needed. For the sake, therefore, of presenting a provisional alternative I add the following view derived from Christian, but perhaps not always orthodox, sources. It might be called " Organic Theism."

The universe is a living organism, and God is the immanent and personal soul of it. Looked at from without it appears as a machine acting in accordance with mechanical laws. So does the human body, yet it possesses an immanent life and mind. Let us imagine a cell in the body to become conscious. To it the body would appear as a soulless mechanism. Surrounded by other cells, it would be able to discover only the mechanical laws operating in the various bodily processes. Were such a cell to form the conception of a personal and purposive consciousness beyond those surrounding masses of muscular tissue how fanciful, how gratuitous, would the hypothesis appear ! Yet it would be true. Such, too, may be the truth of the great world-organism in which we live.

The nature and character of the universe is reproduced in that of the individuals which it contains. Every unit within it is a monad, a living universe upon a small scale, a microcosm which reflects and reproduces the macrocosm.

* *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 29.

The great significance of man in this system is twofold: we know man from the inside, other monads only from the outside, and secondly, man possesses a more highly developed internal aspect, or mind, than any other terrestrial being. Man is therefore by far the best keyhole which we possess to the internal aspect of the universe, the mind of God.

Now let us revert to the analogy of the cell in the body. The organism in which it lived would be personal in itself, but impersonal in its relations with the cell. Similarly on the normal level of human life there may be no definite interaction between man and God, no specifically willed response on God's part to human prayer and sacrament. God, relatively to the individual, may consist of an infinite series of higher capacities than anything hitherto realized. How to realize these man must himself discover. We are in the midst of a universal life, but our share in it, and the share of society as a whole in it, must come through right knowledge and right effort on man's part. It is God that worketh in us both to will and to do, but if our principles are mistaken, however innocently, and our efforts misdirected, our prayers for divine assistance will be of no avail.

Nevertheless it may be possible for men, or for some men, to attain to such a harmony with themselves and with the inner life of the universe that experiences become possible which are equivalent to a social response of an external deity to human prayers. Only instead of regarding that response as coming from without we shall now look upon it as the response of the God awakened within. But it is only an awakened God who can respond, and upon the normal level of experience God is not awakened. When such response occurs it occurs as the result of methods which conform alike to psychological laws and to the demands of true religion.

This view of God is substantially the traditional religious one with its attributes of goodness, responsiveness, and

personality, but without mythology and without that idea of transitive divine action from outside the universe which is characteristic of mythology. It is these attributes of goodness, responsiveness, and selfhood which give the idea of God a value for human life such as no Absolute which transcended these could possess.

These remarks are intended only as a preliminary indication of the direction which some of our later discussions will take, and not as the formulation of a theory.

CHAPTER II

MEDICAL THEOLOGY

§ 1. Spiritual Healing

(a) *Bishops, Priests, and Doctors*

Our aim being the discovery of God in the sphere of objective reality we have now to turn to some particular department, or departments, of experience in search of suitable material. For if there is a God, and if he responds to the prayers of men, there must be some sphere, or spheres, of life in which this takes place. And the fields of experience in which the power of God is most confidently asserted to be effectively operative are the salvation of the soul from the power of sin, the experience of guidance and strengthening grace, the healing of the sick, and the casting out of "devils," *i.e.* complexes, neuroses. Here are some definite points with reference to which faith may come to the test. The alternative is for religion to shrink from every definite issue and lose itself in a maze of muzzy phrases which sound pretentious but which mean nothing in particular.

It is not enough for theology to append to natural science a literary essay on God and Nature in general. Nature consists of particular things, all of which have a "particular go," and people think in terms of those particular goes. And if there be a spiritual basis and background of things it ought to be to some extent discoverable in the laws of their behaviour. What holds good of the flower in the crannied wall will hold good of all biology, and a rigorous application of the Method of Residues should lead to the discovery, naming and co-ordination of facts which are

intelligible only upon supernaturalist assumptions. We should then have theological supplements to physics, to biology, to psychology, and the other sciences. But this would take us rather far from human needs and from what are at present the more distinctive interests of religion. It is better to concentrate upon the fundamental issue of spiritual causation and to view it, first in relation to miracles of healing (chap. ii. § 1), and then to popular religion and current psychotherapy (chap. ii. § 2).

Here we are not entitled to make use of the proposition that God works through natural means and that therefore the importance of miracles should not be exaggerated. For that implies that we already possess a knowledge of God, and cannot therefore be urged in any endeavour to establish the reality of such knowledge. And even if it be conceded that God does work through natural means the further question remains as to whether he responds to prayer or to any other method of approach.

Nor can we take refuge in the statement that religion has to consider the whole man and not only his health. That is, of course, a right point of view for the parish priest. But when we are conducting an enquiry into the reality of spiritual causality we are bound to keep specific effects in view and not content ourselves with the vague hope that even if our ministrations do nothing towards promoting bodily health they may do the patient moral good, and that if the moral benefit is no more obvious than the physical some invisible good seed may yet have been sown which may germinate later on. Such a point of view is often right enough in practice, in medicine no less than in preaching. But it cannot be the attitude of science, whether natural or theological.

It will be convenient to take as our starting-point the Report of the Archbishop's Committee on spiritual healing.* I venture to criticize that Report upon the ground that in principle it almost entirely abandons the basis upon which

* *The Ministry of Healing*, S.P.C.K., January 1924.

the religious position rests. Its religion, though sincerely meant, will be found, upon analysis, to be merely verbal, owing to the substitution of naturalistic presuppositions for those of faith, not here and there, but from beginning to end of the Report. This fact is concealed by the reverent tone which doctors and clergy alike have maintained. But the actual meaning expressed is almost pure naturalism. For, with the exception of two phrases on p. 15, the Report merely catalogues current medical methods, applies religious terms to them, and proposes certain devotional practices *as a means of applying those methods*. The healing itself is treated as a process of natural, psychological law, religious methods consisting merely in the choice of devotional means for producing the desired mental effect; if a person were a spiritualist and not a churchman an alleged spirit-message would presumably, on these principles, serve the purpose better than a sacrament. Indeed, the Committee has been honest enough to admit in so many words that it has "found no evidence of any cases of healing which cannot be paralleled by similar cures wrought by psychotherapy without religion," and declares that "faith works irrespectively of the grounds on which it rests." In the Report this last remark refers only to cases of purely physical healing, but no reasons are adduced for supposing that this is not always the case. The only passage in the Report which seems to indicate a faith in any supernatural agency is the following: "Spiritual healing aims at the strengthening of the whole life . . . by emphasizing the true relationship of the patient to God, and by helping him to realize the healing presence of Christ. . . . The result, when attained, will be spiritual, and indicates a spiritual cause at work." In these words we catch a faint echo of a faith held in other circles, but the Report does not explain what it means by the phrases "the healing presence of Christ" and "a spiritual cause at work," and its meaning is in any case too vague to admit of definition. It does, however (absurdly enough,

surely), define " spiritual healing " as " that which makes use of all or any of these factors "—*i.e.* surgery, drugs, diet, suggestion, psycho-analysis, prayers and sacraments—" in reliance upon God." It is so unreal to talk in this way; as though anyone ever said or meant, " You had better take a dose of ammoniated quinine in reliance upon God and go to bed; trusting in divine omnipotence I will presently bring you up a glass of hot grog." The fact seems to be that the Committee has been so anxious to smite the common foe of the Church and the medical profession, the Christian Scientists, that it has thrown the baby away with the bath-water and given us, except for the echo already quoted, pure naturalism in the phraseology of devotion. Nor is the lack of faith which the document displays to be found only in the logical implications of expressions used; we are bidden not to trust exclusively to God. " Spiritual healing," the Report says, and the context shows that it means healing through prayer and sacrament, " must not exclude medical means." It lays " little stress upon merely physical results," for " it is not the function of the Church to apply its means of restoration if no higher end is sought than the recovery of bodily health." There is, in fact, a painful sense running through the Report of the danger of trusting to Omnipotence, but consciousness shrinks from this admission, and so the rationalization is resorted to which declares that merely physical results are not the concern of the Church. This principle is in direct opposition to the example of Jesus. For all his miracles of healing were concerned with " merely physical results," except the case of the paralytic, in which physical results and forgiveness of sins were combined. Similarly in all Christ's teachings we are told emphatically that " All things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive." It is significant that the Report does not quote, or refer to, any of the miracles or maxims of Jesus except in a few cases as instances of the laying on of hands.

I have dealt with this Report at some length because it illustrates so well the point which I am trying to insist upon in this chapter, namely, that unless an act of God can be to some extent isolated, verified, and grasped in its difference from natural processes, the case for religion, as we have hitherto conceived it, is gone. For although all natural processes may be regarded as products of, or elements in, the Absolute, and the Absolute be *called* God, yet the God of religion is the God of specific response to prayer, and it will not be possible to react to the idea of such a God even in phantasy apart from belief in the real occurrence of acts of God. It is faith in this God which the Report has tacitly treated as obsolete. When therefore the Committee complains that some exponents of medical psychology have "propagated views that are subversive of . . . religious principles" I cannot but feel that no such literature is so damaging to religion as this Report itself, which dares neither act upon the supernaturalism which it professes nor profess the naturalism upon which it acts.

This criticism is not intended to apply to the medical members of the Committee. It was not their special function to represent the cause of supernaturalism: they have merely received the submission of the Church. And although I think that the part played by the clerical members has been a very weak one I say it with all respect, believing that this mixture of practical naturalism and verbal orthodoxy has been forced upon them by the present position of the Anglican tradition.

The important question, surely, is as to the nature of the causality in cases of spiritual healing. It is admitted that in some cases religious methods operate, and operate effectively, in ways that make the assumption of any supernatural agency unnecessary, and the question is whether this is not always the case. If so, our conclusion must be that the experience of sickness and health affords no evidence for the existence of a responsive God. If, on

the other hand, an apparently supernatural response is sometimes evoked we shall be led to study the conditions under which this happens, and so, instead of deciding upon our methods upon patristic and liturgical grounds, and the like, we shall have to base our theory and practice upon the ascertained laws of the response of God. This point of view gives us at least a definite conception of spiritual healing: spiritual healing is healing through the agency of Spirit, as contrasted with healing through the direct operation of physical or psychical means. Is there *ever* a transcendental cause at work, and if so, what more can we say about it? Personally I am not prepared to reject the superstitious hypothesis until it has been fairly stated and fairly tested, and I feel that, this being our object, there is a certain snobbishness in confining our attention to "societies working within the Church" and to theories current in orthodox schools of medicine.

The following quotation from William James * has a bearing on these points:

"If one should make a division of all thinkers into naturalists and supernaturalists, I should undoubtedly have to go, along with most philosophers, into the supernaturalist branch. But there is a crasser and a more refined supernaturalism, and it is to the refined division that most philosophers at the present day belong. Refined supernaturalism is universalistic supernaturalism; for the 'crasser' variety 'piecemeal' supernaturalism would perhaps be a better name. It admits miracles and providential leadings, and finds no intellectual difficulty in mixing the ideal and the real worlds together by interpolating influences from the ideal region among the forces that causally determine the real world's details. In this the refined supernaturalists think that it muddles disparate

* *Varieties of Religious Experience.* The first paragraph of this quotation, slightly condensed, is from the Postscript, the second and third, which are not continuous in the original, are from the last chapter. But the subject, the defence of the actual truth of religion, understood as "piecemeal supernaturalism," is the same in both, the Postscript having been added to make the point of the preceding chapter clearer.

dimensions of existence. For them the world of the ideal has no efficient causality, and never bursts into the world of phenomena at particular points.* Notwithstanding my own inability to accept either popular Christianity or scholastic theism, I suppose that my belief that in communion with the Ideal new force comes into the world, and new departures are made here below, subject me to being classed among the supernaturalists of the piecemeal or crasser type. Universalistic supernaturalism surrenders, it seems to me, too easily to naturalism. It takes the facts of physical science at their face value, and leaves the laws of life just as naturalism finds them, with no hope of remedy, in case their fruits are bad. It confines itself to sentiments about life as a whole, sentiments which may be admiring and adoring, but which need not be so, as the existence of systematic pessimism proves. In this universalistic way of taking the ideal world the essence of practical religion seems to me to evaporate. Both instinctively and for logical reasons I find it hard to believe that principles can exist which make no difference to facts. But all facts are particular facts, and the interest of the question of God's existence seems to me to lie in the consequences for particulars which that existence may be expected to entail.†

"What is this but to say that Religion, in her fullest exercise of function, is not a mere illumination of facts already elsewhere given, not a mere passion, like love, which views things in a rosier light. It is indeed that, as we have seen abundantly. But it is something more, namely, a postulator of new *facts* as well. The world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic world over again, with an altered expression; it must have, over and above the altered expression, *a natural constitution* different at some point from that which a materialistic world would have. It must be such that different events can be expected in it, different conduct must be required.‡

"I think, therefore, that however particular questions connected with our individual destinies may be answered, it is only by acknowledging them as genuine questions, and living in the sphere of thought which they open up, that we become profound. But to live thus is to be religious; so I unhesitatingly repudiate the survival-theory of religion

* Pp. 520, 521, condensed. † Pp. 521–522.
‡ P. 518.

(that religion is probably only an anachronism, a case of 'survival,' an atavistic relapse into a mode of thought which humanity in its more enlightened examples has outgrown), as being founded on an egregious mistake. It does not follow, because our ancestors made so many errors of fact and mixed them with their religion, that we should therefore leave off being religious at all. Even the errors of fact may possibly turn out not to be as wholesale as the scientist assumes. We saw in Lecture IV how the religious conception of the universe seems to many mind-curers 'verified' from day to day by their experience of fact. 'Experience of fact' is a field with so many things in it that the sectarian scientist, methodically declining, as he does, to recognize such 'facts' as mind-curers and others like them experience, otherwise than by such rude heads of classification as 'bosh,' 'rot,' 'folly,' certainly leaves out a mass of raw fact which, save for the industrious interest of the religious in the more personal aspects of reality, would never have succeeded in getting itself recorded at all." *

(b) *Miracles of Healing*

The purpose of the present discussion is to determine whether there is any real difference between spiritual healing and mental healing, and if so, whether the former can reasonably be regarded as, at least in part, involving the operation of some transcendental agency. If there is such an agency we shall ultimately have to ask how far we can rightly speak of it as God. But this is a metaphysical question which belongs to another chapter. Our immediate question is as to whether there really is a specific healing agency, appearing to us as God, which is not identical with those involved in such processes as hypnotism and autosuggestion. These latter may be called mental, as opposed to spiritual, methods, and I am here assuming that faith-healing is a special instance of this class. All healing through laying on of hands may be classed as magnetic healing. The fact that a magnetic healer may

* Pp. 500, 501.

find prayer essential for the maintenance of his own powers does not affect this distinction. So far as healing comes through physical contact we may call it magnetic healing, and so far as it operates through suggestion it may be called mental healing, whatever be its religious accompaniments. Prayer is not in itself an agency; it may contribute to this or that effect, but it has not yet been proved to be an agency *sui generis*. It may, for instance, awaken hope and assurance; so far as it does so it is one of the methods employed in mental healing. So far as it stimulates a magnetizer's powers it is incidental to magnetic healing. Our question therefore is, not how far religious methods are really curative, but whether there exists an agency of a specific kind which can not analytically be reduced to some kind of mental or physical healing which has no close connexion with the idea of God. And we shall not be able to distinguish that agency unless we first have a fairly clear idea of what it is not. It is not the same thing as religious healing, for religious healing may involve many elements; it is not faith-healing or reliance upon prayer pure and simple as these terms are generally understood. To discover its real nature we must first be familiar with what *prima facie* it appears to be.

Now when anyone has any experience of cases of apparent spiritual healing the impression will often be made that these are somehow different from those of simple mental healing. They seem to spring from a different level of being and to involve activities of a different order. In spiritual healing there seems to be something at work which is more deeply seated than the processes of mental healing, and the change which it effects is in the first place less particularized. It is more analogous to conversion; a general change of attitude takes place in the patient's mind and the particular effect desired is based upon and follows from this general attitude. The mind as a whole in its most fundamental determination is somehow brought to bear upon the particular issue and the cure is effected because no other

state of body can harmonize with such an attitude of soul. In mental healing, on the other hand, the suggested idea operates independently. The idea " these scissors are very hot " is suggested to a person who is then touched with them and a blister comes. Similarly the idea " you are not burnt " may be suggested to a person who has touched an iron that is really hot and a cure may be effected. The healing thought here operates more or less independently of the rest of the contents of the mind and as an isolated element *within* it.* In the case of spiritual healing, on the other hand, it seems as though some agency *behind* the psyche and deeper than the psyche first puts the latter straight and then stimulates it to produce a healthful action upon the body. Mental healing keeps the idea of the production of a specific organic effect in view; these or those particular organs shall function in this or that particular way. Spiritual healing pays but little regard to symptoms, but induces a new mental atmosphere, an atmosphere in which disease can not live.

The difference may be expressed by means of a distinction between one-level and two-level processes. Mental healing is a one-level process; spiritual healing, on the other hand, proceeds on two. The processes of mental healing may be present in spiritual healing also, but they are induced by a process of a deeper order. The differentia, therefore, of spiritual healing should not be sought primarily in its religious character nor in the absence of the processes of mental healing, but in the regulation of those processes by a deeper something. " That which dwelling in the mind is other than the mind; which the mind knows not; the body of which the mind is; which from within controls the mind; that is thy soul, the inner

* Cf. Dr. Ernest Jones: " The characteristic of suggestion lies in the free development of the effects of communicated ideas . . . through the inhibition of the criticizing ideas customarily operative." (Article on " The Nature of Autosuggestion " in the *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, Vol. III, Part 3.)

control, the immortal." * It is in this sense of something other and beyond the empirically observable processes of mind that we use the word " transcendental."

The next proof of the truth of this theory is the fact that it works; evidence is there in abundance.† I will quote one instance from my own experience; I am not, I may add, personally a Christian Scientist.

One day in March 1922 on entering a certain house I found that the only child of the couple living there—a little girl of five—was seriously ill with pneumonia. Her stamina had already been undermined by a previous attack. The doctor had called and without actually saying that the child was dying he left both parents with the impression that that was the case. Her temperature then was 104 degrees, and the father told me that the doctor had said that this temperature would last three days, that then the crisis would come, and it was very doubtful whether she had the stamina to pull through. This was on Monday night. I immediately wrote to a Christian Science practitioner enclosing a photo of the child and asking for two treatments for her. The child rallied within an hour or two from the time when my letter was received, and within about thirty hours she was well. The practitioner lived four or five miles away and never saw the child.

The conclusions thus based upon evidence and introspection are supported by another experience. Who is not conscious, when he is in the presence of some exceptionally pure and spiritual character, that he is the better for it? Intercourse with great souls purifies. This fact is recognized and described by means of such terms as " personal influence " or " vibrations." It is possible that

* From the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, but with neuter pronouns in place of the masculines of the original.

† It is true that the published evidence is only that of success; the failures are not so easily discovered. But, so far as the general public goes, this is equally true of all other therapeutic methods whether physical or mental. Moreover, in those cases in which controlling ideas prevent the discipline of realization from being carried out, of course the method will, on its own principles, fail.

it is a special application of the wider principle that Spirit organizes, and when misdevelopments have taken place reorganizes, both soul and body, but requires other personalities as centres of activity from whence it can act telepathically upon the person benefited. All such influence, if it exists and cannot be explained as a product of the animal instincts and of sense perception, is miraculous—*i.e.* is the product of spiritual causality. If this action takes place within the moral sphere, why should the evidence for it in the physical be so scouted?

Finally, for some of us, there is still Jesus. It was in the power of the Spirit that he healed, and therefore his healings were "signs," or, as we now call them, miracles. When the messengers of John asked him whether he was he that should come he replied: "Report to John these miracles of healing." When the Pharisees said that he worked through evil influences he replied, "If I—or, for the matter of that, your own disciples—by the finger of God cast out devils, no doubt the Kingdom of God is here." When he healed the paralytic he treated miracles of healing and the forgiveness of sins as parallel manifestations of the same divine authority given to man. He invariably treated the Kingdom of God as the realm of Spirit so organized as to be operative to the healing of all evils of whatsoever kind. It is strange that those who believe on him should disbelieve the causality of Spirit.

The great difficulty with regard to proof of the miraculous character of these cures arises from the fact that the medical profession will not diagnose and certify cases not under their control. Proof of wonders is therefore unobtainable, not because none occur, but because the only people whose testimony is believed refuse to testify. Their point of view is quite intelligible. Medicine is primarily a trade and neither a public service nor a philanthropic institution. The maintenance of health is very nearly a monopoly of the medical profession, and very naturally doctors will not co-operate with any attempt to take it in part out of their

hands. Just as the conduct of grocers and lawyers is intelligible on human lines, so is that of any other profession, including that of the wonderful medicine-man. The maintenance of life, the maintenance of justice, and the maintenance of health are all modes of service of the community. But these occupations have also their commercial aspect, and the commercial aspect of medicine accounts for a great deal, without its being true that doctors are, as Mr. Shaw thinks, " exceptionally venal."

A similar case is that of lay psycho-analysts. The doctors naturally do not appreciate their existence and try to frighten people with the idea of the hell which awaits those who resort to them. I believe this danger of lay analysis as compared with the safety of medical analysis to be illusory. I have myself been through several courses of analysis. The most efficient practitioner was a lay-woman; by far the most incompetent (as I subsequently realized when I had acquired some knowledge of the subject) was a fairly well-known doctor who was a psycho-therapeutic specialist, though he had never been analysed himself. I have, indeed, heard of the case of a woman who committed suicide after paying, I think, two visits to a lady lay-analyst. What the doctors do not tell us is that this woman had been through a course of psycho-analysis with a qualified doctor and that those two, or it may have been three, visits to the lay analyst had nothing whatever to do with the state of mind in which she found herself.

Other alleged dangers to the community are herbalists, anti-vaccinationists, and all who dispute any current medical dogma. I do not feel that any of these classes get fair treatment, and in the case of Christian Scientists and mind-curers generally our appreciation of the causality which may reside in the spiritual aspect of the universe is being sacrificed to a vested interest.

If we may assume that the facts are substantially as reported there remains the question as to what interpretation should be put upon them. It might be said, simply, that

these cases show that the range of power of suggestion is wider than had been supposed and that it is possible to transmit it by means of telepathy. But the language in which the spiritual healers express the matter fits the facts equally well and perhaps brings out their significance better. That there are in man two minds, or two levels of mind, which possess opposite characters and tendencies, that the higher mind has both an individual aspect (as this or that person's true self) and a universal aspect (as God), that this higher mind is brought into operation through the practice of realization, and that it manifests itself as a principle of harmony and well-being—all this is compatible with the use of the term " suggestion " and the use of that term is compatible with this interpretation. The real existence of the various entities described by physics has, on various grounds, been doubted. But Nature behaves as though they were real and they are counted and treated as real. In the same way God is empirically real if he be treated as a higher mind immanent in, but other than, Nature and not as an invisible man outside it.

The conception of Spirit is thus in the first place an empirical one; it *seems as though* there were two, more or less antagonistic, principles within us; it *seems as though* the one were the principle of a worthy life, the other of self-indulgence, selfishness, and the like; it *seems as though* the one consisted of superficial reactions determined from without, while the other were something unitary and deep within; it *seems as though* the one were a pulse of world-life beating through us, the other something supernatural and divine which visited us. Psychologists will explain the higher forms of mind as evolved from the lower, Spirit (if one must use such an objectionable word) as the sum of socially useful sublimations and reaction-formations, but all as essentially one, and more fundamentally low mind than high mind. But surely for theology the dualism of Nature and Spirit is of crucial importance, and therefore alongside of evolutionary psychology it must formulate

a "noology" of its own. It must employ its own categories and systematize its material in its own way, refusing to recognize in psychological doctrines more than a partial account of the truth.

We may next ask how this idea of Spirit is thinkable as a rational concept. Are we to imagine two kinds of mind of uncertain boundary mixed up in the same creature? Perhaps we may tentatively formulate the conception as follows:

Life is hypostatically real, and exists prior to the evolutionary process. It is one, but possessed of two systems of determination. One of these is Spirit, or life organized as divine. Its principal attributes are self-determination, goodness, and creativity—*i.e.* the organization, integration, and control of the somewhat refractory *hyle*, or material in which it works. For Spirit is dynamic and seeks to express itself, and in expressing itself it endeavours to impart its own selfhood to its object.

But life possesses another system of characters, which we call Nature. In this system life is originally indeterminate, but acquires form and content through the evolutionary process. It is subject to determination from without—*i.e.* each particular mind, organism or other product of life is determined by its environment. Each finite mind, soul, or life, therefore, can be viewed as in two dimensions, or as organized on two very different planes, namely Nature and Spirit. The mind, or soul, of man in so far as it is determined by environment, by experience, by its own past history, is generally called, in medical psychology, "the psyche." It provides the subject for empirical psychology. In its unattractive aspects it is called, by St. Paul, "carnal mind," "the flesh," "the natural man," and by Christian Scientists "mortal mind." The psyche may be regarded as that side of mind which is or has been in contact with the external world and has become shaped thereby, thus receiving an empirical character and content. It comprises both the individual and the collective psyche.

Now if a cure be effected along the lines of natural causation in accordance with psychical laws that cure is a case of mental, not of spiritual healing, whether the apparatus employed be of a religious character or not. But if the cure follow as a result of somehow, and to some extent, bringing that latent higher organization into play it will have been effected, at least in part, by transcendental agency, and the case can be called one of true spiritual healing.

The possible mechanism in cases of spiritual action will be discussed in the next section when the subject of moral regeneration will be dealt with. Meanwhile we content ourselves with a more general treatment of the question. The testimony of introspection has already been referred to. It assures us, not only of the deep-going contrast of Spirit and Nature, but also of the apparent fact that certain processes of healing belong to the sphere of Spirit. Spirit is experienced, not only as the enemy of wickedness, but also as the principle of harmony, the giver of life and of health.

(c) *The Mind-curer's Faith*

We turn now to the aspect of spiritual healing as seen from within the point of view of faith. Here we have two main schools of thought. The first is that of traditional religion. It tells us that when God is petitioned in faith he hears the prayer and answers it in accordance with his wisdom, his love, and his almighty power. I do not enlarge upon this point of view because I believe it to be bound up with deistic views of interpersonal causation dealt with in the next chapter, and because it stands in no relation to the evidence. Although a few particular cases of healing may be explained in this way this view is neither derived from particular cases nor does it recognize the necessity of empirical verification. The second school of thought is based upon the idea of the present reality of a higher order of existence more truly existent than the illusions of sense and feeling. It is represented by such writers as Mr.

Quimby,* Mrs. Eddy,† Mr. Trine,‡ and the theosophists §; their differences need not detain us. I will speak of them collectively as Spiritual Scientists.

Spiritual Science declares that Good, even in the diseased, is real; God is real; health of mind and body are real; but they have to be made more effectively real *for us* by being realized. Is this equivalent to hypnotism? No, say Spiritual Scientists, for hypnotism in practice means the surrender of one's mind to be worked upon by tricks and "malpractices" of one kind or another, such as the induction of trance-states. God, truth, reality, are disregarded, and in place of a clear, intelligent grip on the true principles of well-being the mind relies upon its capacity for unthinking response to suggestion; it avails itself of its own imbecility in order to gain strength. Realization is a fully personal act of a very high order; hypnotism involves the surrender of personality. Repudiate such "malpractices"; repudiate a feeble-minded dependence upon drugs, doctors and the like. Trust in God, in knowledge, in the God-given powers of the soul to master, open-eyed, the morbid conditions that have come upon it. All diseased conditions, whether moral or physical, are conquerable through God. Regard them as the consequences of omnipotent matter and they will conquer you: see in them but the consequences of your failing to take the trouble to control this non-entity, matter, which, with all its products, only exists because thinking makes it so, and health will return. A similar line of thought applies to sin. Whatever you treat as real, strong, terrible, becomes real, strong, terrible, for you. Identify yourself in thought with the unfallen image of God in your soul, and temptation will lose its power.

This general position is supported by a system of meta-

* *The Quimby Manuscripts*, by H. Dresser.
† *Science and Health*.
‡ *In Tune with the Infinite*.
§ Munday, *Studies in Self-healing*.

physics derived from the Bible. The one ultimate reality is God, Spirit, in whom all things live and move and have their being. God is Life, Mind, together with all the objects of his ideal creation, the Kingdom of God. Man as he exists in God is man's true self, the image of God. And this ideal realm is real, eternal, present everywhere. Life partially resembling Mind, or God, and partially fallen into mindlessness, is "so-called mind," "mortal mind," "counterfeit mind." It is life faintly tinged with divinity.

All phrases, well or ill expressed, which assert the unreality of evil or of matter are but negative ways of asserting the omnipresent reality and efficacy of God, who is Spirit, Goodness, Love. They do not mean that evil, pain, sickness, fear have no kind of existence, but that they belong to the sphere of illusion. There are two orders or planes of human life, and one of these is based upon illusion and self-deception. Everything connected with the world of illusion is relative to it and is non-existent relatively to the world of true being. If the world of ideal existence may become, through realization, empirically real for us the opposite state of things—our lives as full of evil—must be potentially unreal. The more strongly it is felt that the ideal not only ought to be real, but also in some sense *is* real, the more strongly will it be felt that evil not only ought to be but is unreal. The hypochondriac, the paranoiac and the melancholiac do live in a world of unreal evils real only for their diseased minds. With mental health they would vanish. The idea of the unreality of evil is but an extension of this; it declares that we are all half-hypochondriacs, half-paranoiacs, half-melancholiacs, and that our belief in the omnipotence of material conditions is a phobia and should be treated as such. In the face of this universal tendency to phobias mental, and therewith physical, health depends upon the steady maintenance in consciousness of the idea of an absolutely good selfhood as supremely valid, *real* and true, as triumphant, and as one's own.

For secular science your diseased condition is the simple truth, but when your hypnotist suggests the falsehood that all is well with you, your organism, controlled by the unconscious, adjusts itself to this new illusion of health until it comes to be true. There is no divine order of things, no all-embracing Intelligence, no true self of man struggling for empirical birth but yet eternally real. For Spiritual Science God creates an ideal world which is yours with all its joy and health and salvation as soon as you realize your franchise in it. For Secular Science this is all pure fancy; a healthful idea has no more metaphysical validity than a morbid one.

In view of the atmosphere of spirituality which pervades so much of the Spiritual Science movement, and in view also of the mass of evidence continually published, it is disproportionate to permit one's judgement of the facts to be too much influenced by the piracies, the vanity, the commonplaceness, and the literary and philosophical deficiencies of a particular writer, or by the very irritating and American way in which her name is persistently advertised. Nor is it very remarkable that attempts to cure by Spiritual Science should sometimes fail and that doctors should then tell the coroner that they could have been successful with drugs. The opposite case may also happen; persons may die under medical treatment who might have been saved by Spiritual Science. Neither method is infallible, and it remains a choice of risks.

Surely the ideal is the fullest and wisest self-determination both for the individual as such and for all social institutions. The Church should understand and practice the psychotherapy of the moral life, freely and without payment. Schoolmasters should be able to detect and deal with all psychic kinks in the children under their care. Parents and nursemaids should be expert psychologists. And the individual should be trained both to understand and to rule his own mind, and to free himself from any morbid tendencies to which he may be inclined to be subject. He must learn

to think for himself not only in the spheres of religion, of morals, and of politics, but also of health and general well-being.

Our present tendency is in the opposite direction. We tend to an uncritical dependence upon medical orthodoxy which is morally and intellectually enervating. What the priest and the exorcist were for past stages of civilization, that the professed medical expert is to-day. It was with especial reference to the medical profession that Mr. Bernard Shaw, in his Introduction to *The Doctors' Dilemma*, makes the profoundly true remark that " Every profession is a conspiracy against the laity." There is no profession more needed than the medical. But we need our medical investigators as teachers of teachers and sources of illumination for all. Too often to-day they are propagators of a blind terror of medical bogeys and blind belief in magical means of escape which is morally regressive in character, whatever the truth of current medical theories may be.

§ 2. Redemption

(a) *Psychiatry* versus *Religion*

The question which in this chapter we are endeavouring to investigate is the empirical evidence for the agency of Spirit. Is there a spiritual being beyond the chain of natural causation which, when rightly approached, is able so to respond as to modify this chain? What evidence is there for such a view? In the last section we considered, as possible evidence, a group of cases of spiritual healing apart from physical means. We saw that the method of approach was not so much petition as " realization," and consisted of an attempt to actualize an alleged ideal and spiritual basis of human nature usually dormant. We saw that miracles—*i.e.* apparent manifestations of a higher agency than any known to science—of this kind are asserted upon respectable evidence to occur, although they have not been investigated by any impartial committee. But

whereas they are almost exclusively miracles of physical healing (or of favourable changes of circumstance, which are not here under discussion), it is the mental and moral sphere which is of central importance for religion. For if there is any one thought more intimately connected with the idea of God than any other, it is that of the attainment of salvation through redemption from the power of sin. To seek and to save that which is lost, to proclaim liberty to the captives, to give a new heart and a new mind—such, we have believed, are the promises of God. We have now to consider this faith. Our enquiry must, as in the preceding section, be a double one. We must ask, first, whether there is any effective method of soul-healing based upon belief in Spirit as a redemptive agency, and if so, whether, in such cases, the operation of some transcendental cause can fairly be inferred.

Now medical psychology is quite definitely of opinion that religion cannot bring redemption. It is not merely that the methods of religion are inadequate, but that there is, in the opinion of medical science, no spiritual power in existence which can and does redeem. This proposition is not generally stated in so many words, but it is implicit in all medical theories. There is thus a certain broad issue between medical psychology upon the one hand, and theology upon the other so far as the latter is seriously concerned with the regeneration of the soul. I suppose it could roughly be said that medical psychology teaches that cases of soul-trouble may be divided into two classes, those of a superficial, and those of a more deeply seated character. The former can be dealt with, often through the interpretation of dreams, by means of re-education, which chiefly means the removal of scruples and a better understanding of life-problems. Sometimes religion can here be of assistance, sometimes it operates disadvantageously. But no discussion of the subject is here necessary because cases of re-education cannot be regarded as instances of redemption or regeneration; it is only with

regard to cases which have both a moral aspect and are also of a deeply-seated character that the difference in principle between theology and medical psychology arises. According to the latter the healing of deeply-seated troubles must take place through the expression of the unconscious (usually by means of reductive analysis), for which purpose consciousness has to be as relaxed and uncritical as possible; distinctions between good and evil, decent and indecent, important and trivial, and so on, are to be allowed to fall, so far as possible, during treatment, into abeyance. The tendency of religion is in exactly the opposite direction. Religion works through consciousness, medical psychology through the unconscious; religion magnifies the importance of moral distinctions, medical psychology minimizes them; religion calls for effort, principle, volition, medical psychology for a freer abandonment to the impulses of instinct; religion stimulates aspiration for the unattained ideal, medical psychology recommends a detached interest in the crude feelings of a long-forgotten past. And not only does medical psychology regard religious principles as unadapted to heal the troubled soul, it looks upon them as a frequent source of endopsychic resistance to the healing process. They may control the outward manifestations of the trouble within certain limits, but in so doing they may render the inward evil more deeply seated, more complicated, more organized, more morbid, more incurable than it was before. Exceptional cases of conversion with permanently satisfactory results may occasionally occur, but as a general rule it should be recognized that religion is too dangerous a remedy for cases of spiritual trouble. The cure of souls (in the sense of "healing" and also, except in so far as healthy normality can fairly be assumed—if that can ever be the case—in that of "care") must be in the hands of the medical profession; the clergy, and laymen generally, must, like hospital nurses, act, if at all, only under medical direction, and subject to medical veto altogether. Even then, however well trained they may be (unless they are

formally qualified as doctors), they must be forbidden by law to undertake really responsible work for the healing of souls. But ministers of religion may be permitted to conduct services of intercession and bed-side prayer, or to administer sacraments when the doctor is satisfied that these are harmless.

Before subscribing to such views as these, with all the consequences that they logically entail, Christians may remind themselves that what is here called "religion" is really a particular kind of religion, and that there are other kinds of religion and other kinds of Christianity, and also that there is a perfectly fair case against, as well as a perfectly fair case for, these claims of the medical profession. The kind of religion which the latter condemns or tolerates is what one may, with all respect, call "popular religion." Popular religion is challenged not only, as we saw in our first chapter, on its intellectual and theoretical side, but also, as we now see, on its spiritual side as a means of salvation. We ought to try to appreciate the force of what can be said against us before we fly to methods of self-defence, and it is perfectly true that the case against popular religion on its practical and spiritual side is a strong one.*

* We may here dispose of two small points of terminology with regard to the use of the words "sin" and "redemption." If it be said that in the above statement of the issue between medical science and theology I am identifying sin with neurosis, but that these are really distinct, I would reply that I neither identify nor distinguish them; I merely treat them together. The two are often but different aspects of the same facts. A person commits an apparently wanton libel. So far as we judge consciousness only that person has committed a sin; so far as we take into account the complexes that have impelled him to it we regard the libel as a symptom of a disease. The impulse may not have been any more overpowering than the average temptation and yet it may have been the outcome of some "complex." It is both sin and symptom. The other term is "redemption." Redemption is the same thing as regeneration, except that the former word implies a reference to divine agency. It should not be confused with reformation. Reformation consists of a change of habitual conduct. Regeneration is a more deep-going change: it is a transformation of the instincts, a new heart, a new inward man altogether. Persons addicted to disreputable conduct sometimes come under the influence of parochial or other social institutions and become

(*b*) *The Failure of Popular Religion*

We are taught that God is our Saviour and Redeemer; when the soul sincerely turns to him in its need he puts forth his power to save. Nay, more: he himself knows it, and searches for it until he finds it. And thereafter whenever the redeemed soul turns to him for help it finds strength and courage, guidance and illumination, renewal of life and uplift above the power of sin in the ever-present riches of the grace of God. In other words, the grace of God is commonly put forward by the Christian Church as a practical answer to an urgent moral need. God restores and heals. That is the faith that has come down to us through generations of Christendom; is it true? In the majority of cases it is not true. In this doctrine the accessibility and responsiveness of God, verifiable in experience, is greatly exaggerated. For most men God is not empirically accessible and responsive. We cry to him again and again, but there is no voice neither any that answers. The old weakness, inefficiency, joylessness, distraction remain; the old sin, evil, and moral perversity persist. Of course it is true that in many cases distress and the experience of weakness and failure have proved a prelude to a new birth of the soul; many such redemptions are on record. But in what proportion to those who have prayed and resolved apparently in vain?

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reformed. The motive power in such cases has usually been, in the past, the fear of hell or the coming of new interests into persons' lives. At other times it has been the influence of some strong and attractive personality; at yet others the reclamation has resulted from the simple withdrawal of some source of temptation. All such cases of reformation, or reclamation, are intelligible apart from the assumption of any supernatural agency. Society is interested only in respectable conduct; it cares little for the struggles and ideals, the personal failures and the inward distress of the individual. From the point of view of society it is what you do, not what you are, that matters. And so it puts reformation in the place of regeneration, good conduct in that of the mind of Christ. It is not necessary to emphasize the fact that the Christianity of the New Testament is concerned with something a great deal bigger and deeper than reformation: it is enough to make this distinction in the use of the terms in question.

The doctrine of Redemption does not assert merely that salvation is sometimes obtainable, or that the universe is in process of spiritualization; it announces the existence of an available pathway of escape from "all iniquity." It may be true that the groans and travail of creation have a teleological import, and that in some cases the new day has really dawned, cases which indicate the tendency of the universe as a whole. But in pursuing this line of thought we are getting away from our practical problem. We are not here concerned with the question of a general world-view. We do not, for our present purpose, ask whether or not the lifelong moral failure of such and such a man can be regarded as a factor in some redemptive world process, but whether *he* can escape from the condition in which he finds himself. Our present question is: What is the cure for mental and moral bondage? Is it God? Is it true that the serious practice of the Christian religion—*i.e.*, such turning to God as is urged upon us from Christian pulpits—does normally lead to Redemption, to emancipation, to inward harmony, strength, goodness, joy, and a sense of peace with the Infinite?

Normally it does not; normally man does not find in God, or in Christ, a Saviour and Redeemer. This should be definitely acknowledged. It is a most mischievous habit which many of us clergy indulge in, to make declarations and promises of spiritual help when we have no evidence whatever that such help is obtainable. I once heard a clergyman say in a sermon, "Christ who cured the paralytic has still the same power to cure the paralysed in mind. Turn to him and he will set you free." I asked him afterwards what facts he had in mind and what exactly was this turning to Christ which could produce such results as these. I found he had nothing to go upon beyond a vague, apparently untested, belief in the efficacy of prayer. He was just saying pretty things; that was all.

I do not mean to deny that religion is of any use in such cases; it is. It helps to maintain reaction-formations

without which the perverted life-impulse would be given free rein to carry the man from bad to worse. And further, in the conflict which then arises many unethical characteristics which gave support to the perverted will may be more or less eliminated. Conceit may give place to greater humility, contempt may yield to some measure of sympathy, a narrow selfishness may be modified by at least a respect for unselfish love. All this is to the good, but it does not amount to redemption or imply the presence of a supernatural agency. Let us frankly acknowledge the truth: normal religion, however earnest, cannot bring the experience of Redemption to man. Sacraments in such cases are especially useless: the Devil, we are told, loves to tempt man after a good communion. In other words, a good communion is apt to do an enslaved man more harm than good, the stimulus to his aspirations being more than counterbalanced by the tendency to reaction. Most communions, however, are not even "good." It must be remembered that practical religion is not an independent method or theory. It is simply the application of current theology to practice. If that theology puts forward propositions (*e.g.* about the efficacy of faith, prayer, the sacraments, etc.) uncritical at least in their generality, it is inevitable that practical religion will prove an unsafe guide.

It may be urged that I have not understood the real meaning of Redemption; that Redemption is really such and such a thing. In that case I am not speaking about Redemption at all. Instead of using the term Redemption it would be possible to say, simply, that the grace of God, operative through the faith, prayers, and communions of the average serious churchgoer, is incapable of effecting that radical cure of a state of inward bondage which is glibly enough promised from our pulpits. But I think that Redemption is the perfectly correct Biblical term, which does not usually denote an aspect of the cosmic process, or an imperceptible influence, and does not only stand for a

hope for the hereafter, but also affirms a definite and profound experience. It is the ending of a state of "alienation from the life of God," and in the new experience of that life there is involved, according to the New Testament, alike an intensification of life, a transformation of the emotions, and an illumination of the mind.

I do not wish to deny the possibility of such a redemption —*i.e.* a deliverance effected through Divine agency—of the soul "from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." But I do urge that the attainment of it, so far as it is attainable at all, is a far more difficult and law-governed process, and one which is far more intimately conditioned by the particular soul-state of the individual than we clergy generally assume. I do protest against the indiscriminate slinging about of loose promises, of exaggerated assertions, and the like; against the neglect of a critical and empirical examination of the concepts of religion; against the attribution to the ministrations and activities of religion of an efficacy which they do not possess, and against a concealment of the truth when that truth is not what we would wish.

This experience of the failure of popular religion to afford the soul help in any great spiritual need is an experience of the futility of what would generally be called "prayer," but which we must remember is really a particular kind of prayer, deriving its character from that of the religious type to which it belongs. Popular religion, in its modern form, might also be called "post-mythological religion." It is of a kind, that is to say, that presupposes mythological beliefs that are no longer there. Its ways of thinking are derived from mythology. Mythology itself has given place to naturalistic habits of thought, and religion is left in the air. The leading characteristic of prayer, for such a type of religion, is that it is supposed to operate as a request operates between man and man; it moves another person to act. Yet at the same time we feel that it is not safe to rely upon it or to expect too much. In most cases the

prayer represents the assent of one's mind to the idea that it would be a good thing if God would effect a change in one's character and disposition. It may be accompanied by a cultivated sense of reverence, humility, contrition, and so forth. It consists essentially, that is to say, of an assent of the intellect plus some attempt to assume a feeling suitable to the occasion. Another kind of prayer, probably most common at Holy Communion, is accompanied by a mild sense of exaltation, the pleasure of which may supply the motive for the inward process which produces it.

A third kind of prayer is a professed desire, as it were, to be good, a desire which seems to the person praying to be quite sincere and may be suffused with an indeterminate species of emotion, accompanied, for no obvious reason, by tears. From the standpoint of release from the power of sin all three are totally useless. No method of seeking redemption can safely be based upon such mental processes as these.

Now we will suppose that temptation in the form of some undesirable impulse is present. The impulse may be resisted. If the resistance is comparatively weak it will appear as a thrusting aside of the temptation, if strong, it will resemble rather the beating down of it. It is one of the most assured results of modern psychology that, in adult cases, resistance of this kind never leads to regeneration. It may be an essential step on the path to reclamation, but the impulse persists in the unconscious and prevents anything like the coming of a new heart or reorganization of the instincts.

When a person says, "I have tried to conquer this sin, and I have prayed again and again, but all in vain," what has probably happened is that he has resisted temptation by thrusting it aside or by beating it down and that he has prayed prayers of one or all of the three kinds of futile prayer above-mentioned.

(c) *The Internal Method*

We may, for present purposes, recognize two main types of religion—the religion of mythology and the religion of mind. For mythology God is conditioned by a material and social environment as an individual among other individuals with whom he interacts in a dramatic but inscrutable way, much liable to anger when disobeyed, but placable, holy, and kind. Prayer is the art of persuading him. But since the time of the Upanishads there has existed in the world another type of religion, common in Christian as well as in non-Christian form. This teaches us that God is the Universal Mind, or Soul, and that true prayer to him consists, not so much of petition, as of spiritual exercises whereby the finite is attuned to the Infinite Mind, and man becomes a partaker of the divine nature. It is an attempt to gain closer contact with that inward source of life and power which presents itself to the religious consciousness as God, in whom all true satisfactions are contained. Whether such closer contact with the source of life is possible in any given case depends upon the psychic processes involved. Within the limits of this general type there are specific religious differences depending chiefly upon differences of ethics, the spiritual exercises of Christian mystics differing from the *yoga* of the Hindus and also among themselves, yet all alike aiming at the realization, rather than at the persuasion, of God. And it is quite possible for Christians to-day to draw up such forms of spiritual exercises as are found from experience to be of value. In so doing there is no reason why the lessons of psychology should not carefully be considered, but it is strange how these lessons sometimes lead us back to our starting-point, and to popular religion. We will consider a few possible exercises.

(i) We will take first the act of surrender of desire, renunciation, giving. This act may, of course, like all religious acts, be faked: it may be imitated in a mere pose.

But that is not always the case. There is a real inward process of the surrender of desire. In many recorded cases of conversion, such as that of St. Augustine, a libido-object is suddenly given up, not in the sense that it is simply abstained from, but in the sense that it is renounced, offered up in sacrifice, cast forth out of the heart. Whenever this act takes place it is followed by a sensible effect. An interesting description of this effect occurs in Miss May Sinclair's *Mary Olivier*, where Mary renounces her desire to go to France. In most cases the feeling is one of deep happiness, accompanied by a sense of the reality of the presence of God.

A lady writes to me as follows :—

"I had read and learnt many things of Him (God), and of the Christian life, but my sorrow for the death of my father was still as acute and active as ever. It seemed strange that with so secure a confidence no change occurred in the very place where I seemed to need it most. But one day I was about to pray and, as usual, to give myself into the keeping of God for Him to use as He best could (an act and a prayer which had even so early in my Christian life become rather formal), when He spoke to me in this way : 'You give me *yourself*; will you not give me your *father*?' and I became aware that I was not *willing* to part from my sorrow because it seemed a final parting from my father. I reflected. I remembered again the faithfulness of God in which I had believed, and at last I said, 'Lord, take my father also.' Then, almost as I said it there came flooding upon me such a deep sense of the divine Fatherhood that it was as if someone had taken of infinite riches and was urging them upon me—so deep, so tender, so wonderful was this love of a heavenly Father that with my earthly father in his care I was at peace, and ever after I have known this Father as mine."

Many years ago I asked a clergyman how one could find redemption. He replied, "Give your heart to God." The answer was a true one, though it went over my head at the time. It seemed to me then as much as to say, "Be devoted to God," and that one could not call up emotions

of devotion at will. It would have helped me more if he had said the same thing in other words, such as: "The essential thing is the inward attitude of giving. When a temptation assails us over and over again it means that we are inwardly clinging to some desire that we ought to give up. We desire to gratify some secret wish or inclination; we resolve not to do so, but, without knowing it we cling to the idea, 'All the same, it would be very nice if I could.' Outwardly we abstain from the evil thing, but we do not give up the wish. We try to give God our conduct but keep our heart for ourselves. Try to find out what you are inwardly clinging to—you can find that out from the temptations themselves if you remember that you are only tempted to do, literally or symbolically, what you secretly want to do—and give it up to God in a spirit of real giving. It can be made a matter of practice."

We have here a process the true execution of which may, indeed, be very difficult to insure, but which is a real possibility of our nature, and which is productive of a real change in our instincts.

The problem is that of inducing a change of desire. Desire is, psychologically, the product of the self-identification of the ego with this or that impulse.* In this process of the identification of the self with the gratification of some inclination there are several grades. First there is *wish*, *i.e.* identification in fancy, as for instance, "I wish I were King"; "I wish we had a pudding." In wishes the gratification is imagined regardless of actual circumstances. Then comes *desire*, *i.e.* self-identification with a gratification conceived as a real possibility. "It is your money I want." But since there are other things to be thought of, the act of self-identification in desire is only conditional or tentative. Not so in the case of *will*, in which this act is unconditional. "It is your money I want, and come what may, I mean to get it." Such an act of will, however, may after all be the product of only

* Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, ch. ii.

part of the self, and may consequently be followed by repentance when other elements become dominant. Finally, therefore, we have the permanent, unrepentant volition of the entire man, the self-identification of the subject with the end in view being here complete.

It very commonly, however, happens that the appetite seems to possess a certain selfhood independent of the normally conscious personality. "I know that this drug means ruin to body, mind and will, but I am just going to have it all the same." The acknowledged self is quietly set aside and a submerged self emerges and acts while the authorized self looks on helplessly until it is all over. Then it bitterly repents. We may speak of such actions as cases of exaggerated impulsion or defective inhibition. Nevertheless they do embody processes of self-identification, only the personality, or self, involved is one which is normally submerged. The impulsion is not a purely instinctive process, but the activity of a self which is at other times repressed.

Now the renunciation of a gratification is the reverse process to that of desire. The latter is one of self-identification with, the former one of self-dissociation from, an imagined gratification. It is effectual in proportion as the individuality is a unity and the act of renunciation sincere.

(ii) Another spiritual exercise which I would recommend is that of the establishment of spiritual control. Every person is controlled by a complex of ideas and feelings which regulate both mind and body. In the case of such phenomena as hypochondria, anal-eroticism, conscience, etc., the presence of controlling ideas and interests is clear, even though the subject may be unconscious of them. In all persons the whole of life, in its main outlines, is thus regulated and controlled by a system of psychical control. This system may itself be, or become, morbid, evil, unworthy, inadequate, or otherwise unsatisfactory. So that when a person feels himself to be under the dominion of some sin, this means that his psychical control-mechanism is a morally inadequate one. When persons speak of

controlling themselves, resisting temptation, and so on, they are trying to control their control-mechanism, for it is from this that the undesirable impulses arise. We may call this the empirical, or lower, system of control; it represents the sum of past ideas, interests, scruples, vices, habits, etc. Its constituents are largely of infantile origin and long since forgotten, yet often, or always, the most vigorous elements in the personality. It controls the present by promoting the assimilation of ideas and interests which resemble its own contents and by militating against, or "censoring," all that are of an opposite character. The various elements in it are not always derived direct from original impulse and experience—some of them are weird fusions, or mutual adaptations, of the various heterogeneous factors which it contains. Thus the past, organized as a system of control, may become a tyrant which compels us to think thoughts, to entertain feelings, to speak words, and to do deeds which our present self condemns and despises. We therefore seek release, emancipation, regeneration, redemption. Religion usually at one and the same time promises man supernatural help and bids him control himself—*i.e.* to control his lower control-system—by resolute moral will. The result, we have seen, is usually unsatisfactory.

The higher control-system, such as seems to be indicated in cases of conversion and, at least according to some interpretations, of spiritual healing of the body, as also in certain aspects of evolution, must consist of certain latent mental structures analogous to those of latent manhood in the child. If they are of a kind which has not been derived from the previous history of the race we may say that they are of transcendental origin. The spiritual causation involved in such control may be conceived in two ways. The process of reaching a higher plane may be aided by the latent disposition to divinity inherent in all mind, and so far, secondly, as any person is once attuned to that plane he becomes susceptible to its influences.

Before the earth was made there existed from everlasting a spiritual world, and man is created for citizenship in it. It may, perhaps, be known, under some circumstances, intuitively; it may also be discovered through its causality. The evolutionary process often gives us the impression that a rigorous use of "the method of residues" would lead to the exhibition of such causation, but the crucial test for it is likely to prove the instances which we are now considering.

The ground of redemption, so understood, must be the possession by men of certain undeveloped dispositions which represent the divine in the human soul, namely, the structure which is called our "true self" or "the image of God." If libido, interest-force or psychic energy, can be diverted either from consciousness or from the deconscioused into the latent dispositions of this higher self it can become a controlling mechanism which operates by continuing, in increasing degree, to withdraw further energy from the condemned elements of consciousness and of the deconscioused.* It can be called into activity by the co-operation of the person concerned and some hypnotist of spiritual understanding or some practitioner of Spiritual Science. Only the patient's own activity can maintain the direction of the flow of the libido from the condemned elements to the higher self, but since the energy invested in the condemned elements is often greater than that which he can put into the directing activity of consciousness the latter must be reinforced by the help of practitioner or hypnotist, until the cathexis, or investment, of the latent structure is sufficient to enable it to gain independence and to continue working without further assistance from without. It can, however, rarely dispense with the help given to it by continuous conscious effort. This directing activity of consciousness aiming at the awakening of the higher self has already been referred to under the name of "realization." And along with this should go the definite act of

* I mean the unconscious so far as this is composed of repressed material and not of elements which "are not yet conscious."

renunciation of desire so far as this is possible. It is true that the doctrine of conscious effort is often dangerous, and may lead to undesirable results in more ways than one, but this is not *right* effort. If, however, the consequences of repression and of the law of reversed effort are borne in mind; and if the discipline is regulated by an ethic which takes due account of the needs of free personal development and individuality; and if the laws of prayer are properly understood and observed, then the organization of daily effort is not only healthful, but for any big result necessary.

Realization, then, is that act whereby, through inward effort, we identify ourselves with our true, or transcendental, self as it exists in God, and force upon ourselves the conviction that since our true nature is divine we declare the annulment of this or that source of trouble, and through faith in God, the one true and real Mind with which our true selves are organically one, rest assured that since that trouble is now condemned to non-existence we will no longer recognize even its apparent existence except as an occasion for this act of realization. Such an act may be carried out on behalf of other people, and personally I have found it easier to assist others in this way than myself; the morbid attitudes which have led to the trouble prove, in the patient's own case, an obstacle to the carrying out of the process, though not an insuperable one.

It may be answered that ideas which go so far towards attributing omnipotence to thought indicate a recrudescence of infantile mentality. That means that *on the assumption* that they are false psychologists can explain how one comes to have such silly ideas. To this the best reply is to challenge investigation. If the facts are true, it does not matter what infants imagine. But the question of possible illusion in such matters will be discussed below.

(iii) A useful practice is that of voluntary extroversion. Go for a walk and try to thrust your libido forcibly out of yourself into the surrounding landscape, or into particular

objects such as trees. It is as though, finding a river flowing in the wrong direction, you were forcibly to twist it round and make it flow in the opposite way. It is not at all the same process as observation or concentration. You will find that this exercise tends to check introvert tendencies and to give you control over them.

(iv) Another most valuable exercise with the same end in view is adoration, or worship. Adoration is *the* extrovert activity *par excellence*. Worship God as you walk and rejoice in the beauty of Nature. Both are aids against introversion and sin. If anyone should protest that such worship with an eye on therapeutic gain is no true worship at all, I would reply that in a chapter on medical theology I am not concerned for the moment with true worship as such, but with empirical results.

(v) Then there is love for, and communion with, a divine love-object—a process psychologically distinct from adoration. Moral health, perhaps even redemption, can often be promoted by the personification and hypostasization of the highest elements latent in humanity as " The Inward Christ " and the taking up of a personal attitude towards the same. If the higher potentialities of the soul are personified as " The Inward Christ," and the Inward Christ comes to be loved and worshipped, a psychic formation comes into being which operates as a solvent of evil, and (provided that our ethics are of the right kind) Christ thus becomes indeed the soul's redeemer.

The formation within the mind of a divine imago round which the higher interests and instincts can organize themselves operates as a " healing presence " in more ways than one. It provides, in the first place, an ideal love-object, love for which purifies the emotions. Secondly, it affords a means for the extrusion from the ego of morbid or unworthy elements. Thirdly, it serves as an internal fulcrum when a change of mental attitude is required. With these three functions of an inward God correspond three doctrines of the Atonement which were formerly

considered to be alternatives, but which could better be regarded as supplementary to one another.

And the important principle *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus* —"apart from spiritual fellowship moral health is impossible"—must not be forgotten. I do not mean church-going so much as intercourse on the basis of common spiritual interests.

These inward activities can be organized through repetition into a coherent group which, taken as a whole, presents some resemblance to an internal method of analysis. The attitude of the ego, or self to which the sense of self-identity attaches, towards the Indwelling Christ, is psychologically analogous to the relation of patient to psycho-analyst; the acts of surrender are acts of giving up *to* Christ, like the giving up of infantile secrets to the psycho-analyst; adoration is analogous to positive transference; the act of extroversion is a volitional counterpart of a process which takes place spontaneously in those cases in which psycho-analysis is successful; the act of realization, or establishment of higher control, is an act of self-identification with the Inner Christ similar to a process which accompanies the anaclitic attitude upon which the transference depends. I do not say that the mental processes involved in this method are literally the same as those which take place in reductive analysis, because I am presupposing a different mental type, but that they roughly correspond when due allowance is made for this difference. And I hope that it will be understood that I am not trying to expound medical psychology, but am only quoting from it so far as is necessary for the purpose of answering the medical case against spiritual methods of redemption.

There is a well-recognized division of human types into two main psychological species, the introvert and the extrovert. These are developed through the preponderance of one or another of two processes which take place in the child's mind in relation to other persons or animals. One

is self-identification with them, the other is a love or hatred for them which arises from their favourable or unfavourable attitude to the child, just as " pussie will love me because I am good " to her. In the latter case the child's love for its mother rests upon its love of milk, comfort, and caresses in exactly the same way as pussie's love for the child. The process of self-identification is the basis of phantasy, and where this attitude preponderates the subject becomes incapable of love, for instead of loving he first admires, then identifies himself with the person of his admiration, then with the character of that person. But this does not make him resemble that person, because it is all just pretending—a matter of ideas and not realities. He grows up in a world of ideas which he mistakenly believes to be profound and original, without making adequate emotional contact with the persons or things of his environment. Jung has described him as thinking his way into things rather than feeling his way into them. And when he has got into them he has not got them, for he has only framed ideas of them. This is not the place for a study of psychological types, and so we must indulge in no further character-sketching. Enough has perhaps been said to indicate the general type of character which the present argument is presupposing. Now the point is this: unfortunately psycho-analysis is almost useless for persons of this type; indeed, it is very doubtful whether it is not worse than useless. Freud himself in his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis* admits that psycho-analysis tends to fail in cases of narcissistic neuroses owing to the resistance proving irresistible, and Pfister declares that analysis without transference (and in such cases that would not take place) may do more harm than good. Prolonged treatment only seems to increase the resistance. Here, then, are persons who are not obviously ill, but whose characters show marked defects, whom medical psychotherapy cannot help, who will turn all the stuff of life into mere ideas from which no generous impulses can ever

spring, whose souls need remaking. For such persons a special method of treatment is required, and I believe that I am right in saying that none exists. It is primarily for them that I recommend the internal method of the religion of mind. Of course I do not mean that religion is of redemptive value for introverts only; on the contrary, it is obvious that such people are less open to its deeper influences than extroverts. Nor, again, do I mean that all extroverts are mentally and morally healthy, or that the introverts I have spoken of have no repressed Œdipus complex, but are pure introverts through and through; or anything else that I have not said. But I do urge that the tragedy of the adult introvert (and we are all to some extent introvert) who can neither escape from nor transform himself, who, without, perhaps, being obviously neurotic is yet deeply conscious that he has not realized his true nature, will be more helped by spiritual than by medical means. These means, so far as they are successful, point to the causality of Spirit which thus manifests itself as empirically real, in the sense in which the ether might be called empirically real in so far as we may assume it to be the ground of empirical effects, such as light.

(d) *Salvation*

I have so far spoken as though the issue were entirely one as to means, a common end in view being taken for granted. And since our subject has been, not so much the conception of redemption as the empirical reality of it, it has not been necessary to stress the fact that the end is different for medicine and for religion. But there really is a difference in the end pursued—the difference between normality and salvation.

There are, I suppose one may say, two distinct and almost opposite states of well-being, the natural and the mystical, normality and salvation. Pushed to an ideal extreme, healthy normality is a state of delight in all

natural experiences—delight in the beauty of Nature, in colour, sound, fragrance, light; in the vigorous health and energy of one's body; in friendship and social relations; in love and family; in science, philosophy, and all knowledge; in art and literature and politics; in quick grasp, clear memory, comprehensiveness of thought; in decision, adventure, romance, enterprise. To enter into and possess all these through the energy of the mind, the variety and delicacy of the feelings, the multitudinousness of one's interests and the efficiency of one's work—these things make man's natural good. But it is all centred round egoism; these good things belong to you as an individual. They mark you off from the common herd as an exceptionally fine fellow. If you are as honest as the Pharisee you will say, " Lord, I thank thee that I am not as other men are, neurotics, dyspeptics, ignoramuses, or even as most of my neighbours. *I* live a full, rich life; *I* am robust in body and mind." You may sympathize with the crocks and failures around you, safe in the subconsciousness of your own superiority (modesty will not permit too clear a consciousness of it). But your whole state of well-being is both strictly relative to yourself as a particular individual and to your exceptional exemption from the defects and limitations of other men. Moreover it is an unrationalized happiness that you enjoy. The sadness and sins and ineffectiveness of other lives remain a bald, ugly fact; as a philanthropist, doctor, or town councillor you may be concerned with alleviating it, but your happiness lies in your being untouched by it, in your being an exception, in your inward remoteness from it. And your happiness may only last until your liver gets out of order or something similar happens.

The other kind of well-being, salvation (and here again, for the sake of clearness, our description is pushed to an extreme), is of a different order. The saint feels all the misery of the world and he has his own share of defects, dulness and failures. But his inward centre of gravity

lies outside that natural order in which all these undesirable things happen and undesirable states exist. It lies in the one universal, supernatural realm of Spirit which is common to all, though only realized by some. In that realm there is, no me and mine, no particularity, no egoism, no "propriety" as the mystics called it. The sound of that unseen world is joy and peace, like a continuous note that persists alongside of, and mysteriously related to, the troubles of the natural order. And so the saint possesses a double experience, that of all mankind and that of God. His share in the sorrows of man and in the joy of God is his well-being, his salvation.

If this distinction holds good it may serve to indicate wherein lie the defects of the above treatment of the idea of redemption. I have perhaps treated it too much as that process which leads to an exceptional natural well-being—to a kind of super-normal normality—whereas it is really the road to the salvation of the soul. But we must not allow ourselves to be led away by exalted concepts. When a man's whole make-up is out of order it is a mockery to talk to him about the soul's highest salvation. His urgent practical need is a little more efficient normality. Nevertheless normality is not the end, and this difference of end must to some extent react upon our choice of means.

(e) *Atonement*

At-one-ment, or Reconciliation with God, is the Godward aspect of redemption. When Nature is restored the isolation and imperviousness of man's surface-personality is taken away. He is brought into harmony and into union with the great depths, and the recognition that that with which it is now made one is God, is the experience of at-one-ment. It apparently has no necessary connexion with the crucifixion, or even with the historical personality, of Jesus Christ. It has nothing to do with the alleged requirements of justice. At-one-ment is the termination of

alienation. And this means that dissociation is at an end, and that the soul has become re-unified. The at-one-ment is an at-one-ment with oneself. Or rather it is at-one-ment with oneself in cases in which God has been developed within the self and provides the principle for subsequent unification. Union with God is not a case of the reharmonization of the self through compromise or fusion, but of the absorption or dissolution of the lower by the higher elements, and Reconciliation would be that point at which the self accepts union as its goal and welcomes it instead of fighting against it.

The individual is not always a unity. He does not act and feel with his whole being in all his deliberate conduct; there are tendencies of varying kinds within him, and these do not operate either, on the one hand, as elements in, or tendencies of, one and the same personality, nor, on the other, in complete separateness and isolation. They group themselves into systems which function more or less as wholes. Thus the conscious, or dominant personality may be only one out of several personalities, selves, or character systems, all existing within the same individual. When a stress arises between two conflicting systems within the mind leading to neurotic conditions it is the aim of secular psychotherapy to effect a compromise, a fusion, a reunion. "The clear must be mixed with the dark." * Atonement is a different process. This presupposes that a God-determined system, or Christ-self, has somehow been formed and has attracted to itself a considerable volume of libido. The spiritual self, that is to say, will be a passion connected with the idea of God—not a mere group of taboos. Then, among other possible developments, the issue may define itself as one between two selves nearly evenly balanced. Of these two the normal will be the lower, incorporating a great deal that is infantile and bad. A state of stress, perhaps of very severe stress, is set up between the two systems. The

* Nicoll, *Dream Psychology*.

Christ-self may be sufficiently real to make the man feel that the dominant self is a tyrant from which he longs to be delivered, but which yet, with the other side of his nature, he desires to gratify and maintain. But a point may be reached when the higher self is able to wrest the possession of consciousness and feeling from the lower,* and there follows a state of conversion which, if sufficiently profound, is known as re-birth. Atonement, or reconciliation with God, is one aspect of this fact.

The various theories of the atonement represent particular factors in the process of redemption. These may roughly be classified as (i) the extrusion of evil from the personality through the transference of it to a sin-bearer; (ii) the union, or identification, of the soul with some source of higher goodness; and (iii) love for an ideal love-object. So far as any type of religion exercises any redemptive influence one or more of these processes will, in all likelihood, be found in it.

The first element in the process of atonement, as it has been known to Christendom, is that by which the sinner lays his sins on Jesus and thus becomes freed from their accursed load. This is not mere theory; it is a statement of an inward process which really took place under the influence of the doctrine of substitution. The evil (whether as guilt or as sinful propensity) on being thus transferred to the spotless Lamb of God really does

* This is not intended as a metaphor, but as a more literal and accurate description of the process than would be afforded by the use of mechanical expressions, such as that of upsetting a balance. All systems, and not only the conscious one, are conative through and through. It is not only a conscious intelligence which can desire and design, can play tricks and fight. These are functions of systems which have reached a sufficient degree of coherence rather than of consciousness, and it is apparently not true that consciousness is necessary as a means. Hence the old belief in a personal tempter is true enough, except that each tempter is part of a man's individuality, not a separate being who tempts all mankind. So also personal agencies may be operative in the phenomena investigated by Psychical Research without on that account being discarnate intelligences. Compare with these remarks the discussion of Apollyonism in chap. iii., § 4.

become annihilated in that it ceases to be an operative element in the self. The crucifixion thus becomes, for believers, a vicarious conversion of psychic evil into physical substitute in a manner somewhat analogous to the phenomena of conversion neuroses. The atonement itself, in this aspect of it, depends upon a doctrine of it; the doctrine enables the sinner to dissociate himself from the evil in himself, which now can be imputed to him no longer.*

Further, while the sinner's sins are laid on Jesus the merits of the latter are imputed to the former. This thought enables him to feel identified, in the eyes of God, with Christ's righteousness. One may note, for comparison, the identifications involved in the act of realization of one's true self and in that of union with God. The immediate processes are different in the three cases, but the resulting sense of identification with divine goodness may operate in the same way.

The remaining factor in the process of atonement is love for God, or for Jesus. It is usual to speak of this love as a morally fitting consequence of the redemption of the world. We should love God because God has already manifested his love to us. But it is equally true that the redemption of the world is the consequence of man's love for God. This is the principal part of Abelard's doctrine of the atonement. This apparently consisted chiefly of three main assertions: first, that the life and death of Christ was a manifestation of the love of God for man; secondly, that this manifestation awakens in man

* A similar procedure of a more objectionable kind takes place quite apart from religion. Let us suppose that A has been guilty of a wanton and malicious libel upon B, who is entirely innocent of the offence which A attributes to him. A has been guilty of it himself, but he cannot bear the consciousness of it. So he imputes innocence to himself and attributes the offence to B and dissociates himself from all sympathy with such abominations by means of an extreme indignation with B. And he may be really convinced that B really is black and himself white. Slander may thus at times be therapeutically beneficial.

love for Christ and for God; thirdly, that this supreme love of man for God operates as an agency of redemption and emancipation. We need here make no comment upon the first and second propositions because it is the third which I wish to emphasize. It is in some ways the most important. It declares that if love for God can be kindled man can be redeemed from the power of sin. To this proposition Abelard added the minor premiss that man's love can be thus kindled by the thought of Christ, together with the ground for this latter statement, namely that the life and death of Christ was a manifestation of the love of God for man. Remove, for separate consideration, the minor premiss together with its ground, and we have the conditional major as a general theory of redemption. Abelard's words are as follows: "Accordingly our redemption lies in that supreme love excited in us through the passion of Christ, which not only liberates us from the slavery of sin, but acquires for us the true liberty of the sons of God." *

According to this view the only principle of redemption is love for an ideal love-object, and the only absolute ideal is God. When a man's heart really does go to the source of all good life found as a supernatural, or apparently supernatural, spring within the soul he is released, redeemed, emancipated, from the attractive power of the things that make for discord, weakness, and death. If a man is capable, apart from such a love, of remaining true to principle and to high ideals he is in no need of redemption. They that are whole need not a physician. But *if* any given soul is in real need of redemption; if it finds its higher principles continually overborne or frustrated by some natural or diabolical power; if it can look back

* Dr. Rashdall, from whom this reference and translation are taken, gives the alternative renderings of "working" and "excited" in us. The participle is supplied, since there is no equivalent in the Latin. Another passage quoted by Dr. Rashdall from Abelard states that the purpose of the Incarnation was to excite the world to the love for Christ.

upon years of struggle ending in a drawn battle, or worse; then it should realize that for it the principle of willed loyalty is insufficient and that it must somehow learn to love differently. And that, in such a case as we are supposing, means that one must learn how to love *God*. When one has once got a wrong attitude towards others, and towards life generally, strongly developed it is psychologically impossible to right it by means of good resolutions and efforts of will. The wrong attitude may be partially controlled, perhaps, in this way, but not eliminated. But love, if once it can be kindled, introduces a new force. God is that in which all holy desires, all right attitudes are contained. Love God and all those right attitudes will follow. God is to be grasped, embraced and loved. In loving him all good is loved; in pursuing him all true ideals are pursued. Only then can redemption be found.

Bin Jagadishwar hargiz mukti nahin hai, ji.

The principle here is that of redemption through an ideal love-object, and it is in this way that Jesus is a redeemer, more easily loved, for many people, than God himself. Jesus is the redeemer, not of all mankind, but of those who accept, believe in, and love him. He is a redeemer in the same way as other good men and women may be who are loved. When love goes forth to Jesus it goes forth to something loved because it is supremely good, and thus a man's striving and desire is diverted from corrupt and selfish ends to ends which he feels that he can share with Jesus. For the love of Jesus he now loves all that Jesus loves; is thus saved and reconciled to his true self, and therefore to God. For his true self is God in himself. No doubt love for a living man or woman who was associated in one's mind with high and unselfish ideals would be, in most cases, far more effectually redemptive than love for a more perfect but historically remote character. But Jesus still stands as the type of what characteristics the object of love must possess if it is to be redemptive. Love for an Ottima will not redeem.

CHAPTER III

MYSTICAL THEOLOGY

§ 1. The Vision of God

(a) *Religion and Civilization*

We have, in the last chapter, inferred from certain describable experiences of redemption and of healing that a transcendental agency of well-being does exist which must, however, to be fully operative, become reproduced, or find its equivalent, within the soul as an indwelling object of devotion. We now change our point of view. Instead of asking, with medical theology, what practical good man may expect from God, we presuppose that God has become an object of devotion and the realization of Him in consciousness an end in itself. That does not mean that God is no longer thought of as a source of benefits, but that the worshipper is now interested primarily in "the Giver rather than the gifts." In relation to the question of the objective validity of the idea of a responsive God the distinction between these two stages of religion may be important. For it may very well be the fact that God not only seems to be, but is, responsive in proportion as He is loved.

With this difference in our point of view there goes a difference in method of treatment of the subject. While such ideas of the spiritual world as we can reach through medical theology are inferences based upon the category of causality, the method of what we may, rather loosely, call mystical theology must rather be an attempt at spiritual perception. The idea of God, if it is to be a living one,

must possess a certain immediacy and self-evidence which no mere inference can have. And unless it is supported by some infallible authority it must present itself to the mind in the form of an apparent intuition, whether there is a real cognitive function of intuition or not. By an intuition I mean a direct, immediate apprehension of something never perceptible by means of the ordinary channels of sense. Whence do these intuitions (or, if you will, pseudo-intuitions) arise?

There appear to be certain basic, formative ideas upon which cultural thought rests, and which function quasi-instinctively. Whether they are products of experience, categories of the understanding, or ideas of pure reason need not detain us. We are trying to think, not on the level of an epistemological critique (which no one troubles about so long as one is satisfied that one is dealing with some sort of realities), but upon those of our general interests. Among such formative ideas are those of cause, value, personality, goodness, fellowship, unity. Thus, for instance, the idea of personality underlies a great deal of ethics, economics, education, and social reform at the present day. Respect for the personality of a school-child; a moral code which shall promote self-realization rather than enforce laws; economic conditions which shall guarantee to everyone the possibility of personal development; a prison system which regards criminals primarily as persons and only secondarily as social nuisances or objects of danger: all these point to the semi-instinctive character which the idea of personality is acquiring. Another such idea is that of harmonious co-operation within a larger whole in place of competitive individualism. The League of Nations is the most striking product of this basic idea in the sphere of political achievement, while Socialism represents it as a tendency seeking embodiment.

Such formative ideas tend to create ideal as well as social objects. The ideas of fellowship, goodness, unity, and personality find expression in the ideal concept of the

Kingdom of God. And conversely, it is an unquestionable fact that the idea of the Kingdom of God has done much to promote support for the ideas of a League of Nations and of a just and humanized social order. Similarly the idea of God Himself seems to arise in the same way, although other factors, of too individualistic a nature to be called cultural, also contribute their influence. Cause, value, unity, goodness, personality, here meet in an ideal concept in which all find their ultimate ground, and since these basic ideas of cultural progress have become semi-instinctive their ideal object appears as if intuitively apprehended.

When, therefore, we accept modern culture we accept it along with its formative ideas, and its formative ideas along with the intuitions of the ideal to which they give rise—God, the Kingdom of God, the Communion of Saints, the sacramental unity of Nature and Spirit, and so on. Ideas such as these express the higher elements in human culture in a form which enables them to become objects of faith. We are often told that without faith we cannot know God. There may be truth in the converse principle, that without God one cannot have faith, and without faith there cannot be progress. God, the ideal, and reality are organically one. I do not, of course, mean that any existing human civilization is ideal or divine, but that its ideals and its deities are so organically connected with its life as a whole that they all share in a common objectivity. It does not follow that the spiritual world is *merely* a catalogue of cultural ideas falsely hypostasized. That is a question for our metaphysical prejudices to decide. But it does follow that the deities which belong to any syntagma share, like the human minds and conduct which also belong to it, in its objectivity. And if its Supernatural dies that whole pulse of world-life becomes morbid. It may be that this is what is wrong with Bolshevism—not that it has repudiated the Orthodox Church, but that it has not found its own God.

If there is any truth in these thoughts the intuitions of

God are not merely illusions of the individual imagination, or discoveries of the individual reason, or revelations to individual faith. They may be any of these, but in any case, so far as they are alive and widespread, they are elements in the spiritual organism to which we belong, forces natural to it as part of itself which contribute to its total energy, and regulative influences which control it and preserve it from disintegration.

Although, however, this organic unity of religion with the other elements in civilization, its interaction with them, and its cultural function in generating ideals and faith, does give it a certain practical objectivity, we cannot go so far as to say that religion is simply and solely the leading ideas of the age, or of some past age, in symbolical and idealized form. For this form seems to arise only when something more purely and specifically religious is also present. The formative ideas above mentioned are formative only in its presence. (Think, for instance, of the deadness of machine-made religions like Bahaiism, in spite of an exceptionally liberal allowance of the current ideas of modern times.) As to the nature of that distinctively religious factor in religion it is not necessary here to speculate.

Let us revert to a simpler point of view. The objectivity of belief in a thing seen or event witnessed depends, first of all, upon its describableness, upon the number of the witnesses, and upon the coherence and harmony of their accounts. If, then, we take our own ideas of God so far as they are seemingly more or less instinctive and rooted in the structure of our minds, can we give a coherent description of them? If our religious ideas answer this test, if one can fairly well reckon upon the consequences of action based upon them, and if we are conscious of an impression of reality, we have got a "Common Sense" objectivity which at present is more to the point in theology than metaphysical analysis.

In mystical theology we take the standpoint of what

might be called Common Sense transcendentalism—*i.e.* of the same attitude towards the idea of God as is called "Common Sense" when applied to mundane experience. This means the principle that we ought to take the apparent as the real except when we have definite reason to believe that it is not real; the mere facts that we can analyse it and that there is no strictly logical necessity to postulate reality is not reason enough for rejecting it. We say, "There comes So-and-so"; we assume that we have apprehended a real person in real space at about such and such a real distance from us. Logically all this can be explained away. You cannot prove that the world exists in space at all; you can adduce good reasons for the view that our sense of the distance of an object is really a product of our own minds; you can resolve your knowledge of So-and-so into processes of analogy, projection of motives, and so on. But you do not, in practice, allow all this to reduce you to a state of scepticism as to So-and-so's real existence and to your real apprehension of his existence, of his character, and of his real contact, or intercourse, with your own mind. We call this determination to accept appearance as reality "Common Sense."

We can proceed with regard to God in just the same way. We can, for the time being, accept our apparent experience of Him as real, and content ourselves with the description of it in terms that assume its objective reality. Our friendship with So-and-so would not get very far if we persisted in talking to, and of, him in a manner compatible with the hypothesis that he was a mere synthesis of subjective elements of our own, a psychological phenomenon rather than a man. In the same way mystical theology takes all first-hand experience of God at its face-value except in so far as there is some particular reason to suppose that this or that particular experience is illusory.

Moreover, what is illusory for the intellect may nevertheless be the vehicle of the soul's real contact with God.

(b) *Intuitions of God*

I have thrown the following sketch of some typical forms of the consciousness of God into the form of a symposium. I have done this for purely practical reasons in order to give each point of view its fair expression without criticism, and without reducing them to my own way of regarding the matter, distinctively ethical lines of thought being left over for the next chapter. I have avoided all attempts at artistic touches which would tend to give the discussion the character of a literary composition. It is not a dialogue; it is merely a series of view-points. If our immediate sense of God contains any elements of objectivity a comparison of such impressions may make the objective reality of the discerned object more apparent, just as a number of partial glimpses of an object seen through a mist may corroborate one another.

A number of men and women had begun to discuss the idea of God, and the suggestion had been made that instead of flying from point to point each of them should state what the term " God " meant for his or her own personal feeling. This was agreed to, and the first speaker, A., commenced as follows :—

(i) *God as Nature*

For me God means Nature thought of as a unity and as essentially vital. God is embodied life, visible in trees, birds, beasts, rivers, mountains, seas, sunlight, moonlight, clouds, and so on. I should include farm labourers as parts of Nature, but not bankers; ants' nests, but not slums; all elementary passions, but not science and civilization. This is, of course, very illogical from a philosophical point of view, but when I try to philosophize about God I tend to lose what is really my God—a god akin to the gods of Nature-polytheism, to Diana of the Ephesians, and to fetishism and animism generally. I think, however, that this form of religion can be justified as a partial account of,

or element in, whatever may be the truth. It seems to represent the raw material of some sense of divine immanence. It conveys the truth that God is not a remote being inhabiting a fancy heaven, but something sacramentally present in the life of Nature. Nature is at any rate something real and at hand, and the worship of Nature is, for me, the beginning of all piety. I suppose my point of view is very much that of Gœthe, but I am just as ready to admit kinship with more primitive forms of Nature-worship. I maintain that some form of Nature-worship is the natural starting-point for modern as well as for ancient religion, and, as we can see from the case of Akhnaton, it is capable of development into a pure monotheism. Speaking of Akhnaton reminds me that I once wrote a hymn to the God of Nature myself—not, of course, that I want to put it on a level with his. It runs thus :—

Let us praise and worship God immanent in all the world. To the God who is in all the earth, whose life-power is in the deep forests, who is in all great trees, and in the shining of the sun, and in the falling of the rain, we lift up our hearts. Thy beauty, O Lord, is in the flowers, Thy peace is in all still waters, Thy power and terror is in the storm. All this world is in Thee; may we see Thee in all the world. When the flowers put forth their buds, when the deer run, leaping, through the jungles, when the birds sing among the branches, when the insects hum beneath the trees—all this life is Thine, all is of Thee, for Nature lives by Thy life, O Lord of Nature, O Supreme Self and Soul of all. Therefore we exult in Thee, we the creatures of Thy hand. For by Thy breath we live; with Thee is the well of life, and in Thy life we have our portion in life. Therefore we praise and bless Thee; in union with the least of all Thy works, in union with the beasts of the field, our brothers, with the birds, and with all living creatures, we acknowledge Thee to be the Lord. All the earth doth worship Thee, the Father everlasting. Heaven and earth are full of Thy glory; glory be to Thee, O Lord Most High.

But when one comes to think of it, this intuition of God

in Nature really involves a touch of dualism which escapes the verbal formulation of it. There is more in this dualism than the distinction between *natura naturans*, or the creative energy of Nature, and *natura naturata*, or the sum of particular objects in Nature. The Nature which is identified with God is not consistently thought of as empirical actuality as it is, nor is it the productive forces of empirical actuality, or the uniformities of empirical actuality. From this starting-point I find that the idea of Nature often passes into the intuition of a harmonious system of life and beauty, one yet manifold, visible, yet an expression of the unseen. The very fixity of the laws of Nature says " God," for they are the manifestations of the unity and the harmony of the All, and prove a God at its heart. Life is a system of Good; its immanent principle is God; its face is Nature. What appears to us as evil is either an illusion due to the false isolation of the part from the whole, or it is a transitory phase which has its justification as a means to the development of higher planes of being, or it is the result of a disregard of the laws of Nature; follow those laws, live in accord with the inherent principles of the all-harmonious system of the universe, and all will be seen to be very good. First I seem to feel " silent Nature's breathing life "; then I want to call it God, and as soon as I have done so I begin to think of it as a harmonious system of good.

A " Nature " so conceived is more like the φύσις of the Stoics, rather dehumanized, than an unvarnished description of actuality. It is an object of faith rather than of sight. Actuality consists not only of potentialities of life and joy, but also of the absence of the conditions which make the realization of them possible. Even if the formula be allowed that evils come from the " transgression " of the laws of Nature (the term " laws " having here a double sense), still that transgression is itself a part of actual Nature, and the expression is particularly pointless as applied to the non-human sphere. But as soon as I have

formed this idea of a system of harmonious life I feel I am false to Nature as it really is and so revert to my heathen starting-point. The actual intuition of God as Nature cannot quite be resolved into that of an ideal order of Nature, the expression of God Himself, co-existent, but not identical, with empirical actuality. It is this Nature whereof we are now parts, Nature visible and varied, beautiful and bountiful, panting and pulsating, leaping and laughing, kissing and killing, which is "*Deus sive Natura.*" That which sickens and dies is cut off from God; it perishes. But that does not matter, for the well of life is inexhaustible.

(ii) *God as the Unseen*

For me, too, said the second speaker, it is Nature which makes me feel God, but I do not identify them. I do not even identify God with Nature so far as it is joyous and harmonious, but with what is beyond Nature. When one is looking at Nature one may, for a moment, see through it; what is on the other side of it is God. But He does not share in all the antitheses and variety, the passions and pleasures, the adventures and the tragedies, which make Nature Nature. He is at the very heart of Nature, yet He takes no part in it; He does not leap through jungles, pursued or pursuing; He does not eat the sweet berry. God is the mystery of the Unseen. He is ever present and yet ungraspable. He is here, yet He is beyond. There is another side to things, and God is there. And so He is at once infinitely far away and yet more intimately near than any finite thing. He is a presence, a haunting — often almost caught, but almost always eluding at the last. He is the light upon the distant horizon, a thing yearned for with blind longings for one knows not what.

Perhaps connected with this kind of feeling for God is the idea of Him as the Real. There are things that are seen, things that are not seen, which lie beyond the things that are seen. The seen is a veil that hides them, a veil of mere appearance, almost of illusion. The veil is of tran-

sient things, a show that passes before the eyes. But the Unseen is Eternal, Unchanging, Restful, Real. It is itself real and it is the reality of all that has any true being, especially of the soul. "It is the Real, It is the True, and thou, whosoever thou art, art It."

From the idea of the Unseen there is a transition to that of the Real; from that of the Real to that of the All. God is the All in all. Whatsoever things there are in Nature animate and inanimate, whatsoever powers and forces fill the universe and move human life, God is the truth of all and the unity of all. His is the eternity of transient things, His is the ultimate reality of all. And not only of that which empirically now is, nor of like things yet unborn. In the treasure-house of His being are all true desires and satisfactions yet unrealized, all high ideals and aspirations to guide political and private life among men throughout the ages in this and other worlds. In Him all is one, is harmonious and glad. In the truth of its being everything is good. When we take up the standpoint of competitive multiplicity, as though colliding molecules were the ultimate truth of things, we inwardly get away from the One and create a false world of evil and illusion. Renounce this false world and take your share in the eternal life of the Whole.

This sense of a Beyond supplies, perhaps, the real basis of the idea of the transcendence of God. It is almost the same as that of His immanence, differing from it, indeed, in emphasis rather than in meaning. The transcendence of God does not mean, surely, His complete separateness from, and externality to, the world, but the truth that beyond and behind what is manifested in Nature there is a measureless Something which is not manifested. My view, therefore, seems to me to include A.'s, but, to my feeling, it is more definitely theistic and religious in character than his. I have no hymn of my own, as he has, to quote in support of it, but I will quote something better; many of you probably know it :—

Truly this All is God! As born of Him, returning to Him, breathing in Him—So let a man with peace at heart meditate thereon.

For man is in truth a thing that yearns. As is a man's yearning in this world, such does he become on his departing hence. *Therefore* let him yearn *for God in meditation thus:*—

Of mind is He made; Life is His body; Light is His form. His purpose is truth, His Spirit is space. His are all deeds, all desires, His are all scents and all tastes. Robed is He in this All, Silent, Unconcerned.

He is my Soul within my heart, smaller than a grain of rice or barley, smaller than a mustard-seed or a canary-seed or a husked canary-seed. He is my Soul within my heart, greater than the heavens, greater than these worlds.

His are all deeds, all desires. His are all scents and all tastes. Robed is He in this All, Silent, Unconcerned. Such is my Soul within my heart: Such is God. To Him shall I be united on my departing hence. He who has felt this truth can know no doubt.*

(iii) *God as the Correlate of Thought*

A. and B., began the third speaker, C., have both given expression to their sense of a Being either identical with, or somehow present behind, Nature. Unfortunately I have no such sensibility myself, but I am conscious of a compulsion, which I believe to be purely intellectual, to think theistically so far as I can. I will have no mere apologetics; my theism must be honest conviction of real proof. But I am not happy if I cannot see how facts square with theism. Some people have an appetite for mechanical habits of thought. They reach their conclusions honestly, but they do so under the influence of a form of intellectual appetite.† I have a similar craving for theism. God is an idea which I feel impelled to entertain. I cannot honestly say that I love God or find emotional comfort in faith. It is rather that I feel intellectual dis-

* See *The Religious Mysticism of the Upanishads*, p. 59.

† For some expressions of appetite for mechanical conclusions see, *e.g.*, Stallo's *Concepts of Modern Physics*, ch. i.

comfort in views which are not theistic. Perhaps it is a case of "Reflex action and theism." * And I do not think that it is so much the practical, volitional side of my nature which makes me a theist. It is certain impressions —the "department One" of the reflex triad—which awakens in me such a strong conviction of the reality of God, or perhaps I should rather say departments One and Two—impression and reflexion. Such things as epigenesis, and what has been called "orthogenesis" in the sphere of evolution, and facts brought to light by Psychical Research, but also the phenomena of instinct, compel me to believe in the unmanifested, or transcendental, existence of an immeasurably More and an immeasurably Higher which are the ultimate ground of empirical reality, and to regard mechanism, and its subjective tendency to mechanical thought, as products of creative Spirit. And unless this line of thought is carried to a definitely theistic conclusion it falls short of its own logic. So God is for me that which I absolutely *must* think, if I am to think coherently at all.

(iv) *God as the Ground of Values*

I cannot myself see what is the practical value of mystic presences or gods who are merely unseen causes, began one who spoke next. Suppose there is some transcendental cause of evolution; that does not make things any better so long as God is just a cause and nothing more. For me,

* The subject of an essay in James's *The Will to Believe*. It contains the following passages:—"My thesis, in other words, is this: that *some* outward reality of a nature defined as God's nature must be defined, is the only ultimate object that is at the same time rational and possible for the human mind's contemplation. *Anything short of God is not rational, anything more than God is not possible.*" "God may be called the normal object of the mind's belief." "First, it is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, He must be conceived under the form of a mental personality." "Theism always stands ready with the most practically rational solution it is possible to conceive." Pp. 115, 116, 122, 127. By "more than God" James is referring to the doctrines of a gnostic Absolutism.

God is something which makes things worth while and saves us from pessimism. From the standpoint of naturized, egoistic mind life is worth while and delightful so long as the body is strong and we are full of natural energy, so long as our desires are not thwarted and we are prosperous, victorious, admired, and full of inflated self-feeling. But when the reverse of all this is the case the interest in things that gives freshness to life evaporates; we become old in mind, jaded and discontented, and then "how weary, stale, flat and unprofitable seem to us all the uses of this world!" There is no ground for faith or hope, even if we still, as it were, forcibly cherish these. But in so far as through spirit we do genuinely in feeling transcend our circumstances we tend to posit a ground for cheerfulness in spite of them, and that ground we call "God." "God is in His heaven, all is well with the world." Therefore, "although the fig tree shall not blossom, neither fruit be found in the vines, though the yield of the olive shall fail and the fields produce no food, yet will I rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation."

Without the thought of God everything is robbed of its highest value. The starry heavens become a symbol of soullessness—of a mechanism that assures us that all our values are of very limited value. We like some things and profit by others. To such extent they are of value to us; no further. There can be no intrinsic worth in anything that is a chance product of the laws of matter and motion. But add the thought of God, the ground of all worth, and the world becomes a system of real values. Everything is significant, everything is good, for God, the Eternal Goodness, is in all.

Without the thought of God Nature becomes a mere scene of scientific interests, of opportunities for sport, of noxious vermin, and of scenery which we happen to like. But add the thought of God and the world becomes what it was for St. Francis or St. Rose. The things of Nature, our fellow-creatures, become our brothers and sisters. All

are to be loved, for the dear Lord who loveth us He made and loveth all. And the beauty of Nature is then a revelation of a beauty that transcends Nature, an absolute Beauty which is God's perception that His creation is very good.

Without the thought of God man appears as a bundle of very earthly impulses, chiefly towards self-assertion or towards lustfulness. But add the thought of God and every man, woman, child, becomes an incarnation of a Divine Spirit. Everyone is a person, possessed of wonderful capacities of selfhood, a reproduction of the Great Self immanent in all things. Man's good is no longer what he can get or what he can enjoy. His good is to Be, and therefore to partake, as fully as may be, of the life and nature and happiness of God.

Without the thought of God all man's high social ideals are but the devices of weakness for paralysing another's strength, to be discarded when one is strong oneself. The reality is the class-war, our dictatorship, not yours, and then the victorious allies divided against themselves. But add the thought of God and a basis is given for the principle of the brotherhood of man, and all social endeavour becomes a crusade. God Himself is the Great Crusader, our captain and our strategist. His is the great ideal of the Kingdom of God, the world as it is in God's purpose and thought. His are limitless resources to achieve the end, even if our assault should fail. When achieved it will be something heaven-deep within as well as something world-wide without, a spirit and a consciousness as well as an order of things. It will be God's own self reproduced in the form of a manifold of co-operating selves.

Without the thought of God the interests of life tend to become drab and trivial. But let a man be able to retire into God and all is changed. Even if he be too weak for great achievements, or too old, or too unqualified in any way, yet in God he will surrender his egoism and rejoice in the expanding life of God around him. And although

it is not always that the thought of God thus releases the Divine energy immanent in the world, yet often it is so, and under the right conditions may be so, and therefore it is true that the thought of God is one of the greatest assets of mankind. For there is a principle of true life immanent in all things. Realize it, and life becomes good, fruitful, happy; the guarantee that this is true is God. God is that which makes all existence an object of faith and an object of value. Therefore, if we honestly can do so, let us believe in God.

"I do not see," here remarked the third speaker, "that your point of view clashes with what A., B., and I have said. A. discovers in Nature an immanent source of life; B. declares that it extends immeasurably beyond it; I find that the transformations and emergings of higher characters in Nature are logically impossible except on the assumption of its causality. You add that its presence does indeed transform things, not only biologically, but by investing them with a value and a significance which they could not otherwise possess. There is no contradiction here, is there?" I do not know, replied D., whether there is any logical contradiction, but there is a great practical difference between my way of looking at farm labourers as children of God and A.'s vision of them pursuing and eating one another in jungles. I look upon even animals as being more than mere products of Nature. They have an intrinsic worth and ought to be treated always as ends in themselves and never solely as means. Trees and flowers too are not there merely for human gratification or as accidental products of inorganic forces. They have a right to live and be beautiful whether they are seen or not. And that which gives them all their intrinsic value is God. The more religious we are the more we shall see everything as possessed of significance and value. If God were annihilated the light would go out of Nature, and all its kissing and killing and consuming would be too dismal for words.

(v) *God as the Inner Self*

The fifth speaker, E., said :—When I ask myself suddenly what God means for me, not as an idea or as a luxury-sensation, but as a practical and necessary part of my own inner life, I find that what I treat and invoke as God is an unrealized state, or attitude of myself. I seem to consist of a stream of states, attitudes, impulses, all more or less cramped and unsatisfactory. But beneath them there is a state or attitude of myself which is perfectly adequate, which is universal and identical with the deepest part of everyone else's soul. The trouble is that it is usually so unborn, so difficult to actualize in daily life. But it is what I pray to; it is obviously the source of redemption and salvation; and the only way I can get into touch with it is when I make it my God, worship it, pray to it.

There is one ideal fundamental attitude of mind from which all holy desires, all good counsels and all just works do proceed. From it are derived the virtue-attitudes, and the principles of all right thinking in all departments of life. From it comes, in the sphere of the individual life, the fundamental attitude of mental health as opposed to everything in any way neurotic or perverse. There comes also the attitude of bodily health so far as this rests upon a mental basis. In the sphere of politics there arise from this one fundamental Right Attitude all movements and institutions which make for the betterment, enfranchisement and enrichment of human life.

Similarly in all branches of civilization and religion, whether Eastern or Western, older or newer, there is a Right, or Ideal, Attitude making for harmony and for happiness, for peace and for progress, for goodness and for grace. It is, in fact, the principle of all salvation. The constitution of the universe is such that from one fundamental right attitude of mind all salvation in all departments of life proceeds. We feel, or intuit, that basic fact or constitution of things and call it " God."

Now it is quite possible and legitimate to treat the fundamental attitude of the self from which all good proceeds, and the constitution of the universe in virtue of which it does so, from the standpoint of natural science and even in conjunction with speculative atheism. "God," for such a school of theology, would not be a living person, but a quality of mind in virtue of which it could flow in the direction of life and well-being, and "the Devil" its capacity for flowing in an opposite direction. Or "God" and "the Devil" might be opposite conditions of protoplasm. Or however else anyone may happen to conceive the problem. But this is speculation. As presented to introspection God appears to be a certain attitude of mind, within us, but not our own.

For this fundamental right attitude is not that of our normal selves. There is something universal about it very different from the egoism which marks our natural impulses. And so within ourselves we find a duality; on the one hand our normal self-feeling with the appetites and impulses that accompany it, on the other hand the possibility of a calm, all-embracing right attitude of mind which would, if realized, take us out of ourselves altogether. This latter is the antithesis of all that is self-centred, self-seeking, particularistic, narrow, materialistic.

It is, of course, a truism that good and evil of all kinds depend to an enormous extent upon our states of mind, and it is not only orthodox, but I believe psychologically true, that welfare-producing states of mind are not always disjointed things but are functions, or "fruits," of one and the self-same deep-going attitude. (When they are disjointed they are what has been called "splendid defects" the defect lying in the lack of that organic unity which is effected only through the universal right attitude.) This deep-seated right attitude is the Holy Spirit, or God. God is thus a psychological fact which can be known in exactly the same way as many other psychological facts. He is something within our own souls, but he (or it) fulfils

the functions of God, such as guidance or redemption, and therefore he *is* God.

It may be objected that the right attitude I speak of, so far as it exists at all, is a function of the individual psyche. To argue this out would take too long, but I believe it could well be maintained that the objection rests upon an illegitimate assumption of a more ultimate pluralism than is borne out by the facts; that it is only the lower psyche, with its concern for the individual body, which is so completely individualized; that the development of Spirit (upon whatever instinctive basis) is really a process of transition from a state of individuality, or atomism, to the state of being "a member (*i.e.* limb) of Christ"—an organ of a spiritual organism instead of a self-contained unit; that, in fact, Spirit is a collective rather than a purely individual thing. But even if this is not the case I would still hold that God is such as I have described, except that I should then have to admit that there were as many gods as persons. Even now I do admit that God is partially individualized in each person so that he is empirically many, though I think the underlying unity is obvious enough.

I admit that in my own case God is very weak. I explain that in this way: power means energy—something which belongs to the realm of matter. Our organic energy is controlled by our animal instincts. Spirit can control energy only indirectly through controlling instinct. When instinct or appetite has obtained control of our organism, and therewith of all supplies of energy, the God within us is powerless.

It seems to me that this observation of a latent Spirit within oneself which turns out to be the latent capacity for a certain attitude *of* oneself is quite sufficient as a theoretical basis for a religion of the Holy Spirit such as even a materialist might have. For even if he explains it, however unreasonably, as a product of matter in motion, yet relatively to the individual consciousness it is God.

(vi) *The Adorable*

We have just been told, said the next speaker, that God is an empirical fact, a datum of psychology, something which is found by simple observation of what is inside one. To me that is just the reverse of the truth. God is found entirely by the way we react to Him. He is not presented to us either as an observable state of mind or group of faculties which are there whether we love Him and worship Him or not. It is love for God that gives us God. Our adoration alone finds Him and proves His reality. He is neither me nor a nest of ants nor any other finite mortal thing. He is not weak and dependent upon physical energy; He is all-powerful, all-good, all-adorable.

From the love for man as a principle of universal love transcending all distinctions of race, character, agreeableness, and the like, there is a natural transition to love for the source and ground of universal love, God Himself. In fact " God " means just this attitude of universal spiritual love reflected back upon itself as its own ideal and adequate object. God is that which ought to be loved with all the mind, the soul and the strength. He is the ideal, all-inclusive object towards which the ideal attitude is primarily directed.

If we analyse this Godward attitude we shall find that it contains about five or six primary elements. There is first adoration, love, positive feeling carried to an extreme; secondly, belief - a conviction of God's metaphysical reality; thirdly the desire to realize Him in personal thought and feeling; fourthly the will to serve Him and to regulate life by Him; fifthly the will to utilize Him and to avail myself of His will to serve me. Therefore my duty towards God is to believe in Him, to love and adore Him, to seek to know Him, to seek to find Him, to conform myself to Him, to avail myself of Him, and to serve Him truly all the days of my life. With substitution of the word " seek " for the word " fear " it is exactly this account of

the attitude of mind which constitutes religion that is expressed in the Church Catechism. "The right attitude towards God is to believe in Him, to seek Him, and to love Him, with all my heart, with all my mind, with all my soul and with all my strength. To worship Him, to give Him thanks; to put my whole trust in Him; to call upon Him; to honour His Holy Name and His Word, and to serve Him truly all the days of my life." "Fear" is appropriate only in so far as man is not yet religious and does not yet love God. It should therefore not come into an analysis of the religious attitude.

We may call this attitude, with its resulting tendencies, "the Godward trend." Its effectual presence differentiates religion from mere theism and from mere interest in religion. Apart from differences of emphasis, the Godward trend is substantially the same in an Amos or Jeremiah, in Jesus or St. Paul, in St. Francis or St. Catherine, in William Law or Henry Newman, in Al Ghazzali or Ali Mirza Muhammad, in Shandilya or Ramanuja, in the Shaiva Siddhanta or in Akhnaton.

God is the Adorable; He is that towards which the Godward trend is the appropriate attitude. He is that which must be loved with all the heart, worshipped in intensity of spirit and served without reservation, whatever sort of thing or being the rightful object of such devotion may be.

Idolatry

The principle of love for God is almost certain to be misunderstood until we clearly grasp the difference between such love and idolatry. For it is idolatry which, both for believers and for unbelievers, falsifies the central concept of all religion—the idea of God—and evokes tempers and attitudes of mind quite the reverse of those of true religion.

Idolatry is a form of devotion, worship, passion. Herein it differs from mere superstition or mythology. Of course feeling enters into these also to some extent. But super-

stition as such is primarily non-religious: this or that is lucky or unlucky, this or that proceeding can effect this or that. And mythology is often the expression of genuine religion, of the higher feelings, or of some innocent play of the fancy. Idolatry on the other hand is an affair of the cruder and baser passions. It is devotion directed towards a supernatural object thought of in such a way that the right attitude towards life, towards mankind, towards all possible objects of interest cannot possibly be associated with it. National ambitions, sexual passion, thirst for pleasures, partisan animosities, and the like, create and find support in idols.

An idol is a fancy object imagined in order to provide satisfaction for our lower instincts in the worship of it. An idol is not usually a concept, but a mental image, the product of phantasy and associated with mythological ideas. In order to justify devotion to itself it has to assume some divine name, so that the uninstructed may surrender their hearts to it and indulge in all the passions which are the real basis of it, thinking all the while that they are doing God service. Such idols are therefore often called "Christ." Unlike God, Christ is picturable as in space, and as human as well as divine. But the feelings and attitudes associated with the idol are what make it an idol, and some idols have no visual image. The Church is often an idol of this kind. Religion always tends to be permeated in greater or less degree by idolatry, and when we are dealing with such a term as "God" we naturally have to consider whether we are thinking of "the true God"—who is defined as "Spirit" and as "Love"—or whether we have to do with an idol of our own imagination which we call God. But religion also contains—real religion *is*—a movement of the soul in quite another direction—the movement towards Spirit. And this will not be understood so long as we are unconsciously confusing religion with idolatry.

If the term idol be used to signify a material image employed in the worship of God some other expression

may be used to denote what I have called an idol. But I think that "idol," or "mental idol," is the right term because the real significance of idolatry is that it is a direction of devotion towards the fancy-gods of passion instead of towards Spirit. It is devotion, not merely to a god who happens to be non-existent, or devoid of mental properties, but who is the god of the antithesis to Spirit.

When, therefore, I speak of love for God I trust it will be assumed that I am not simply expending fine language upon a mental object which I should myself call an idol; that I am satisfied that there is a supreme religious object approached through mental processes quite other than those involved in idolatry; and that I am conscious of some of the more obvious dangers which beset the treatment of this subject.

It is religion itself which discovered and repudiated idolatry, and, as can be seen in the case of the prophet Amos, the religious condemnation of idolatry is originally a condemnation, not of image-worship, but of the moral accompaniments of a debased religion. And the Christian formula "God is Spirit" is directly levelled against the introduction into religion of those motives of national and denominational partisanship, and against those materialistic ideas of the dependence of religion upon spatial and physical conditions, which are represented by the Woman of Samaria, the type of unspiritual religion. "Spirit," or pneuma, is mind in so far as it is free from all determination by the limitations and the passions of Nature, but determined by a definite content of its own of a higher order. And prior to the impulse to realize Spirit in the individual soul there rises, self-created, the idea of Spirit-in-itself, and that is God.

(vii) *God as the Helper*

What an inert body you all have come to think God to be! said the seventh speaker. Beyond creating a world by such imperceptible degrees that one cannot be sure that

it is not creating itself He does nothing at all. Good and evil, higher and lower forms, all come rolling mechanically along in accordance with the same general laws, and God either does nothing or does everything, and does it regardless of particular circumstances—which comes to the same thing as doing nothing. A God who does nothing in particular is not a god at all, but only a name for the unknown ground of existence. What is the use of a *fainéant* deity like that? Give me a God who makes some difference in particular concrete situations, a God who can perform miracles and make Himself felt as a power to be reckoned with! That is the very meaning of the word God. It is a term always related to some other term. Thus there is the intuition of God and Nature, God and the soul, God and history, God and evil, and so on. And each of these itself represents a group of revelations of God manifested in this or that relation to the soul, to the course of history, and the rest. Thus in relation to all these things God is that transcendental Other which supplements, modifies, transforms, negates, or reverses that which seems to be given as fact or to be rationally inferred. He brings to naught the things that are and calls things that are not as though they were. He is known, not as He is in Himself—*i.e.* in abstraction from the world—but as He is encountered through the various relations in which He stands to human experience.

When Yahweih met with Moses as he was feeding the flocks of his father-in-law on Mount Horeb, He bade him go to the Israelites in Egypt with a message of redemption. Moses answered that the Israelites would ask for the name of the god who was promising to redeem them: in that case, what should he say? (We must remember that the "name" of a god meant, for primitive Semitic people, a great deal more than a mere conventional sound by which people might refer to him. The name was the expression of the attributes of a being, so that to ask for the name of a god was to ask for what would pass as a definition of him

and explanation of his existence.) Yahweih answered: My name and nature is "I will be what I will be." That is to say: The nature and definition of God is inexpressible; it cannot be represented in theological theory. But it can be realized in life. The Israelites accepted Yahweih, and found in Him a redeemer from their bondage, a leader through life's wilderness, a captain and source of inspiration in their battles, a source of law, a creator of a new social order, teacher of a higher faith, manna to the hungry, water in the desert, a guide to the promised land. How could all that have been expressed in an initial definition or metaphysical explanation? It was only life itself that was able to teach them, after they had once accepted Him as being for all practical purposes their god. So Yahweih, instead of declaring His name, said to Moses: Tell the Israelites that I will be to them all that I will be. All that He would be to His people only life and service could explain—not definitions, explanations, or names.

God's acts are therefore miracles, acts which somehow modify, or "violate" a normal order. He may, indeed, be the ground of the normal too, but for religion it is those occasions where the normal is transformed or reversed, and therewith the counsel of the prudent based thereon is shown to be foolishness, which reveal God. When, therefore, the question is asked, "Where is God revealed?" philosophers may answer, and may rightly answer, "In the world-order." But it is not true that this is the usual answer of sincere religion; it is not the normal intuition of faith. This is rather "In the wonderful intensifications, revaluations, transformations, reversals, of the apparent world-order which we have known." In fact, in miracle. And the doctrines of religion are attempts to indicate certain typical classes of cases in which the real seems to be modified, and the rational falsified, by a transcendental Power.

To-day, as of old, the Name, or essential, manifested property of God is "I will be all that the occasion re-

quires"; God is the great Magician, the worker of miracles, the reverser of evil, the bringer forth of life and joy and health. Miracle cannot, indeed, be brought into our lives merely by reciting petitions, performing ceremonies, or otherwise pressing a button; the higher order must be really entered into and "realized." But the possibilities are there because God is there. God may also be this or that, but, above all, God is a realm of amazing possibilities.

(viii) *Synthesis*

The last speaker said: I have no definite idea of my own, but I have been very interested in noting the agreements and differences of the rest of you. It sounds at first as though you disagreed completely, but I am not sure that your views are really inconsistent with one another. God may be some transcendent reality which is all-good and the ground of all beauty and value and goodness. But He may be reproduced in persons in the way that E. says and be discoverable as a psychological fact. There would then be two modalities, as it were, of God (quite apart from any idea of an Absolute which one may hold). On the one hand a transcendent Adorable, on the other God in man. E.'s God may be the ground of all those reactions in us which make one person want to love and adore Him, another to frame proofs of theism, another to deify Nature, another to feel a presence behind Nature, another to reverse Nature and find miracle everywhere. In that case it would be true of all these views and impressions that "they are but broken lights of Thee," which are visible and prismatic only when they are broken. Intuition is one-sided, but real; falsely isolated, yet true. Its own remedy for this one-sidedness must be a gradual synthesis. If we take sides with one intuition against others we make that false isolation all the greater and prevent the growth of a more unified and adequate intuition. That is one of the drawbacks to the unfortunate distinction between ortho-

doxy and heresy, my denomination and yours. It is not so much a unified and adequate concept or creed that I mean, but a fuller, more many-sided vision. To get that larger vision the last thing in the world to do is to "safeguard" our favourite intuitions or doctrines in any way. It is a pettifogging thing to do. Let each feel free to follow his own light, and in the course of centuries the Spirit himself will effect a synthesis of our intuitions of him.*

(c) *The Spiritual Life*

The main significance of the idea of God in modern times lies in the fact that it is the principle of the higher life. There is a life determined by the lower instincts regulated by a moral law. There is also a life which is conceived as of a higher order, and which is often called spiritual. The ground and principle of that life is called God. We need not here analyse and characterize the Spiritual Life; the broad distinction of the moralized-natural life on the one

* This principle of the synthesis of intuition is insisted upon in many places in the Upanishads. The synthesis of the intuitions of God as Brahma, the ground and principle of Reality, and as the Ātmā, or inmost self, was one such synthesis. The synthetic intuition of Brahma-Ātmā was called "*vidyā*," knowledge. The intuition of Him as the Adorable, infinitely rich in gracious attributes, knowable through love and worship, had been classed by some thinkers as mere superstition, *avidyā*. But most of the Upanishads, and especially the oldest verse Upanishads, insist equally strongly upon the synthesis of the intuition of God as Reality and that of God as the Adorable. Thus the Kaṭha says, "He must be intuited in both ways, both as Being and through His determinate character." (Astītyevopalabdhavyastattwabhāvena chobhayoḥ. The word ubhayoḥ is in the locative case). Similarly the Brihadāraṇyaka says, "When a man, by direct intuition, has a vision of Him as the Soul, as the object of devotion, and as the Lord of the Ages, there can be no room left for doubt." (Yadaitam anupash'yati ātmānam, devam añjasā īshānam bhūtabhavasya na tadā vichikitsati.) Compare the Īshā, especially verses 9–11. The Sh'wetāsh'watara Upanishad might fairly be described as an effort to give expression to this synthesis of intuitions. On the other hand ecclesiastical Christianity, as presented in church services, seems to be almost totally devoid of any desire for a vision of God here on earth and to exhibit no consciousness of its possibility.

hand and the Spiritual Life on the other is enough.* When the Spiritual Life, which need not necessarily involve theistic beliefs, becomes conscious that it is dependent upon an unseen source and reacts to it positively † we have religion. The coming of the idea of God means in principle the emergence of religion, and religion is the welcome of the Spiritual Life conceived in relation to a transcendental source, namely God. Or, again, religion is devotion to the hypostatically conceived principle of the Spiritual Life. Once believed in, God is also recognized as the ground of all existence, and the apparent contradiction between these two conceptions leads to problems which need not here be discussed. Enough that we have here to do with the evolution of the self-consciousness of the higher life, and that the idea of God symbolizes, and to a large extent effectuates, the coming of that life. Otherwise expressed, the Spiritual Life, fully developed, properly involves the idea and worship of God, while conversely the purified idea and worship of God tend to the realization of the Spiritual Life, and therefore the return of faith is a significant fact.

We thus set aside all ideas of gods or of God which are rooted in the natural life or in the moral law by which it is held in check, and all religion which centres round such ideas. The existence of unspiritual religion, its fears and hopes, its passions and superstitions, fall outside the scope of our present study. We are not concerned with all that goes on in the name of religion, but only with that religion which is the product of the Spiritual Life.

When the Spiritual Life turns towards itself we have religion. When, that is to say, Spirit in man directs itself towards God, its transcendental source, we call it the

* For the nature of the spiritual life see, *e.g.*, the Bible, the mediæval mystics, *A Serious Call*, and the philosophy of Eucken. Spirit has become increasingly conscious that the whole of life provides occasions for its realization, but it is not synonymous with culture and civilization.

† The term "positive" is here used as in the expression "positive affect." For the characteristics of positive reaction see b (vi) above.

religious consciousness. Spirit may be conscious of itself as principle without assuming religious form; in the higher political and educational ideals, for instance, its impersonal self-consciousness is obvious. But there it is self-conscious only indirectly; primarily it is conscious of some mundane task, such as the development of a child's mind or the organization of peace, and in connexion therewith is indirectly conscious of itself as the principles, attitudes, dispositions, which promote and harmonize with such aims as these. But Spirit may also turn directly to its source and frame for itself ideas of this latter and develop attitudes and " duties " towards it, and so arises the worship of Spirit conceived as God. It will then feel impelled towards these same mundane tasks except that the interest in them is in this case a secondary result of its primary interest in itself and its own source.

In this process Spirit " props itself upon " more primitive and unspiritual interests. Just as a child's first love for its mother rests upon its satisfaction with the food and comfort which she supplies, and as later capacities for love support themselves upon that first love for the mother, so does Spirit graft itself upon the pre-spiritual. Pure unadulterated love and reverence for God could find no inlet into a soul entirely preoccupied with material things; God needs a door to enter by, a bridge, or stepping-stones, whereby to cross from heaven to earth. This door, or bridge, is provided, among backward peoples, by idolatry, fetishism and the like. However unspiritual they may be, however crude the self-interest and passions to which they may appeal, these gods of the heathen are at least supernatural powers of unspeakable importance whose demands require most careful observation. From this low-grade religion, Spirit then, like a refining and consuming fire, burns away the connexion between the idea of the supernatural and the cruder passions, brings them into opposition with one another, and finally, upon the framework of the idea of a supernatural power of ineffable importance, whose demands

require most careful observation, it builds the idea of God and defines Him by itself: "God is Spirit," "God is Love."

But there is another road to God later built than this. In the process of asserting itself against the flesh Spirit not only purifies religion, but also secular life. Higher interests, such as education or the organization of peace, arise outside the sphere of religion, and then find that after all they are themselves in principle religious. Just as in the former case the idea of a supernatural power was spiritualized by the absorption of higher and the extrusion of lower interests, so now, conversely, higher interests not originally religious may discover in themselves the influence of a supernatural power. The prophet Amos is a good example of the former process, Eucken of the second.*

All human interests, religion included, prop themselves upon survivals of infantile interests persisting in the unconscious, and so we may say that spiritual religion on entering the world shapes itself, form for form, to the threefold basis upon which it supports itself—submerged (predominantly childish) interests, primitive religion, and spiritual interests of a non-religious character.

We are not here concerned with the psychological paths by which the interest in the idea of God arises—arises

* The following quotations are from his *Christianity and the New Idealism*. (Harper. Transl. by L. J. & W. R. B. Gibson.)

"Religion is not a supplementary adjunct to the Spiritual Life, but is essential and native to it; nay, more, it is the fundamental condition upon which alone the Spiritual Life can realize itself within human experience. To regard the Spiritual Life as merely man's work is to destroy it at the root. It cannot be understood save as a development of the organized universe, a development which takes place in man, communicates itself to man, but is never merely man's production. The wholeness of a man's life must proceed from the wholeness of some deeper Life and must be constantly replenished at this source. Its presence attests the invasion of our life by a new Order of reality, involving a breach in the causal order of nature. . . . That there is some superhuman Power at work within us, lifting us above the narrow limits of our private and particular individual existence, renewing us and also transforming our relations to our fellow-men, is the supreme truth for which religion stands" (pp. 28, 10, 15, 4).

independently of ecclesiastical authority. But an analogy may make the general conception easier to accept. In cases of auto-suggestion and hypnotic suggestion an end is suggested and the subject provides the psychological path by means of which the end realizes itself. In the same way it is thinkable that if there is a spiritual realm its content should be, by a kind of telepathic process, transferable to man as ends which he has somehow to actualize and conclusions to which he should somehow come.

Once formed, the idea of God may develop into a full religious consciousness. This is not a special group of interests occupying a corner of the mind, but a new level of mentality altogether, as is seen most clearly in cases of conversion. But even when there has been no crisis the supervening of religion means a new kind of mind which might be described as the nucleated Spiritual Life. Its nucleus is God. True religion, as opposed to spiritual culture, is the Spiritual Life *κεφάλαιον*—*i.e.* with its natural climax, nucleus, or focus, present, even though it may not be fully developed. It cannot be fully developed without an adequate ethic, for, without this, whole tracts of life, such as politics, may be withdrawn from its influence and obstructions in the form of artificial commands and prohibitions, such as sabbatarianism, may throw it out of right relation to the laws of life. But it " has its head on," it is consummated even if not completed. We may therefore claim that religion is normal in the sense that it is a development whereby the powers of the soul reach their proper organization and expression. It is the " proper " organization of the soul, not because it is considered right, but because the soul is so constituted that the realization of its highest capacities depends, directly or indirectly, upon religion. " Thou hast made us for Thyself." And if this is true the emergence of intuitions of God is a normal and healthy function.*

* To say that in religion Spirit turns upon itself and becomes directed towards its own source may appear equivalent to saying that

§ 2. Providence

The doctrine of creation declares that, as Law says, "All things in the whole order of nature, from the highest heavens to the smallest hair, are always to be considered, not separately as they are in themselves, but as in some relation to God," that this God is a Being of infinite wisdom and goodness, that His power is all-sufficient for the realization of His all-good will, and that all the mighty forces of Nature owe their origin to Him. It must be admitted that this doctrine is one which is very difficult to hold with conviction because it involves so much; it implies providence as well as causation.

"Every man is, by the law of his creation, by the first article of his creed, obliged to consent to and acknowledge the wisdom and goodness of God in His general providence over the whole world. He is to believe that it is the effect of God's great wisdom and goodness that the world itself was formed at such a particular time, and in such a manner; that the general order of nature, the whole frame of things, is contrived and formed in the best manner. He is to believe that God's providence over States and kingdoms, times and seasons, is all for the best: that the revolutions of State and changes of Empire, the rise and fall of monarchies, persecutions, wars, famines and plagues, are all permitted and conducted by God's providence to the general good of man in this state of trial.

"A good man is to believe all this, with the same fulness of assent as he believes that God is in every place, though he neither sees nor can comprehend the manner of His presence.

"This is a noble magnificence of thought, a true religious greatness of mind, to be thus affected with God's general providence, admiring and magnifying His wisdom in all things; never murmuring at the course of the world, or the state of things, but looking upon all around, at

religion is a process of introversion. But that which in religion is introverted is not libido but Spirit. Libido cannot acquire the character of Spirit until it has passed through and incorporated processes of extroversion. And when Spirit in-itself, or God, is realized it is found to be an outward-flowing thing.

heaven and earth, as a pleased spectator, and adoring that invisible hand, which gives laws to all motions, and overrules all events to ends suitable to the highest wisdom and goodness." *

This doctrine, then, teaches us that the whole history of the world is providential in that all creation is the outcome of God's will for the salvation of man. He created this world in the overflowing of His love; that man may win salvation He guides and educates him; when he falls He seeks to redeem him, as a shepherd seeks a sheep that is lost. From the earliest dawn of life, through all the struggles of evolving and declining races, through sorrow and failure and sin and torture and death, the one constant purpose of the Infinite has been the salvation of the world; the one basal fact about both Nature and history is that they are both, ultimately, the expression of infinite love.

But this way of putting it seems to be an overstatement. The real doctrine of Providence, surely, is that which declares that all things work together for good *to them that love God.* Whatever loss or trouble may befall them—yes, even whatever evil they may have to struggle with in their own hearts—will result in more than compensating blessings. A reaction to the occasion from within will always be forthcoming, a reaction sufficient not only to give them a certain sovereignty over fate, but also in time to win a happy and favourable environment for them and to turn failures into success. But the qualification " to them that love God " is essential. It is not that God insists upon being loved as a condition for giving the help which he is quite able to give without it. God is not omnipotent. He seems very largely to lose complete control of the world in the process of creation and only regains it in so far as his creatures return love for love. Only we must remember that " love for God " does not mean a sentimental feeling towards a mental idol that we call " God," but something quite different.

* W. Law. *A Serious Call.* (S.P.C.K. ed., § 54.)

God, Soul, the Supernatural, the Kingdom of God, Providence, etc., are names for different aspects, or apparent implications, of one great fact. That is the fact that there is another side to, or order of, the Universe other than Nature and largely contrary to it. This higher world is found through trustfulness, love, and comparative freedom from certain tempers and passions. The higher world is all-harmonious; it is peaceful and peace-loving; it is filled with the spirit of Jesus; the events which happen in it are miraculous; diseases are healed, characters regenerated, misfortunes averted. A person acquires effective citizenship in the higher world through a certain determination of spirit. That determination cannot be identified with morality, or with ordinary religious devotion, or with belief. There is an attitude deeper than any particular moral code, any particular mode of worship, any particular creed. It is a conscious or unconscious love for God, and this attitude admits to the higher order. When this attitude is present the order of events is modified. Nature changes. Thus if event *m* has taken place it will be the tendency of the order of Nature for events *n*, *o*, *p*, to happen, but the tendency of the higher order is that things *l*, *k*, *j*, should happen. What actually does happen will be the resultant of all the natural and supernatural tendencies operative at the moment, and so far as events *l*, *k*, *j*, actually do happen the order of history is providential.

When we approach the question empirically we soon become convinced that there is probably a vast amount of evidence (though doubtless of a kind which is convincing only to the persons concerned) in favour of the reality of Providence. There are in all likelihood very many who could say, with Dr. Rendel Harris, "We deduce the doctrine of Guidance from the fact that we have been led." Further, it is probably true also that consciousness of Providence tends to connect itself with the consciousness of a life-purpose. If we may then generalize from this assumption we conclude that the sphere of Providence is

not primarily the fortunes, but the functions, of the individual. If a man is false to his own innate function and mission in life he deranges his own providence, and becomes "deserted by God." The inborn purpose of such and such years of a life may be either some kind of deepening and purification of the soul, or it may be some special service of mankind. In either case his Providence will manifest itself in a tendency for circumstances to conspire, in a way which often gives the impression of their having been planned, to make his response to his call possible and fruitful. If a man has a mission which he is fulfilling obstacles will tend to arise to prevent his taking a course—*e.g.* booking a passage on such and such a vessel—which, if carried out, would prove fatal. This is only a tendency, a tendency which may be thwarted. But it is probably marked enough to indicate at least the primary sphere of Providence.

Negatively, Providence is not an agency to distribute the amenities of life as equitably as possible or to avert disaster as such, and the picture which represents Providence as an angel ready to prevent two children from falling over a precipice is, from the standpoint of empirical observation, untrue. Providence is primarily neither preservative nor effectively universal. It is rather a special agency, operative to any effective extent only in special cases, whereby the normal, purely causal, course of things is modified. It can operate only when a number of conditions are fulfilled, affecting perhaps several people. A bread-winner is knocked down in the street and killed, not because the ways of Providence are mysterious, but because the man's transcendental apparatus had not established empirical control. It seems as though Providence were a function of individuality and in this case happened to be insufficiently developed to work the required miracle. This individual providence-machine may be the means for the transmission of Divine action. But in any case it seems to require a special psychic organism.

Thus from an empirical standpoint personal Providence might be described as a series of impulses which emanate from some transcendental ground connected with the life-purpose of the individual and possessed of powers of telæsthesia and precognition. It is not concerned with the comfort of the individual or even with his physical safety except in so far as this is required for the fulfilment of his life-purpose. For it must not be forgotten that the value and purpose of every individual life is subordinate to, and comprised under, the great world-purpose which we may call the Realization of Spirit. And where life is too easy and pleasant men tend to degenerate, and Spirit is not realized. Therefore God's love and Providence may indeed be directed towards every individual, and yet it may be that the object of the eternal love is some lofty potentiality within us and not our empirical selves. Thus St. Catherine of Genoa says: "The love of God is . . . love . . . directed to our true selves, since these selves of ours were created by and for Love Itself." And the true self of man is never passive, never a mere inert receiver of enjoyable things, but a fulfiller of high functions. Divine love and Providence must accordingly not be understood too much on the analogy of the watchful care of a human mother concerned for the physical safety of her child. Providence in this world may be like Providence in purgatory, where too much peace and comfort would be incompatible with the whole idea of the place. But the love still remains a love for the individual, and Providence what has derisively been called a *Privatverhältnis* between the Infinite and the creature. For, to quote St. Catherine once more, "If man could but see the care which God takes of the soul, he would be struck with stupor within himself." *

If, therefore, the intuition of omnipresent love and wisdom fails us, so that we can no longer feel it true that "When God created man He did not put Himself in motion for any other reason than His pure love alone," if we cannot

* Von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, i. p. 261.

see that each soul is the object of Divine care, let us at least admit that our negation of this belief is due to a general impression rather than to any conclusive reason, and is influenced by assumptions which may not hold good, such as the assumption that care for a man means care for his comfort and longevity, or the assumption that "God can do whatever He likes." If we do not spin silly deductions out of the word "omnipotent"; if we do not exaggerate the idea of Providence; if we try to appreciate it in its most adequate form before we criticize it in its most extravagant expressions, we shall not find it so contrary to all experience as at first sight seems to be the case.

Apart from this special mechanism it seems to be incorrect to attribute any particular fact to the Providence of God. The progress of the world may be imagined as prompted by the suggestions of Spirit. But these promptings require for their realization the response of humanity. Spirit is powerless to coerce evil or to control Nature beyond a certain point. Things may happen, not because God, Who is Spirit, wills them, but because He cannot prevent them. He can only suggest. For God proposes, but man disposes.

I append an example of apparent Providence. Mr. Avertoom, an Armenian gentleman of Calcutta, told me that he and his wife had started a small home for famine children. As it grew financial difficulties developed. He had written or spoken about the home to a lady friend in America. This lady told the story to a certain Nonconformist minister. Some months later an English nobleman came to the town and went for a stroll one Sunday morning. On coming to a certain chapel he felt an impulse to enter, and did so. The minister, on going into the pulpit, said that he had intended to preach on such and such a subject, and had, indeed, prepared a sermon on it, but something impelled him to tell his congregation instead something which he had heard some months before about some Indian famine children. After the sermon the nobleman went

into the vestry and contributed a substantial sum—I think £200—to their support.—There is an element of organization and timing in this occurrence which goes beyond telepathy and which may fairly be called providential.

§ 3. Grace

The problem of religion may be regarded as the problem of reconciling the testimony of religious persons (and especially of mystics) with the experience of persons who are either not religious at all or religious only in a second-hand, ecclesiastical way. The former assert that God interacts with them in such a way as to exercise Providence and guidance, to bestow grace and healing, and to effect a radical deliverance of the soul from the slavery of sin. This faith is so unlike the experience of other men that it is readily set down as imagination, mythology, phantasy. The simplest hypothesis which corresponds with all the evidence will be that we may distinguish between the God of the universe and the God of the individual; what is true of the one is not, without qualification, true of the other.

By "the God of the individual" I mean a theoid formation within the individual psyche which exercises those functions which are attributed to God—providence, guidance, healing, grace and redemption. Whatever else may help to constitute a theoid centre within the soul, it does exercise powers which lie beyond man's other conscious and unconscious capacities. And further, a theoid centre is developed only under the influence of the Godward trend. It must be treated as God, believed in as God, loved, trusted and cultivated as the real eternal indwelling God. Then it will grow and function; God will be no mere object of belief, but a source of available help.

God seems to operate upon the individual in two ways. God, the God of the universe, acts upon the existing personality as latent capacity of a higher selfhood. As the

child has a latent manhood within him, so has every man a latent divine manhood. This is derived from the supreme Self of this All, and it runs through the universe as grain through a piece of wood, and determines what developments shall be possible or fruitful. But this influence of God, due to the structure of the universe as founded upon a perfect self, operates under all circumstances and at all times and is not a special empirically felt influence such as is understood by the term " grace."

It is the nature of available, empirically felt grace that we have now to consider. How can a man have such intercourse with God that he can experience a something coming into himself as it were from without and from God, purifying, sanctifying, deepening his whole inner and outer life? And what is that something? The answer must be that the God of grace is not the God of the universe but the God of the individual, the Divine focus within the limits of each finite individuality, that psychic formation which functions within the soul as God.

Grace, or sanctification, in the sense in which we are now using these terms, differs from redemption in that it represents, not a radical reorganization of the psyche, but an interaction between the theoid centre and the rest of the psyche whereby the latter is kept healthy and is progressively modified for the better.

Such centres appear to us as a non-ego. Our Me, our self, is that group of instincts, habits of thought, feeling and action to which our sense of self-identity attaches. These alone are " our own "—*i.e.* what belong to our self. Those higher elements, on the contrary, which we feel at times within us but not as our own are truly objective for us; they stand over against us as a " Not-ourselves." It is this Not-I within us that we should love and try to make the centre round which our self is to be organized. God, therefore, really is objective to our empirical self-consciousness.

Further, this otherness and objectivity attaching to the

divine element in the soul must be developed by our taking up the attitude of religion towards it. In so doing we must avoid the mistake of emphasizing our own unworthiness, sinfulness, or the like. Never mind what are the characteristics of the conscious self. Treat this element within you as God. It will become God for you. (At least, that sometimes happens, and we are supposing that it will happen in any given case). The God so developed within you will exercise the functions of the Godhead; He will prove an "I will be all that I will be"—all that your need requires.

The soul possesses considerable latent quantities of divinity—that is to say, the psychic material of which God is made. The entire soul of man should be organized about two centres, not about one only. One centre is self-consciousness, the other God. God has to be built up. When He is, for the individual in question, in being He interacts with the conscious self. His functions are grace, guidance, providence, healing, redemption and the giving of joy. The content of the self is richer and of higher quality when thus double than when it is single. The attitude of the conscious self towards its god should be that of a man towards God. This is justified by the fact that a man's god, though a psychic formation, is not *merely* a psychic formation, but therewith also a reproduction in man of the transcendental Godhead.

This doctrine of strengthening and purifying grace as the influence of the divine focus upon the normal consciousness has practical consequences. For the experience of grace presupposes the existence of a sufficiently developed God within the individual. If God is developed in any given soul he can be utilized in such and such ways as the source of grace. But if God be not developed the doctrine of grace ceases to be real and true. It is not true without qualification that God gives grace through sacrament and prayer, but it *is* true that *if* God be developed in an individual he often gives grace in such ways. A very

large proportion of the verbalisms and futilities of traditional religion rest upon this fallacy of *a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.*

For those in whom God is not sufficiently developed as an organized centre the doctrine of grace is not true (except in a sense that is not really a doctrine of grace at all). If you have no God functioning as part of your being you have nothing to answer your prayers or send you comfort and strength. We hear numberless unqualified declarations about God's grace which are really true only under certain conditions. And the first and most important condition is the existence of a sufficiently developed God-centre within the soul. No private God, no grace. But if any person's God is developed, everything which may stimulate him into activity becomes a means of grace—*e.g.* prayer, sacrament, the beauties of Nature, or, indeed, anything else.

§ 4. Judgement

There sometimes seems to be an element of negation, an element making for death, for Not-being, inherent in the human spirit. I do not refer to mere transiency, the fact that organisms die, but to a black principle ceaselessly active to neutralize his best efforts and to sterilize his life, to rob it of its joy and its glory even while it lasts. It manifests itself as sin, as folly, as misunderstanding, as suicidal mania, as hypochondriasis, as neuroses, and in many other ways. Man is born for life, love, knowledge, conquest, achievement, health, God, the unseen Kingdom. Something persistently thwarts all this. Life is blunted down to mere existence; love withers or fails to come; knowledge is blotted out in the mists of oblivion; instead of conquest and achievement he finds weakness and failure; infirmities cripple him; before he knows what it is to find God he knows what it is to be forsaken by God; the Better Land fades away as a mirage and leaves the

would-be pilgrim alone in a limitless desert. This is the Destroyer of life, Apollyon. As a ghostly *retiarius* he throws the fine meshes of his net over his victim, and only very gradually does the soul find that it is caught fast, and that there is no deliverance. Conceived as an activity of God, Apollyon is called the Divine Judgement upon sinners:

> "He who has never eaten bread with tears,
> He who has never sat, heart full of anguish,
> Weeping upon his bed the long nights through,
> Knows you not, Powers Divine; he knows you not.
> Ye lead us, all unwitting, into life,
> Ye let the wretch incur the penalty,
> Then ye abandon him to his sure doom;
> For every sin finds recompense on earth."

Can it then be asserted that it is a function of God to judge and punish sinners? Such a proposition is not empirically verifiable in the same sense as those which we have been considering. For in the case of the latter what is asserted is that *recourse to* God tends to be followed by such and such experiences, whereas no one can have recourse to God's judgement upon sin. This can only mean that the universe is so constituted that sin is always punished. But this is an interpretation of experience rather than a specific reaction which can be empirically verified.

Furthermore, it is never God who punishes. Nature punishes, not God. That part of the Absolute which has become to a greater or less extent mechanized is Nature, and "Nature never forgives and never forgets." But God is unmechanized spirit: He is that which reverses and overrules Nature and brings good out of evil. This God does not condemn nor punish, and this God alone is the Redeemer and Healer of souls.

It is not here a question of moral feeling, but of empirical fact. Certain men have said that they have discovered an agency, seemingly Divine, for rendering help in time of need. Well, *this* agency never punishes. Spirit never

damns or destroys. It is difficult to see by what logical process one could infer that it did. What happens is that we first personify the agency of grace by means of some such metaphor as " King " and then proceed to attribute to it functions, such as punishment, the idea of which is derived, not from the facts, but from the metaphor.

Illusion, sickness, sin, retribution, distress, damnation, form a single group of processes. That which deceives and tempts also judges and condemns. And this, for experience, and for empirical theology, is not the Eternal Goodness, but Apollyon, or howsoever called. We are not here discussing the origin of evil. The point is that evil, as it exists for experience, and howsoever relatively " unreal " it may be, tends to destruction, and that we have no reason to attribute certain aspects of this fact, under the names of Judgement and Damnation, to God, while we attribute others to the Devil. The Everlasting Mercy knows no such thing as " Justice "; it will forgive unto seventy times seven.

We have, perhaps, in Apollyon, to do with a psychic formation comparable to theoid centres, but of an opposite character. It operates as an agent, and there is, therefore, some reason to hypostasize Apollyon as an entity. What happens is probably that certain partial trends, escaping integration, borrow a derived personality from the ego and subsist as a consolidated, pseudo-personal complex. But this finds itself up against an influence making for good and for perfect selfhood, and therefore for its destruction. In self-defence it reacts against its enemy, the self, and thus manifests itself as a destructive, apparently suicidal, trend within the individual. In the course of the struggle the dark complex more and more becomes a will to evil for evil's sake—*i.e.* a will to evil to the self because evil to the self has become its own good. However this may be, apollyonism exists as a latent trend in all human nature. When a partial factor, that is to say, escapes integration it does not merely seek its own gratification,

but also the destruction of the self, of other selves, and of all good. But there is no reason to attribute destructive, or punitive, activities to that inward power, or Being, which we experience as God. It is but false analogy which makes us think otherwise.

CHAPTER IV

MORAL THEOLOGY

§ 1. Personal Ethics

(a) *Adult Morality*

Personality is the possession of selfhood. "Personal" is the adjective of "self." A self is not simply a soul, or animating principle, of an individual. It is a soul organized as a unity which is its own end. In so far as a man has no selfhood he is a string of impulses such as some speculative writers suppose the animal soul to consist of, but of which a bad case of morphia- or cocaine-taking is a much better example. Here there is nothing but inclination and indulgence, with no power of resistance and no steadfastness of purpose—in fact with no real purpose or end at all. So far, on the other hand, as a man is a self he is a system of permanent ends which control his whole life and character. He wills to be such as his ideal for himself prescribes. That ideal may be union with God, a seat in the Cabinet, a large income, usefulness to mankind, or other aim. In every case he acts, not on the inclination of the moment, but as a single whole that sees its good in the doing of that act, whether it be work or relaxation. A self can be realized, can come into concrete being, only through the medium of natural instincts. But it does not consist simply of a group of instincts. The instincts, wants, impulses, are, in Green's language, "organic to it"; they are elements incorporated in, and necessary to, the self as a concrete living whole. But they do not completely constitute it, for the self as a transcendental principle is presupposed throughout. From the very

first the self is a self, and the history of its development takes place within itself; it is not put together from extraneous material such as sensations and impulses which have no original connexion with one another beyond a common dependence upon the same body. The word "self" therefore, in this sense, means "an organic whole consisting of an active, supernatural principle of selfhood and certain psychical elements derived from Nature, its aim in every action being itself as realized through that action."

If this be a true account of personal action it is clear that self-realization is the form of all its activity. A person cannot choose whether he will act in accordance with the principle of self-realization or not, for all his choices conform to this form. Self-realization means personality in action. But it is equally true that such action can only take place through the expression of instinct and the development of capacities. This does not imply the indiscriminate expression of all instincts and the development of all capacities, for this would, of course, be impossible, even if it were desirable. But it means that personal action has two sides, or aspects; one is its formal character as self-determination, the other the choice of a particular content according as these or those instincts are expressed and these or those capacities developed.

When we apply these thoughts to the sphere of ethics the subject naturally falls into two divisions. There is the more formal and the more concrete side of ethics. Its formal side will consist of the development of those principles which are necessary to the maintenance of genuinely personal action. Right conduct is real self-determination. Its material side will be an exhibition of right attitudes towards the concrete issues of life, attitudes involving a right expression of instincts and right choice among rival possibilities of development. The present section of this volume, on Personal Ethics, is an attempt to deal with the former problem upon the basis of Christian tradition.

The moral and quasi-moral forces which regulate life

may be classified as taboos, instinctive feelings, and, thirdly, moral convictions. A taboo is a prohibition resting not primarily upon any assignable ground, but upon the habit of regarding the violation of it as being awful, shocking, wicked. Taboos may be of various origin. But common to them all is imposition from without, unrationalized character, and superiority to criticism. The person bound by a taboo is unfree, unemancipated. He sees the word *Verboten* written over all sorts of possible actions and is subdued. He feels that he is acting from pure respect for the moral law.

This feeling that something is forbidden and that to do that thing is very wicked and wrong is quite different from a simple calculation of the consequences. This latter is not a moral but a prudential judgement, with which we are not here concerned. Further, it is different from instinctive feeling, or apparently instinctive feeling. This latter is one's own, wherever one may have got it from. One may feel a thing abominable, magnificent, disgusting, and know no more about it than that these are the words which best express that feeling. But at any rate it is oneself which is feeling. The taboo on the other hand is an alien body embedded in one's own psychic organism. The forbidden act possesses no particular moral quality, but the doing of it is surrounded by a mysterious awfulness. A good example of a violated taboo is the case of the Welshman in *Lavengro* who had sinned against the Holy Ghost.

Different alike from the taboo and from instinctive moral feeling is reasoned moral conviction. A conviction is a moral judgement which one has consciously and deliberately made part of oneself. One has reasoned out the pros and cons to the best of one's power; one has challenged one's own instinctive feelings and forced them at least to be conscious that they are real functions of the self, and that in that fact lies their authority.

We have, then, three types of moral judgement to consider in their bearing upon ethics :

(*a*) The recognition of, and acquiescence in, an unassimilated, but incorporated, prohibition, or taboo. Infantile morality.

(*b*) The expression of instinctive feeling giving moral quality to act or feeling judged; the expression of the raw material of moral selfhood. Adolescent morality.

(*c*) The expression of reasoned, criticized conviction. Adult morality.

Instinctive morality is an essential and permanent element in moral selfhood, and the fact that the presence of any feeling is recognized and deliberately approved may be quite sufficient justification for it.

Adult morality, so far as it is realized, involves the total elimination of infantile morality. It is an essential and important part of ethics to clarify and rationalize the moral judgements. Every taboo must be challenged, and if it is not found to correspond either with our reasoned conclusions, or with our really own instinctive feelings, it should be discarded. Moral freedom is emancipation from mere taboo.

Such reasoned convictions imply standards—standards which are themselves generalizations from moral experience: this or that point of view carries an immediate moral authority or value.

It is, I think, quite wrong to assume that all moral problems can be adequately treated from a single standpoint. There are several quite distinct sides to the moral life and their standards are in practice incommensurate.* These may all converge and harmonize in some transcendental realm, but they are incommensurate from an empirical standpoint, and only an indefinable *phronesis*, or moral wisdom, can tell us which point of view on any given occasion is the most urgent.

There are, first, the ethics of tradition, environment and taboo. Certain things are right, others wrong, and

* This view was expressed in a paper by the present writer read before the Congress on Moral Education at The Hague in 1912.

that is the end of the matter, until fashions change; meanwhile the voice of our early training is the voice of God. Then there are social ethics. Things which promote the well-being of the social organism are right; things which produce bad social results are wrong. Different from this are altruistic ethics with their standard of my nearest brother's need regardless of remoter considerations. Altruistic ethics have regard to particular individuals rather than, as in the case of social ethics, to an impersonal community or to social conditions. There are also the instinctive, or intuitional, ethics of formed personality; a person may have an unconquerable aversion to doing anything mean or dishonourable, and that simply because it is so utterly repugnant to him. Then we have the ethics of self-realization and the ethics of mysticism. These, I think, are the main genera or most distinctive types. And the right way, surely, to treat any moral problem is to approach it from all these points of view successively. The present section (§ 1) is concerned only with the ethics of self-realization. These rest upon the idea of a higher, as yet imperfectly realized, self; the laws of the realization of which afford the ground for the moral judgements of distinctively personal ethics.

The idea of spiritual attainment is associated in the New Testament with the principle of self-realization. This is expressed by the frequently occurring term "grown up," *teleios* (usually translated "perfect"), as in the verse "in malice be babes, but in understanding adult." * The whole idea of perfection in the New Testament is not so much that of "faultlessness" as of "completed being," and this, in modern language, is self-realization. Thus we are told that apostles, teachers, etc., have been given us to adjust and unify the constituent elements of the Christian community (like the setting of the fragments of a broken limb) with a view to functional activity and corporate progress "till we are all come . . . to full-

* 1 Cor. xiv. 20.

grown manhood as measured by the fully-developed personality of Christ." * The self-realization of individuals is here put forward as the end aimed at in all social organization, and is linked with the exhortation to be no longer children.

One of the chief characteristics of moral immaturity, or childishness, is the lack of rationalized standards. This or that "isn't right," but one cannot say why. When people round us begin to do, or approve, the forbidden thing—such as, *e.g.* playing tennis on Sunday—we gradually conform to the new fashion. This is suggestibility rather than moral conviction. It is a being tossed to and fro by other people's opinions, and in contrast thereto the apostle bids us "think out valid principles." † Moral maturity involves a relative independence of the judgements and standpoints of our environment, and this is possible only when our principles have been rationally thought out and we have, to a greater or less extent, reached the level of adult morality.

(b) *Relativity*

The idea of self-realization has reference to three factors. There is, first, the formal character of the act as an act of the self as a whole, deliberately willed for assignable reasons: moral action is personal, as opposed to merely instinctive or suggested, action. Secondly, there is that system of higher interests of which the individual is not yet capable, but of which he is capable of becoming capable. Thirdly, there are the actual instincts and habits which contain all his sources of energy. The question here is not the medical problem of avoiding conflicts

* Eph. iv. 12, 13.

† This is the meaning of the word ἀνεπίληπτος in such contexts as that of the passage under consideration. See especially the references in Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon* to the use of the term by Aristotle.

leading to neuroses, but that of the expression or renunciation of instinct with a view to the ultimate maximum actualization of the highest selfhood of which a person may become capable. The true, or higher, self is no mere idea; it is introspectively discoverable. But it is, at first, unenergized, and the way to the energizing of it is through the right association of it with temporary interests of a lower order. What those interests are to be must depend upon the individuality of the person concerned.

The morality of the self-realizing subject, in accordance with the laws of the growth of moral selfhood, is essentially relative. What is right for me to-day is relative to my own particular potentialities and the experience of my own particular past history; to the influences to which I have personally been subject and to any conclusions at which, however mistakenly, I have honestly arrived; to the particular stage of development which I have reached and to the particular alternatives that are psychologically possible for me. In any given case the next step forward for this or that given person may be something far from ideal. He may refuse to take that step for moral reasons—*e.g.* unwillingness to kill or injure a man he would have had to fight. But he does so at the cost of his own development, unless he can find an alternative which his instincts will accept as a substitute.

It is a question of the right balance of the three factors in self-realization—will (*i.e.* whole-self action), ideal and impulse. And since all energy comes from instinct, some instinct (such as fear in the form of fear of hell) must be yoked to the ideal, or no real action takes place. And the instinct must be a real one of one's own, however unexalted it may be. At first the ideal is mere idea; then it unites with some instinct; then it absorbs its energy and becomes itself a passion. Unless this result has substantially been reached by the twenty-fifth birthday true self-realization is impossible. The next stage onward must of course have

more goodness and less badness in it than that left behind, but it must be the expression of some real development or modification of existing instincts.

Real morality is not, in the great majority of cases, the achievement of some part of a divine ideal, but the realization of that alternative which brings one somewhat the nearer to it. Hunting animals to death is hardly a Christ-like sport, and yet in some cases it may be the higher alternative so far as the ethics of self-development are concerned. Commerce may mean a selfish and more or less unscrupulous pushfulness under the influence of the desire to be rich—again hardly a Christ-like interest. Yet the actual alternative to such occupations and such sports may, in this or that given case, be a general moral deterioration, masked by a hollow morality of mere ideas or mere negations. Or again, let us take as an example the situation described by Browning in "The Statue and the Bust." Here the Duke and Riccardi's wife, though desirous of an abduction, fail through sheer irresolution; the higher alternative would have been to have done the deed. It was already committed in wish and phantasy; it was abstained from only for reasons which were really mere rationalizations to cloak irresolution.

It is fatally easy for some of us to abstain from this or that mode of self-expression for the sake of a vague ideal that is not organically related to our actual interests, and so to relapse into actionless theorizing, or worse. One does not understand at the time what deadly infantile weakness may underlie this turning away from empirical reality. Empirical reality is the material in which the ideal must be realized. Once lose emotional touch with it and the ideal becomes a barren concept, incapable of exercising any appreciable influence. In other cases too much abstention from evil leads to contentiousness, bigotry, and the like. In yet other cases (as for instance occasionally in the case of conscientious objectors) we find an obvious posing, an overwrought scrupulosity, a morbid

craving for admiration, a general censoriousness, a something indefinably wrong somewhere, showing that Nature and Spirit are somehow out of joint in good men genuinely devoted to an ideal.

It follows that the same particular act, done by such and such a person on such and such an occasion, may be both right and wrong. It may be positively unchristian. But it is nevertheless quite possible that from the standpoint of personal ethics it may be a good act, because it may conduce to the development of the moral personality of the doer at the particular stage which he had reached at the time of the action. The further point that morality is also relative to the circumstances of, and to opinions current in, the social environment, is a consideration of less practical importance.

(c) *Freedom*

Christian morality is based upon an antecedent realization of freedom. Liberty is not the reward of perfect virtue —an illusory gift to those whose period of temptation is over. St. Paul calls the Galatians " senseless " and as not yet having Christ formed within them. Yet it is these very imperfect Christians, these beginners, whom he exhorts to " stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free." He regarded the Corinthians as " carnal," as " puffed up," and as likely to abuse their freedom. And yet he recognized it even in their own dangerous formula that all things were lawful. The Jewish-minded Christian will insist that man must be bound by divine laws until at last the great change somehow is effected and with the consequent release from the bondage of sin he passes into the life of freedom. This is not in the least the teaching either of Jesus or of St. Paul. Indeed, it misses the whole idea of freedom as found in the New Testament altogether. That idea is *not* the Kantian idea of moral autonomy or

freedom from the slavery of the passions—I mean, this is not the meaning when the word "liberty" is used.

In the New Testament the word "liberty," or "freedom," almost always, if not always, means "freedom from externally imposed law which has become transformed into irrational scruple, superstitious regard for taboos, and the like." This is insisted upon by St. Paul over and over again. "Let no man exercise judicial authority over you with regard to questions about eating, drinking, the observance of holy days, and so on. . . . If you have the Christ principle in you the elementary morality of respecting prohibitions such as 'don't touch this,' 'don't eat that,' is over and done with for you. Why then should you submit to such things, as though you were still subject to all the restrictions of secular ethics?" * And the whole epistle to the Galatians is occupied with the denunciation of such command-and-prohibition ethics put forward in the name of religion. The opposite principle is called by St. Paul "the law," or "the A.B.C. morality of secular ethics."† And "the law" means just the opposite of "liberty." It means "subjugation to externally imposed laws which has become transformed into superstitious scruple." Any act, says St. Paul, which implies the acceptance of such subjection stultifies the Christian principle altogether, however neutral in itself the act may be.‡ It is no refutation of this principle to call it antinomianism; Christian ethics *are* antinomian.

Of course it is absolutely true that the significance of such antinomianism is determined by its moral context, and that context in Christianity is constituted by such principles as the ambition to be spiritually minded, the recognition of Jesus as Lord, and the conviction that love is the fulfilment of all true law. But this is very far from amounting to a rejection of "antinomianism." Everyone must decide for him- or her-self whether or not, for instance,

* Col. ii. 16, 20, 21. † "The rudiments of the world."
‡ Gal. v. 2.

it is right to go to church or attend Mass. And the same is true with regard to all acts which are not obvious offences against one's neighbour, even when, from some points of view, it is admitted that they are morally objectionable. And to say this does not mean that none of these things matter, but that the individual Christian must be responsible for ruling his own life, and not consider that all such questions can be settled by proxy upon the authority of the Church or of society. It is for "the Church"—*i.e.* all ecclesiastical authorities, teachers, etc., not only to be themselves free, but also to treat other men as free, "commending ourselves (and our message) to every man's (free) conscience in the sight of God." *

Christian freedom itself springs from the same source as Christian obligation—from the idea of God. A code of touch-nots, taste-nots, handle-nots implies an external, social, legal relationship between ruler and ruled. But when the ruler is an Inward Ruler, is Spirit, is an all-working principle ruling the heart from within, no externally imposed laws hold good any longer. That is to say, they do not hold good as absolutely binding obligations, but only as grounds for free self-determination: in view of the disapproval of society or of the majority of my fellow-churchmen it may be better not to do this or that, but neither Church nor Society can impose real laws or prohibitions upon the soul.

One day Peter was asked by revenue officers of the Temple whether Jesus paid his Temple-rate as a good Jew was bound by the law to do.† When he came to Jesus to tell him Jesus said to him: "These duties and obligations of theirs remind me of the attitude of a subject people towards some heathen king. Do you not realize that we are not God's subjugated enemies but His children? The children of the King are free." The metaphor was suggested by the occasion, but the underlying thought was of wider application. What Jesus criticized was not the

* 2 Cor. iv. 2. † Mat. xvii. 24–26.

collection of money for the purposes of the Temple, but the unfree, legalistic attitude of the Jews towards God. His words implied an assertion of freedom, not as his own special privilege, but as a principle of all true religion.

It is hard to see what room naturalistic ethics can have for freedom or for self-realization. For if the soul of man is simply a centre of crude passions tamed by social fear, the only morality that there is is the morality of command and prohibition, the morality of respect for taboo. Take this away, give man's nature free play, and we relapse into savagery. A sense of honour, consideration for the weak, truthfulness, justice—what are they but superstitions like the obligations to fight duels or to keep the Sabbath? Challenge them and they melt away; they have no basis except convention and mutual fear.* The individual psyche is differentiated out of an hereditary mass of primitive instincts—the soul of the race—and possesses these as its permanent basis. The goodness of any man or woman, such as it is, is essentially a refinement. It is brutality tamed, civilized, educated, and remoulded under the influence of historical forces. The brutality is the primary and the prior; the civilization is the secondary and incidental. It does not represent the ultimate nature of things in any way. For the cosmos is a wild, blind, soulless thing, and so in his deepest nature is that insignificant by-product of it that has been thrown up in one microscopic corner of it, man. From these premises one can hardly draw the conclusion that we should trust

* I am not, of course, referring to the actual ethics of naturalistic writers, but to the logical conclusions to which in the sphere of ethics naturalism points. See, especially, Freud's essay on the war, in which he argues that we ought not to be shocked or surprised at the barbarities displayed in the war because the essential, indestructible part of man is his primitive impulses. These, with all the evil we may regard them as having, can never be eradicated. They can only be veiled by reaction-formations due to social fear—for that is all that conscience is. To suppose that man is born with any inherent nobility in his nature is an illusion hardly worth serious consideration.

freedom and have faith in humanity. And conversely, if, for some mysterious reason, we ought nevertheless to exercise that trust and that faith there must be something in the universe that naturalism has overlooked.

§ 2. Social Ethics

(a) *The essence of Christianity*

Every religion is a complex of many elements. It includes a certain type of worship; certain beliefs about God, the soul and the unseen world; certain institutions; certain habits of mind and principles of conduct. It is a mere academic exercise to discuss which of all these elements can be regarded as containing the essence of the religion and which are of a more secondary, derivative, or incidental nature. But it is not a mere academic question when we ask, "What is the essence of Christianity *at the present day?*" For the depth and vitality of a religion lie in its power to answer the demands of every age. In one age one factor will be more essential, in another, another, according as the one or the other enables the religion to meet the need of the moment. To-day the centre of interest in Christianity lies in the possibility of its application to social practice.

A religion is, among other things, an enthusiasm for certain principles of life. This, rather than metaphysical doctrines, is what can interest and stir people to-day. And above all it is ethics as applied to public affairs which have become the centre of religious interest.

The nucleus for a resurrection of faith, so far as this is still possible, is thus given; instead of morals deriving their interest from dogma it is dogma which is dependent for its life-blood upon the energies which it derives from ethics, and above all from social ethics. This is a simple given fact, and need not here be further laboured.

Nor need it be urged that Christian ethics themselves presuppose Christian dogma. There are two methods of

practical Christian ethics. One commences with the idea of God and with the words and example of Jesus and proceeds by applying that idea and example to modern instances. The other starts with the moral tradition of Christianity and reaches the idea of God from the ethics, not the ethics from the doctrinal theology. Each method has its advantages, but here the choice is not open to us. We cannot in such a book as this postulate the metaphysical idea of God in advance. On the contrary, we shall have to examine the roots of that idea and watch its emergence. But we can assume ethical principles which admittedly are held. And we can assume such ideas as that of the Kingdom of God as regulative ethical principles irrespective of their validity as metaphysical concepts. Christian ethics may thus quite well be treated, to start with, as their own authority independent of any doctrinal basis.

Equally little can it be urged that all ethics deal with formal principles rather than with concrete issues. This may be true of the text-books prepared for the use of unfortunate students, but it is not true of the ethics of the Bible.

There is no study of less benefit to man or beast than that of purely Abstract Ethics. I have been an Ethics lecturer myself, and have discoursed upon such uneducative topics as the moral standard, the moral judgement, altruism, the social organism, and so forth. The net result of abstract ethics, apart from topical application, is so many barren concepts, "isms," and theories. Very different is what one may call Concrete Ethics - the rational study of the moral issues of the day. The justice or injustice of the social order; the rights and wrongs of subject peoples; the League of Nations and national sovereignty; the ethical bearings of the acquisitive impulse, avarice, competition, and so on; resentment and forgiveness; cruelty to animals, vivisection, etc.; the good and evil of our basic impulses. All these should be studied

as they present themselves in the living issues of the day, and from the results of such studies we may arrive at a certain number of more general principles, theories and "isms." But this is the last and least important stage of ethics; the really educative process is the attempt to think rationally and coherently about the warm, contentious issues of the hour. It is when we are trying to think both concretely and rationally that the need arises for moral standards to serve as major premises for our moral syllogisms. It is when we are tortured by our own problems or contemplate our own failures or progress that we can see something of the real nature of the moral judgement and moral action. But if we reverse the process and commence with abstract *a priori* ideas about the good will, responsibility, social approval, and the like, we seldom reach conclusions of very much value to life.

Christianity is wonderfully rich in social concepts; the tragedy is that they have been so little applied. The ideas of the Kingdom of God, the love of God, the example of Jesus, the antithesis of God and Mammon, the "Catholic," *i.e* international, Church, the principles of peace on earth and goodwill to men, the principle of reconciliation, the unity of the body, the golden rule, and many other texts, instances, etc.—these contain the possible solution of all the social and political problems of the day. One cannot, from a non-dogmatic point of view, assert *a priori* that the solutions so reached will be the right solutions or the best possible solutions. But it is obvious that these principles have, to all appearance, a very marked social and political bearing. And it is at least possible that the solutions which they suggest *may* be the true ones.

Further, the fundamental concepts of Christianity are not only rich in social content; they are also, so long as the religion possesses any vitality, exceptionally dynamic in virtue of the emotional energy which they possess. If, therefore, Christianity is not exhausted it is in a position to achieve exceptional results in the social sphere. To this

end what the Church seems to need is not so much exhortations to greater zeal as a change of outlook, and this can only come with systematic ethical thought. Meanwhile we have to emphasize the truth that the application of the social concepts of Christianity to practice is not a mere corollary or appendix to Christianity. It is that which to-day constitutes the very essence of our religion.

(b) *The Kingdom of God*

In the forefront of Christianity stands the doctrine of the Kingdom of God. With this doctrine the preaching of Jesus himself began; upon St. Augustine's re-formulation of it the Church of the Middle Ages rested; and in the last century it again formed the central idea of reform movements in the Church as diverse as the Christian Socialists and the Ritschlians. The doctrine possesses three aspects—the social, the spiritual, and the supernatural. It is the doctrine of an ideal world-order, and is therefore a social doctrine. But that world-order is the outward manifestation or product of a certain spirit and temper. It is realized in the individual soul as an inward state and inward possession; in society as the world-order which corresponds with that inward state. There is here no temporal priority one way or the other. The Divine Order is a single fact; and whether we look upon its social aspect as a world-order as being the product of the soul-order, or whether we regard the soul-order, or inward aspect of the Kingdom, as itself conditioned by its outward manifestation, we should avoid a one-sidedly causal point of view. We should aim, rather, at a synthetic vision of the Kingdom in its outward and inward aspects as an organic whole. Of its supernatural aspect as the sphere of miracle something has already been said.

The doctrine of the Kingdom of God, on its ethical side, is virtually idealism in its religious aspect. This doctrine asserts that the "first" aim of right endeavour is the

realization of a perfect order of society in which there shall be no more social injustice, war, or national or sectional hatred, where disease of body and evil tendencies of the mind can be mastered and controlled as soon as they arise; when the possibilities of the human personality are fully developed, and life is rich, pure, strong, and happy. This state of things must be brought about by the renunciation of those passions—especially of avarice—which at present make it impossible; by the spread of knowledge and a deeper understanding of man's true well-being; and by the spirit of universal love. The will of God for man will thus be realized in social form; and His will will be done in earth as it is in heaven.

Over against the Kingdom of God stands " the world "—*i.e.* society organized upon the basis of a spirit and temper the opposite to that of Christ. Mankind tends to become split up into groups based upon material self-interest and group-feeling. Thence spring emulations, wrath, strife, envyings, and similar works of the flesh. Even apart from materialistic motives all group-consciousness tends to narrowness, dividing mankind into foes and comrades. The patriot is the Chauvinist, the class-conscious person is the despiser or bitter hater of other classes. With the accession of power there develops the will to crush all rivals, to dominate, subjugate, and exploit. Such is the order of what the Bible calls " the world," however much it may be mitigated by caution and convention. The great corrective of all these attitudes is the idea of the Kingdom of God. Where that is dominant all narrow, hate-inspired loyalities are controlled and purified by its wider vision and spiritualized interests. One important test, therefore, of the reality of Christian social morality is readiness to oppose the State, or one's own party, whenever it is acting in an unchristian way. And that must necessarily be often, for the State is essentially an organization of sectional interests irrespective of the welfare of humanity as a whole, except in so far as the latter is a

means to the former. The Church, on the other hand, is essentially international—the word "Catholic" means "international"—and its end is the salvation—*i.e.* true well-being—of man, as opposed to the promotion of sectional economic interests. Proclaiming the unity of all mankind in God and the deeper unity of all Christians in Christ, it must insist that that unity be taken seriously as a guiding principle for Christian conduct. "For He (Christ) is our peace, who hath made all nations one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us . . . to make in Himself of all peoples one new man, so making peace, that He might also reconcile them all unto God in one body by the cross, having slain the enmity (of race towards race) thereby.*

The idea of the Kingdom of God is thus that of a just world-order, an international order, and a spiritual (*i.e.* spiritually motivated) order. The existing order means that men are subordinated to money, personality to profits, that the majority of our population remain more or less uneducated, compelled to spend their lives in dull uninteresting work for others' profit, and often in great poverty, while vast millions are being spent on Army, Navy and Air Force in support of the trading interests of competing nations. And then at intervals war, with all that war means. It is in its antithesis to such a world-order as this that the Kingdom of God must be understood.

(c) *Christianity and Politics*

This brings us to the question of the relation of Christianity to politics. If the relation of inner to outer factors in the moral life is at all a close one—as is almost universally admitted to be the fact—religion will inevitably be intimately connected with politics. Sometimes the

* Eph. ii. 14-16. I have changed the duals "both" and "the twain" (*i.e.* Jew and Gentile) into plurals ("all nations," etc.), but the sense is not affected. "Both Jew and Gentile" means "all nations alike."

only way in which a moral principle can be carried into operation is by means of regulating social or international conditions, and then we have politics. A few instances will show that the rigorous exclusion of all political matter from the sphere of Christian ethics is an artificial one, and that, on the contrary, Christian politics are, in many cases, not a dubious corollary to Christian ethics, but an essential part of the elements of Christian conduct.

Let us take first the Collieries Bill of the year 1842. Can we say that Christianity is neutral as regards such issues? Can we say that a man with a full understanding of, and perfect devotion to, the Christian religion, and with a full knowledge of the facts of labour in the mines at that time, could vote against such a Bill? No one would to-day put forward such a contention. But that means that in 1842 religion was in principle bound up with politics, whether this was widely recognized at the time or not. And if in 1842, then always. As a second example let us take the various texts of the New Testament which enjoin peace. They bind Christians, as much as lieth in them, to live peaceably with all men. They refer both to a certain spirit and temper and also to a definite will to peace. It is psychologically impossible to possess that spirit and to exercise that will and at the same time to remain hostile or indifferent to all proposals for promoting international arbitration in the place of war. The will to do anything (*e.g.* to live peaceably with all men) is incompatible with unwillingness to take steps to bring it about. Inwardly and spiritually the Christian will to peace is one and indivisible, whether expressed through Parliament or not. To hold that we ought to live peaceably with all men in the abstract and at war with all our concrete rivals would sound, so bluntly expressed, hypocritical nonsense. But that is what in practice the separation of religion from politics amounts to. As a third instance let us take the political question as to whether the system of competitive individualism, with the hope of big profits as the incentive

to investment, should be maintained, or whether experiments should be made in modification of it. Is it psychologically possible to champion such a system and at the same time take seriously the various precepts of the New Testament about covetousness, about having consideration for the things of others, about the unity of the body, about the wickedness of oppressing the poor, and the like? It is not. To say so amounts to the will to relegate Christianity to the realm of pretty words and vague emotions. I am not here implying that the necessary economic consequence of Christianity is Socialism—*i.e.* collectivism. Another possibility which was being successfully developed in Germany before the war is State-controlled capitalism, or, as Mr. Belloc, in *The Servile State*, calls it, Distributivism. There may be yet other alternatives. But if we are Christians in practice there must be the will to *some* kind of more spiritualized a social order than the present one.

It is said by the opponents of the introduction of Christianity into politics that the true sphere of religion is the private life of the individual. "The private life of the individual," however, is an abstraction. The concrete fact is a number of persons who are pursuing their own ends (chiefly the acquisition of wealth), now by comparatively private, now by more political means. The interests which determine a man's politics and those which govern his private life are, in the main, the same. They do not constitute two separate "spheres." The individual is at the same time a voter, an economic unit, a being personally and financially interested in the doings of the Government. Through his party, or through the influence which the federation to which he belongs is able to exert, he makes laws, regulates the distribution of wealth, and embarks upon military expeditions which involve famine, pestilence, ruin, wounds and death for other individuals. For all the acts of a Government rest upon the volitions of the individuals who by supporting it endorse its acts.

All this is just as much part of the individual as is his thirst, and the presence or absence of the spirit of Christ makes at least as much difference here as at the door of the public-house.

From this point of view we may distinguish three kinds of principle. In the first place there are abstract principles, then general applications, and thirdly political details. Thus the principle of the brotherhood of man, taken in abstraction from any concrete application, is an abstract principle of Christianity. As an example of general moral applications we may take such conclusions as " The present order of society is unjust and ought to be changed, or at least modified." As an instance of political details we may in this connexion take the theory of collectivism. Now, the whole controversy as to the right relation of Christianity to politics has reference to the middle principles, or general applications of Christian ethics to concrete situations. There are but few who would wish the Churches to commit themselves to political and economic details, and there are but few who entertain objections to the abstract principles of Christian ethics. Apart from general applications all abstract principles remain quite ineffectual and inoperative. It is very rarely that they are applied direct to practice. Middle principles are necessary as a bridge, and if the Antichristians can prevent those bridges from being built the harm done to the Devil by the abstract principles of Christianity is so negligible that it can be left out of account. It is a simple fact that a vague assent to abstract principles, such as that of the brotherhood of man, can exist quite comfortably in the mind along with principles of conduct of a diametrically opposite character. For most people it is only in conjunction with general applications that abstract principles can exercise any influence at all.

It should be one of the tasks of the Church to formulate these general applications of abstract principles. It is just here that a living organization of the highest Christian

morality could be so profoundly useful. At times it seems as though the world were about to go to the Devil for lack of applied Christian ethics, and in the midst of such a situation the Church stands weak, irresolute, and even, in some of its representatives, in league with the Enemy. Many of us are conscious of the power of prejudice and Mammon in our own hearts and look to the Church for a little stimulus and encouragement for the germs of a better nature which we still have within us. But, instead of that, the Church only gives us the impression of evading real issues under a cloud of weak generalities which may mean everything or nothing.* In any case they afford no help and guidance as regards the problem of their application, and it is just this which is the crucial point. The challenge of a principle comes when it is applied; till then it is nothing.

Among the general applications of Christian ethics are perhaps the following principles :—

1. It is incumbent upon all Christian people to apply the principles of Christianity to all departments of practical life.
2. The regulative principle of all political action should be the true welfare and brotherhood of all mankind.
3. True welfare must be understood to include all that refines, deepens, spiritualizes, and gives happiness to life, together with the exclusion of that which tends to degrade and sadden it.
4. Even the true welfare of mankind must not be pursued by evil means; a good purpose, or lofty ideal, will not justify assassination, injustice, tyranny, intrigue.
5. In the event of an alternative being presented between an increase in the material wealth of

* Since the Copec movement this is no longer so true as it was even a few years ago.

England on the one hand, and the true welfare of some other race upon the other, the former interest should be subordinated to the latter.

6. No economic policy should be adopted which tends to perpetuate jealousies and strife among mankind.
7. Without offering an opinion upon any particular proposal for reform the Church is bound to express its conviction that the present econonic organization of Society is unjust, and ought to be changed.
8. It should be the aim of Christian politics everywhere to substitute co-operation for competition, arbitration for war, and agreed settlements for forcibly imposed terms.
9. An attitude of conciliatoriness in social disputes is part of a Christian's duty, even when it may fairly be held that one's opponents are morally in the wrong.

This last principle requires a brief discussion. That " forbearing one another in love if any man have a quarrel with any " is a true Christian attitude will, as an abstract principle, be readily enough admitted. But can it be applied to the case of economic disputes between class and class? It must, unless the whole principle of applied Christian ethics be invalid. In many cases it may be better Christianity to give way to the unjust demands of an opponent and to wait for a later opportunity of pressing one's own just claims rather than to stir up unavoidable bitterness and strife. This applies to every stimulation of class animosity. Class hatred is obviously unchristian, and the righteousness of an economic cause does not do away with the fact. To wait until our economic enemies cease from action which appears to us unjust is tantamount to the rejection of the principle altogether. For our opponents, whoever they are, will always appear to us monstrously in the wrong. The tendency of things will probably be towards greater and greater hatred, propagated

by abusive language, unless somehow or another Christians can raise the idea of conciliation to the level of an effective principle. The Christian principle, surely, is that if there is any struggle, whether between nations or classes, it should be conducted without hatred or virulence. Its driving force must be love, not anger.

At the same time this is a principle which is often misapplied under the name of an appeal to "goodwill and mutual understanding." It is sometimes implied that all that is wrong in the relations of employers and employed is a certain hastiness, irritation and lack of mutual consideration upon both sides. Were this the case the exhortation to mutual understanding and goodwill would be appropriate enough. But when it is part of the trouble that the workers believe that the whole existing system of relations between capital and labour is grievously unfair, simply to call for goodwill is equivalent to a demand for total surrender made upon the men. Upon what basis is goodwill to be exercised? Upon that of simple acquiescence in the *status quo*, or upon that of patience *while* the possibilities of economic readjustment are being considered, or upon that of patience *until* they somehow spontaneously come to be considered? The whole question, in short, is, as to the basis upon which the goodwill is to be exercised.

The principle of goodwill is one which has especial reference to circumstances under which an ideal final settlement is, for the time being, not practicable. In social disputes at the present day such circumstances are normal, and a right understanding of the principle of goodwill is therefore a matter of practical importance. Can it be further elucidated? The first point with regard to it is, I think, that it operates in subordination to the principle of true welfare, above mentioned. For when a conflict of interests arises, and some temporary settlement is to be arrived at, some general principle for determining what is fair and just is required. Mere compromise is

possible without reference to any such guiding principle; but if progress towards a settlement that shall satisfy all legitimate aspirations is sought for, principles must be brought into the discussion which will show the fairness and reasonableness of concessions with a view to such an end.

This leads us to the second principle of goodwill, namely this : forecasts of economic consequences are seldom to be relied upon as a decisive argument for or against any social measure. Thus at the time of the Collieries Bill it was argued that the retention of the existing system was necessary on economic grounds. The argument was disregarded and the terrible economic consequences did not occur. All appeals to " economic laws " are to be received with caution, for reasons which it would take us too far afield here to discuss. Of course such things as dislocations, slumps, and the like, can be forecasted, but the argument that this or that change of system would prove economically unworkable can only be a matter of guesswork, and can seldom be adduced as a decisive consideration. The over-facile appeal to economic necessity is one of the chief obstacles to goodwill, and always demands the closest scrutiny.

A third and most important principle of goodwill is that of balanced justice—I mean due regard for both the factors in justice, traditional right and ideal right.* Exclusive regard for either of these will often amount to gross injustice. Exclusive attention to the traditional rights of property must inevitably involve injustice towards relatively distressed classes; exclusive attention to what one has not got, but imagines one ought to have, can only lead to lack of all objectivity of outlook, to perpetual grievances and resentments, to reckless and bewildering changes whenever there is a shifting of power, and to social chaos. The principle of goodwill will thus mean that possessors

* For this double-sided character of Justice see H. Sidgwick's chapter on Justice in his *Methods of Ethics*.

shall be ready fairly to weigh considerations of ideal, non-possessors those of historical justice.

It will be observed that these principles are of varied degrees of generality. But they are all middle principles in the sense that they come between abstract principles upon the one hand and technical knowledge of details upon the other. In the process of applying general principles some such intermediate principles must always be formed in the mind, and it is the special function of the Church to elucidate them. They constitute, not politics itself, but some of the moral issues involved in political questions, and there is no more reason for the Church to refuse to deal with such issues on the ground that they are partly political, than for the State to refer all legislation to Convocation instead of to Parliament on the ground that questions of morals are involved.

The prejudices which militate against the recognition of Christian politics are connected with private interests, with class-feeling, with political partisanship, and with national self-consciousness. Each nation tends to postulate that there is something so exceptionally noble in its own breed that it has but to rule the world and all will be well. In the face of this ridiculous racial conceit it is for the Catholic Church to assert its impartial aloofness from all tribal standpoints. Above all it can never, without betrayal of principle, accept the bare word of statesmen with regard to any facts, motives or intentions connected with any war or international quarrel. This country has been grossly deceived by its own political leaders, and the Church, in its servility, has permitted the fiercest passions to be aroused by what are now recognized to have been deceptions. It is for the Church of Christ to represent a more excellent way. And wherefore should not the Church be sufficient for all these things, if it really is, as it claims to be, the primary organ through which the wisdom, love and power of God can function here on earth?

(d) *The idea of God in social ethics*

It is now necessary for us to cover more or less the same ground from another point of view. Hitherto we have dealt with the duties of the Church. Let us now suppose that, for whatever reason, men have renounced the Church and its doctrines. There still remains the moral tradition of Christianity upon an Agnostic basis, and our present point of interest is to note that there is a certain tendency for a rejuvenated Christianity to develop upon that ethical and Agnostic basis as soon as the old super-structure has been removed. Our task is not to invent new formulations but to observe growths which are actually taking place. We commence with the fact that Christian Agnostics do exist. Such men reject the Church and its doctrines because it is so worldly, so conventional, so insensible to all moral issues outside a certain narrow circle of ideas—issues which Jesus Himself would have cared so much for.

"The Church is dead. Snow covers the ground. Silence and heavy misery spread their wings dull against the faces of the people. The Church is dead. All the long years of Christianity have come to this; all the preaching and the prayers and the psalm-singing have come to this; all the rapt outpourings of the soul to God, and hidden yearnings of ages, to *this?* The Church is dead. Snow covers the ground. Snug in their firelit homes, with closed shutters and surrounded by every luxury, the wealthy, the pious and the respectable sit—and without, the People are dying of cold and starvation." *

An idealism of this kind is essentially the presentation of Christianity minus all its mystical, devotional and speculation elements. What is left is not nothing. It is human brotherhood felt as a universal principle, a principle backed by a Power beyond ourselves that makes for righteousness, the source of all that appeals to us as the holiest and best in life. It has its religious practices, too,

* Edward Carpenter, *York Minster.*

which are these : to look upon the poor man as a brother and to see to it that he has a brother's share ; to look upon the criminal as a brother and to value his personality and happiness ; to look upon the alien as a brother and to respect his freedom, his rights, his territories ; to look upon the Negro or the Chinaman as a brother and to take good heed that our trade and prosperity is not based upon injustice done to him. It is the service of the Ideal in and through the real, instead of through the medium of ceremonies and doctrinal phantasies. Whenever an issue arises in which the Ideal is involved there is the cause of Christ.

True Christianity, these idealists maintain, consists in maintaining the spirit of love and of service, and recognizes Jesus as the leading inspirer and exponent of this Way. That spirit of love and service leads on to sympathy with all sincere schemes for the abolition of poverty and distress, even when they appear mistaken in their methods. If you love you will find it intolerable that a social order should exist which condemns men to so much destitution and often to degradation, and which denies them the opportunity of true human development. For practical purposes such discipleship thus tends to become identified with social reform. But it is not ultimately based upon any economic theory, but upon a spirit—a spirit which Christian idealism recognises as the spirit of Jesus. Only in so far as the spirit of love reigns will economic redress be of much value. Both are necessary, the outward conditions and the inward spirit, and it is the inward spirit which makes us see the spiritual value of the outward conditions.

This practical type of modern Christianity, like all true religious movements, is a system of faith. It begins as faith in certain moral values, faith in a certain kind of life as by far the best in the world, faith in the spirit of Jesus Christ as the true solution of our personal, social, economic, international difficulties. Unlike other reforming schools it is not wholly utilitarian in standard (though it sometimes

professes to be so). It goes beyond utility in its instinctive response to the principles in which it believes. It trusts these farther than it can itself see, and it is this trust beyond the limits of sight which gives it that truly religious note of conviction and intensity which is its strength. But it goes yet further and is secretly inspired and sustained by faith, not only in the value, but also in the power, of love and in the glorious future which is to be. For unofficial modern Christianity, in spite of its Agnostic beginnings, is inspired by belief in a coming reign of righteousness upon earth. The time is to come when man shall no longer oppress and exploit man for his own selfish purposes. Happiness, freedom, and fellowship—these and such things as these are to be the features of life in the age that is to come. There is here the thought of an unseen power, or hypostatic tendency, working for love and truth and brotherhood upon earth, and the believer is conscious that he is on the side of the great Cosmic Purpose, of Goodness, of the deepest Reality. Is not this to have faith in God? Is it not a much more real faith than that of the conventional Christian, who for mundane purposes is a thoroughgoing materialist, but who believes in all the articles of the Apostles' Creed?

As an example of this tendency to faith upon a non-religious basis we may take Paul Richard's little book entitled *To the Nations*, published during the war. The author's convictions constitute a system of faith which is logically faith in God, in His goodness, in His providence, in His will and His power to establish His kingdom upon earth. This faith is hidden away under a veil of evasive language, but it is, apparently unconsciously, there. I will quote a few passages which are characteristic of the book :—

" This was not only inevitable but necessary, and it may be said, willed by the Will of the future. This bankruptcy of diplomacy was needed to clear the sky of Europe from the lies of State which were infecting it. This ruin of the

great nations was needed to liberate the world . . . from the very state of mind which was dominating it. This foundering of a civilization, vainglorious and false, was needed, so that the upward striving of human life could free itself from the barbarous mechanism and commercialism by which it was shut in, and humanity could go forward. This hell was needed, that out of the old order a new order might be born, a new heaven and a new earth come forth. . . . Brutal pretensions to domination of the world will be overthrown. This can certainly be predicted. But the cold ambitious calculations will be frustrated also. That is no less certain. . . . The war which the Powers are waging is, above all, the war which the Power of the future is waging on them all. . . . Look at the events from this point of view. Then you will understand them. . . . You will understand the character and the *raison d'être* of this great shock where everything seemed to be calculated for the long duration that none believed in, and the final wearing out that none wished for. You will understand that which is hidden, but must be seen, behind appearances; and beyond what is disappearing that which must be waited and willed for: the future which is on its way—something or someone whose mighty conquering footstep is shaking the world to its foundations. . . . For the war has a purpose, even if the belligerents have none. It has a purpose to which none of them would care to attain, but which all will be forced to realize at last. This purpose is very simple; the old evil must be destroyed down to its root; the old foundations of the life of the people must be torn up, and replaced by the foundations of a better and truer civilization."

It is obvious that language such as this can be justified only on the strength of faith in God. "The future," so far as it is merely "the future," is non-existent and nothing can be "willed by its will." The writer means that there is some spiritual Force, personal enough to will ends, which is striving towards realization in human society—*i.e.* towards a better future. The frustration of selfish ambitions can be "certain" only if the fact of God is certain. Every idealism, therefore, which is confident of ultimate success beyond the limit of what can be logically

inferred implies faith in God, and therewith at least a latent theology. Let the cynic be a secularist if he will; the idealist must believe that God is, for otherwise his idealism lacks adequate justification. And so the strange fact emerges that it is the revolters against Church and theology who have themselves provided a means for the rejuvenescence of the Church and a new basis for theology.

Thus belief in the real existence of God tends to supervene upon a position originally merely ethical. We commenced this discussion with a view of Christian social ethics as independent of dogma. The idea of the Kingdom of God was accepted as that of a world-order organized *as though* in accordance with the will of an all-good God. We have now seen how, in moments of apparent insight, the " as though " tends to be dropped and enthusiasm for the true world-order leads to an intuition of a Supreme Principle in virtue of which the triumph of the Ideal is assumed. This is one of the roots of the idea of God. It is not so much an inference as an immediate transition of thought under the influence of moral enthusiasm. It is not a proof; it is an emergent conviction the significance of which can be assessed only in conjunction with other facts.

§ 3. Sexual Ethics

(a) *The Nature of the Moral Principle in Sexual Ethics*

All is not well with the sexual ethics of the Church and of Society. The majority of the people of this country are, relatively to the higher possibilities which at birth we possessed, but since then have lost, cramped in spirit, enslaved to evil tempers, lonely and sad in life, and that ultimately because we are without lot or part in real love. There are the unmarried and the miserably married and those for whom marriage is as incidental and uninspiring as feeding; there are the mis-developed, the neurotic and the repressed. The sum of unhappiness and of badness for which the mistaken methods of training are largely respon-

sible is enormous. But too often good people do not heed it and do not want to heed it. They tell themselves again and again that the unhappy cases which are not due to the person's own wilful sin are exceptional, although as a matter of fact there are more unhappy than happy ones. When faced with the fact that their neighbour has never known real love it does not strike them as a tragedy the recurrence of which must be prevented. And when a tragedy is too gruesome to be ignored, as in the case of children born blind or syphilitic, their only remedy is schemes for the more rigorous enforcement of the existing sexual system. But what if that system itself be at fault?

The Church has made virtually no effort to make people understand where the moral principle in sex comes in. It has relied upon emphatic asseveration; it has proclaimed that it is upholding sanctities and divine laws, while the views of its opponents are called loose or immoral. But all these words are mere words until one can get a glimpse of the reason for them, and that the Church, to all appearances, never stops to consider. If Jesus, or St. Paul, said this or that, why did he say it? What did he mean by it? How far are present-day circumstances really analogous? Why should we accept his authority on this point, but not on others? In fact, speaking quite generally, the common attitude of the Church has been an unthinking and ill-informed dogmatism which regards conservativism as a synonym for purity—an attitude which the present writer has fully shared. We therefore need clearer guiding principles. We need especially to understand the higher and more spiritual element in sex and the laws upon which its realization depends. We have to ask why we should judge some forms of sexual activity to be good and others bad. We need to think out our ideas afresh without taking them too much for granted. We have to challenge all that passes as Christian and force it to give account of itself and show that it is Christian in fact.

For present purposes we may contrast three competing principles of sexual morality—the sacramental principle, the principle of free sex, and the orthodox British tradition. To distinguish them is by no means an idle classification, for practical consequences flow from each. Free sex disregards the higher spiritual aspects of sex and treats it simply as a harmless, and within certain limits as a healthy, form of self-indulgence. To believers in this principle it is a mere matter of taste in what form you like to enjoy sex. All are morally legitimate and none are anything more.

Orthodox British sex morality is essentially legalistic. What is regarded as sacred is not love itself, but certain legal rules which regulate its practice. The rule that there must be no coitus outside of marriage; that adultery must not take place; that divorce, except on the ground of adultery, must not be permitted—these and similar regulations and restrictions are the divine and sacred thing —not love itself—and chastity consists in the observation of them. The reason why they are considered sacred and divine is the fact that they are traditional and are apparently to be found in the Bible.

There is no essential difference between the tradition of the Church and that of secular conservativism in sexual, as in economic, matters. The former is naturally expressed in more Biblical language. But when asked what it is which the Church really and in effect stands for we must say that it is a complex of property-ethics, security, propriety, domesticity, comfort, church-going, orthodoxy, and law-abiding habits felt as a single cultural whole. It is the type in which it feels at home, and which it assumes to be of divine origin. But it can hardly be called Christian. The sexual morality which it supports is a matter of law. The law in question is primarily the law of the land, but there is a tradition, spoken of and regarded as "the law of the Church," mixed with it. The law views the whole subject of sex primarily from the standpoint of legal

possession. An Englishman's home is his property, and not only his wife, but even the chastity of his wife before marriage, is an essential part of it. Likewise he naturally wishes his daughters to be kept in good order. A maiden must be moral, modest, marriageable. She has no right to be anything else, as her chastity is one of the adornments of her father's home; it is an asset belonging to her parents rather than to herself. So patriarchal a standpoint is not, indeed, openly professed, but it underlies the Conservative Complex and the social rules which the Church regards as the laws of God. Women support this ethical tradition from a feeling that in marriage they have a safe investment. Tamper with it and the sense of security will be gone, and the marriage-value of the unmarried women seriously diminished.* So far as there is any ideal element in this nineteenth-century idea of marriage the ideal is that of a safe cosy home of one's own with its security, comfort and domestic affections, and to this end the conventions of chastity are a means. These conventions can claim a fair hearing on their merits. But they have small title to be regarded as in any special sense Christian. The ideas of life in the Spirit, of the Kingdom of God, of the divinity of love, of growth in moral stature, regard for personality, of freedom and anti-legalism, of the irreligion of a cautious, worldly, monetary frame of mind, of forgiveness, of care for the social outcast—these ideas are not in the sexual ethics of the Churches. The latter may be in many respects admirable; the point is that they are not *Christian*.

* I once remarked to a Churchwoman that the chief reason why women were averse to the recognition by society of the liaison was that it would tend to give them a sense of economic insecurity. "Yes," she replied emphatically, "that is the whole point." I do not for a moment blame this attitude of mind, but it is one of worldly wisdom pure and simple.

An unworthier point of view is occasionally also expressed. Married women, that is to say, sometimes regard sex as their preserve and resent the intrusion of an outsider who has not had to put up with the matrimonial troubles which they themselves have had to bear.

If, then, we reject the principles of free sex and of British conservativism as alike lacking in that spiritual point of view which we expect from a religious ethic we must turn to one which can be more accurately described as sacramental.* A sacrament is an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace, and what we are seeking for is the principles of such a practice as shall render sexual life as intrinsically sacramental as possible. The right principles, whatever they are, are those which could most truthfully be so described.

Wherein, then, does the higher spiritual element in sex consist? We have already sufficiently seen that the observance of legal and traditional restrictions does not make sex spiritual. Nor, again, can we say that the inward and spiritual grace of marriage consists in the influence of domestic life and in the occasions which the latter provides for the exercise of many virtues. This moralizing influence of domestic life through the occasions which it provides may be true enough in the case of most families, but it is not quite the point. By the term "grace" we mean something more than the influence of circumstances. The point, rather, is that love, if it be really love and really sexual, contains a spiritual element *within itself* to which man otherwise would not have access. We need not here dwell upon the various ways in which love may ennoble and purify the character; the point is that such purification is the outcome, not, primarily, of some law or custom regulating sex-relationships, nor of the circumstances of family life, but of sexual love itself in its reaction upon the individual. It is only from the standpoint of biology or of politics that sexual love can be regarded primarily as a means for the propagation of the race. It is at least as essentially a means for the development of the spirit,

* I admit that the inclusion of marriage as one of the seven sacraments of the Church is due to the accident of a word, but that word happens to be exactly the right one if by "marriage" in this connexion we understand "sex relations as they ought to be."

and its release from the cramping and insulating influences of narcissistic and introvert attitudes. Sex is there for the growth, the joy, the expansion, the deepening of the individual soul; it is the human sacrament of which all should partake. If anyone do not, his or her soul will be stunted and his finest sensibilities will not be developed. For the flesh is "the gateway of the spirit."

This is the sacramental principle of sex; it is the principle that when the sexual instinct is rightly developed and exercised it functions as a spiritualizing agency. The inward and spiritual grace is then evolved in the activity of the sexual instinct itself.* And from this the principle will follow that, where sex is the vehicle of real love and promotes the development of the personality, is allowed by conscience and involves no hurt to another or violation of contract, it is sacred and sacramental whether it be exercised within the limits of wedlock or outside of them.

In the discussions which follow an attempt will be made to exhibit the truth and validity of this principle.

(b) *Abstinence, Prostitution, Masturbation and Phantasy*

It is commonly asserted by champions of the existing social order, and denied by their opponents, that it is perfectly possible for normal persons to be sexually abstinent and yet remain healthy. It is not within my competence to give an opinion. But it is at least within the province of sexual ethics to insist that if a moral judgement is to be passed upon abstinence the facts of the case should be known; that "healthy" should be taken to mean, not merely healthy in body, but also healthy in mind and spirit; and that the ideal of abstinence should not be permitted to serve as a synonym for secret vice.

In this connexion I would suggest that the classification of persons into "the ordinary healthy man or woman" on the one hand, and "extreme cases" on the other, should be avoided.

* See Sub-section (f).

All persons may be classified as being either oversexed or undersexed. I do not use these terms with reference to any so intangible, contentious, and question-begging a standard as "the normal." By "oversexed" I mean those persons who require some specific sexual outlet. By "undersexed" I mean those who are under no such necessity.* They can get along quite happily and healthily without either rigorous self-discipline or sexual expression. Work, study, games, social interests and ordinary friendships suffice for their needs. If their sexual impulse now and then gives them a little trouble it is only to a negligible extent and constitutes no serious problem for them. In other words by "oversexed" I mean those who temperamentally possess more than a certain, roughly definite degree of sexual warmth; by "undersexed" I mean those who possess less than that amount. The amount of sexuality which makes a person oversexed is that amount which cannot be worked off simply by work, study, games, social interests, and ordinary friendships.

With such a classification an attempt could be made to estimate what proportion of the adult population was oversexed, what undersexed. Meanwhile assertions respecting "ordinary healthy persons" have little value.

Sexual abstinence should be clearly understood to mean complete abstinence from coitus, from masturbation, and from the phantasies which arouse sexual feeling and lead to emissions during sleep. It does not imply the absence of emissions the erotic dreams leading to which have not been stimulated by the phantasies of waking hours. Since, however, it would be difficult to be sure of the lack of con-

* If these terms be thought to imply a reference to a mean or "ordinary" degree—the very thing I wish to avoid—others might be employed, but in any case the division ought to be a twofold one. Perhaps aniceterotic and niceterotic, or megaloerotic and microerotic, would serve. The Church admits that there are such people as aniceterotics and refers to them as "such as have not the gift of continency." It says that they should marry. If a person is temperamentally aniceterotic and is unmated something psychologically and morally undesirable is probably happening.

nexion between the phantasy and the emission, and since any stirring of sexual feeling would tend to that result, abstinence could be defined as absence of coitus, masturbation and of any phantasies which stir sexual feeling. If this is not made perfectly clear the instances upon which the generalization rests may be found to prove nothing more than that abstinence from coitus is possible for those addicted to secret vice. This may be true enough, but it is hardly a principle which the Church would advocate, since secret vice is morally worse than illicit coitus. In judging health especial stress should be laid upon health of mind and spirit, with due regard to temperament, and to the past history of a person. It is by no means necessarily the case that a celibate will find abstinence easier than a widow or widower, for an unsatisfied instinct may remain more insistent than one which has had some gratification. In any case, a doubtful possibility of mental health should not be regarded as a sufficient basis for important moral teaching. Instead of preaching abstinence to the unmarried and just saying nothing about secret vice it would be far better if the Church assumed that all persons between twenty and fifty years of age required some sexual outlet and considered which outlet was morally the best. If any person could dispense with that outlet, well and good; but the moral teaching of the Church should not be based upon the assumption of its possibility in every case. The need of a sexual outlet, coupled with the impossibility of marriage for the time being, should be taken as given facts which in some cases hold good, and the Church should be prepared to throw its influence into the scale of the highest practicable alternative for such people. To say "Be abstinent or marry" may be but offering the choice between two impossibilities. Of all alternatives which is the best? And which is the worst?

There is a group of practices the characteristic of which is that they are merely sensual. All persons are more or less sensual, and all normally developed persons are more

or less sexually sensual. The craving for sexually gratifying sensations is normal, even when it is only latent. Sacramentally and biologically speaking, man's natural sensuality is there as a means to love; it is that out of which love develops, and when it has once generated love it gives it an intensity and depth which it would not otherwise possess. All those practices which while gratifying man's sensuality afford no basis for love, but rather hinder its coming, are therefore, from this point of view, morally bad. On the free sex principle, however, they are legitimate. These are (to mention only quite common practices) prostitution, self-abuse, and sexual phantasy. Prostitution on the woman's part, is sexual venality. (All persons who marry for money, security, social position or other worldly objects are morally akin to prostitutes.) On the man's part—and it is that which we are now considering—it is a gratification of sense without love or real comradeship. The spiritual elements of true sex-relations are lacking, and so the whole thing, on the man's side, is a debauching of the sexual instinct, and so an outrage upon the soul.* But at any rate for the time it takes the man out of himself and gives him a sense of adventure and it may be morally useful for a short period in getting a youth successfully on to a genuinely adult level of mentality. If a genuine love-affair does not take place in youth I think it quite conceivable that this practice, repulsive as it is, may, within narrow limits, be morally beneficial in some cases.† The moral evil of a timid, unadventurous, introverted and censorious spirit is not always realized by young men of high moral ideals; bad young men sometimes realize it instinctively and express a genuinely moral judgement in this rather disgusting way.

* Whether or not wrong is done to the women, as part of the question of degrading occupations, is one for social rather than for sexual ethics.

† I have been assured by one who had for a time thus "womanized," as he expressed it, that he felt all the better man for having done so.

Morally worse than fornication with prostitutes is the practice of masturbation or self-abuse. It is worse because it is not a case of object-libido, but remains within the limits of the self. The sexual force which might have burst the narrowing barriers of egoism is now used to strengthen them. In this sense it is a veritable perversion inasmuch as it is a use of sex to thwart the true development of sex and indeed to produce effects diametrically opposite to those which it is the function of sex to bring about.

Worse than physical self-abuse is sexual phantasy. This is the inward psychical part of which physical self-abuse is the outward. The two go very largely together. But it is possible to have the one without the other, and the deadlier of the two to the soul is sexual phantasy, or psychic self-abuse. For this leads still more decisively than does physical masturbation to the perversion of sex from an extrovertive to an introvertive function, and renders the spirit more and more incapable of love, more and more insensible to the varied impressions of Nature and of human life. (I am speaking of sexual phantasy, but would, in the case of adults, deprecate all phantasy whatsoever. It is always the vehicle of the baser elements in the psyche even when these are disguised as angels of light.) Of all alternatives this is the worst.

(c) *The History of early Christian views on Sex*

The sexual morality of Christianity emerged in a world that was partly freely licentious, partly monogamous, partly anti-sexual. Heathendom was, on the whole, licentious, ordinary Judaism more monogamous, and the Essenes virtually anti-sexual. The anti-sexual trend was very strong in the first century. Christianity did not identify itself with any of these tendencies—all three subsisted within it—but endeavoured to subordinate the whole sexual problem to the idea of the Kingdom of God.

Apart from declarations on the subject of divorce Jesus

has left us but one utterance on the subject of sexual ethics. Some people, he says, with special reference, probably, to the Essenes, there are who have chosen a celibate life for the Kingdom of God's sake, but this life is not suitable for everyone.* The blessing on those who are of a clean heart (Mat. v. 8., Ps. lxxiii. 1) has no special reference to sexual purity, and the woman we must not lust after lest we commit adultery in our hearts is another man's wife. But as to the general relations of the sexes Jesus has neither said nor implied anything. This is all the more remarkable as he is known to have consorted with prostitutes and other disreputable characters. The inference is that he did not feel so strongly on the subject as he did with regard to such sins as avarice, hypocrisy, or refusal to forgive. And, apart from the question of excess, it is possible that he may not have condemned unmarried love at all.

Two opposite tendencies soon manifested themselves in the Apostolic age—the tendency towards free love and the tendency towards celibacy. Both of these were Christian; they were applications of Christian thought and feeling to the sexual problem, and if we think that we have got beyond the moral standpoint of these early heretics let us first assure ourselves that we have got as far. Both tendencies expressed aspects of the Christian ideal, both sought to transcend conventional practice. The Corinthian Church argued that Christianity differed from other religions in being a religion of freedom. There were no commands and prohibitions in Christianity which had to be obeyed just because there was something authoritative and traditional about them. Christianity meant the realization of a certain spirit—a certain felt relationship towards God and man. Legalism was the great enemy. Jesus had begun the war against it, especially with reference to Sabbath-keeping. St. Stephen and St. Paul had carried it on with regard to association with

* Mat. xix. 11, 12.

Gentiles, circumcision, and the like. But the principle that life must be regulated by knowledge and by spirit rather than by taboo applied to the sexual sphere as well. What was there really wrong or unchristian even in a man's having sexual relations with the same woman * as his father? And as for free love generally, or for meats offered to idols, there was nothing in either of them, *per se*, that was either good or bad. Have true knowledge, keep in touch with the Spirit, maintain freedom; that is the true road to perfection. So argued the Corinthians, and certain mediæval sects are said to have drawn similar conclusions.

It is customary to look upon these Corinthians as mere half-converted heathens, really swayed by the lusts of the flesh even when they thought they were ruling their lives by high principles. But this is true of all of us, while we have not all got as far as the Corinthians in spiritual understanding. Their argument is far from being immoral nonsense. "All things are lawful" means "the standpoint of taboo ethics must be superseded." In place of prohibitions blindly and irrationally obeyed we must cultivate

* 1 Cor. v. 1. The word *gunē* generally means either "woman" or "wife," but it may also mean "concubine." (See Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon*.) The sin in the case at Corinth consisted partly in the wrong done to the father (2 Cor. vii. 12), who was evidently still alive. The word "adultery" is not used, and it is hard to imagine that the Corinthians would have gloried in a case of adultery with a step-mother. But they might have been "puffed up" about a mere lack of squeamishness if the "woman" was not the father's wife and if his exclusive rights were not too obvious. The offence seems to have been that referred to in Amos ii. 7: "a man and his father will go in unto the same maid, to profane my holy name."

The Greeks drew a distinction between a mistress (*hetaira*, or unmarried sex-mate) and a prostitute (*pornē*), between *hetairēsis*, or the liaison, and *porneia*, or connexion with prostitutes. The Latin word *fornicatio* (from *fornix*, a prostitute) has the same meaning as *porneia*. How much can be fairly inferred from the absence of all allusion to the *hetaira* and *hetairesis* in the New Testament one can only guess. I do not at all mean to suggest that St. Paul, with his Encratite sympathies, approved of it. But I do mean that when he used the term *porneia* he was thinking of connexion with prostitutes and not of love-affairs between unmarried social equals.

knowledge, and in the absence of reasons for not doing a thing we must assert our freedom to do it. Now this is not the whole of the matter, but it is a great advance so far as it goes. Christian ethics may so complement the principle that all things are lawful as to minimize its dangers. But for all that the principle is morally true and genuinely Christian as well as very dangerous. (Christianity is dangerous from beginning to end.)

The opposite tendency was exhibited in the Encratite movement which repudiated sex altogether and declared marriage immoral. Here again we are in the presence of a real moral principle. The flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary the one to the other. At the highest levels of the moral life all sexual gratification is a hindrance to the full development of personality, and even at more or less average levels there is often a conflict between full normal sexuality and the impulse towards the higher life. It is not a case of taboo, but of experience and of spiritual cravings. When the Godward movement is abnormally powerful a general tendency to renounce all forms of the world and of the flesh, legitimate and illegitimate alike, manifests itself. But this asceticism, which has its ample justification, has nothing to do with legalism.

From some passages in early writers we might easily get the impression that the primitive Christian conscience regarded chastity as the self-evident rule, and all unchastity as a monstrous offence. Against this must be set those which express the view of chastity as a rare achievement. Such a view is implied in the exhortation of St. Clement of Rome (1 Cor. xxxviii. 2): "If you are chaste do not brag about it."* The practice of having virgin sweethearts became common, even among married men.† This was

* ὁ ἁγνὸς ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ μὴ ἀλαζονευέσθω. St Clement, like the other writers of his time, uses the term ἁγνός in the sense of "chaste" and applies it to married as well as to unmarried persons.

† The virgins referred to in 1 Cor. vii. 36, etc., were probably virgin sweethearts.

a far from frigid affair, but on the contrary involved passionate kisses and caresses. Yet it stopped short of coitus and was based, in part, upon a religious enthusiasm common to the lovers. But all the passionate friendships of early Christianity were not celibate. The lawfulness of keeping a concubine was recognized by Bishop Kallistus (A.D. 217), and in A.D. 398 (or 400) the synod of Toledo decided that a man might have either a wife or a concubine, but not both. This decision held good for the practice of the rest of the first six centuries, which constitute the Anglican court of appeal, and later.*

(d) *The Liaison*

If it be true that when the inward conditions of a spiritual union are fulfilled a union is sacramental, whether it is legally valid or not, whether there has been a formal ceremony or whether there has been none, it will follow that the liaison between equals is not necessarily immoral; indeed it may be definitely uplifting. It may be regarded as having two forms, that of the trial marriage and that of the substitute for marriage: whether temporarily or permanently.

The purpose of a trial marriage would not only be to obviate disastrous marriages, but also to secure a more thorough and deeper act of mutual consent, and therewith more truly spiritual and sacramental conditions. The first step would be a period of intimate conversations and "walking out" together; the second, occasional connexion; the third, betrothal, handfasting,† or non-legal

* The entire text of the seventeenth canon of that synod is as follows: "Si quis habens uxorem fidelem, si concubinam habeat, non communicet. Ceterum qui non habet uxorem, et pro uxore concubinam habet, a communione non repellatur; tantum ut unius mulieris aut uxoris aut concubinae (ut ei placuerit), sit conjunctione contentus. Alias vero vivens abjiciatur donec definat et per poenitentiam revertatur."

† In mediæval Scotland it was the legally recognized practice for couples to live together on trial for a year and a day. This was called "handfasting." If a child was conceived, or if the parties

marriage, after which the parties would live together and try to realize the true marriage state; the fourth, a step taken only if the third succeeds, matrimony. If this approach to the marriage-state is undertaken with a view to securing a deeper, truer marriage it is difficult to see why it should be considered immoral. In the betrothed state there would, let us hope, be a constant effort of both parties to win the moral right to put the final seal upon their union. There would not be the feeling, "Now I have got her safe," "Now I have caught him," "Now I can rest from my attempts to please." On the contrary, now would begin the deeper wooing: the lessons of forbearance and unselfishness; of loving the true personality of the partner rather than his or her surface-manner; of loving, like God, in spite of recognized faults; of discovering the real needs of the other's soul; of exchanging the

did not separate on the completion of their trial year, they were held to be married. The one strong argument against any form of handfasting is the fact that there comes a time in the history of most marriages when one or both parties regret their bargain, but that in many cases this feeling passes and happy conjugal relations again emerge. Were it not for the irrevocableness of marriage the parties might separate when the disillusionment came and thus miss the happy conjugal life which comes after all. To this it may be answered that moral preparation for this period of disenchantment would be morally far more satisfactory and probably far more efficacious than compulsion. And in the second place it is at least doubtful whether, in the majority of cases, these regrets do yield to a subsequent abiding happiness. They wear out; "it's no good wishing." But life remains broken, spoilt and sad.—"Do you know," said a lady to a woman friend of mine, "among all my acquaintances"—and she knew many people—"I only know of two really happy marriages, yours and mine." The friend to whom she said this was at the time in acute distress owing to her husband's desertion of her, a fact which she was trying to conceal while she hoped against hope that he would yet return to her. The argument that trouble will sometimes arise after many years does not prove very much. Because handfasting would not prove a panacea for all cases it does not follow that it would not be of great value in many. Possibly the holding of an informal ceremony only before the honeymoon and the conclusion of the legal contract at its close would be of some use. It is a question of the constituent elements of the act of consenting together. The greater the knowledge of facts and of the other party's character involved in it, and the less dependent upon speculation or upon the intoxication of the moment, the more moral will that act of consenting be.

impulse to conquest for the readiness for self-sacrifice—the great time for all this would be those betrothal years when early passion itself could be yoked to the service of a daily self-discipline. Surely this would be a more genuinely spiritual, Christian, sacramental marriage-system than our present one.

What, then, are we to say of the case of two persons who form a liaison without any definite intention of forming a permanent life-union? Nothing, until we know something as to the nature and character of it. Let us assume first that they openly live together and form a common life with its duties and social relationships, its mutual affection, its lessons of forbearance and the like—all as in the married or betrothal state, though pitched in a lower key and devoid of the mystical feeling which will be satisfied with nothing short of eternity for discovering each the transcendental depths of the other. It will be a bond relatively imperfect as compared with the other, but not necessarily sinful. It is possible that each may feel that it is the highest course of which he or she is personally capable; that it represents the real position of the two wills to each other more truthfully than would a professed betrothal aiming at its completion in marriage; and that it was all that the life-duties of the two would render possible; and so on. It is quite conceivable that it really would be the best course really open to the two, and there is nothing in the New Testament inconsistent with it. What Christianity does condemn is a sexual intercourse which is merely the outcome of a chronic lasciviousness, without love, without a common life, without daily duties, without moral relations, as in the case of prostitution.

Let us suppose, next, that a man and woman are attracted to one another and desire occasional connexion as an expression of warm friendship which falls short of real love, but without actually living together and sharing a common life. Would such a relation be incompatible with a Christian attitude towards life? I cannot see why it should be

so considered. For though the love would be imperfect, there would be more of it, more moral relationships, more escape from egoistic isolation, than there would be for both if they remained celibate. Each, too, would tend to find interest in the interests of the other, so that in this way, also, the relation might well prove a moralizing influence. If we look as strictly as we can to the spirit and teaching of Jesus Himself and ask whether this harmonizes better with freedom for unmarried persons to love sexually, or with Puritan propriety, the almost self-evident answer seems to be "with the former." As soon as we begin to weigh the arguments on the other side we find ourselves reverting to the (non-Christian) standpoint which I have called above "the British tradition," or to simple considerations of worldly wisdom. Thus it may be imprudent for a woman to love without insisting upon endowment with all her lover's worldly goods in advance. On the other hand it may, in any given instance, be a case of nothing venture, nothing win. But, either way, these considerations of policy are hardly questions of ethics, and still less of Christian ethics.

From a Christian standpoint, therefore, all love has a spiritual value and is a manifestation of the very being of God. And although this thought, that he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, is applied chiefly with reference to universal, altruistic love, yet the case of sexual love is covered by the same principle. All love is one, and all love is somehow divine. And all kinds need one another for their own completion. If the higher spiritual element is lacking sexual passion will prove soul-destroying; if there is no focus in sexual feeling the higher elements will tend to be weak, hollow, verbal. Those who believe that all love is of God should surely respect it in all its manifestations so long as it be really love and some synthesis of higher and lower be present.

There is, then, in the liaison nothing obviously incongruent with religion and devotion. The moral tradition

of Christianity is divided upon the subject and there is at least a good case for the freer practice. If it is not a matter of excess, and if no violation of conscience is involved, there is no evidence for supposing such a relationship to be incompatible with love for God and love for all mankind, with high ideals or with purity of heart.

But is the open liaison between social equals positively desirable as an institution of modern civilization? The subject can be approached from various points of view, all of which should be taken into account. We are passing here from Christian to general ethics, but we do so in order to verify a position already tentatively reached from a more religious standpoint. The standards of general ethics are of two main kinds, the consequential and the intuitional. The former, which estimate the moral value of conduct in view of its effects, are divided into egoistic ethics, which consider the effects which conduct possesses for the doer; altruistic ethics, which deal with its relation to other specific individuals; and social ethics, in which all problems are discussed from the point of view of the welfare of the community as a whole. These should not be regarded as rival schools of ethics, but as studies of distinct and heterogeneous elements within the moral life. So distinct are the standpoints of altruistic and social ethics as at present understood that they are sometimes almost diametrically opposed—as, for instance, when it is usually held right to inflict solitary confinement, soul-deadening occupations, or other uneducative misery upon prisoners in the supposed interests of the community, while cases of apparent conflict between the claims of self-realization and duties to others are common.

Intuitional, or instinctive, ethics deal with the moral impression made by the act, or contemplated act, itself rather than that made by its probable consequences. In view of the formed character and developed instincts of a person an act will have, for him, a certain character and be, for his feelings, repulsive, harmless, fine, base,

magnificent, mawkish, silly, commonplace, contemptible, as the case may be. This is, for the individual concerned, the chief moral standard. But it depends so entirely upon the individual make-up that it can never be a decisive argument in any matter of dispute. Thus all sex often impresses children and saints as disgusting, though they do not like to admit it, either for the sake of not casting a slur upon their parents or in order to avoid being censorious and superior. This primitive disgust will then be modified by various influences until to one person marriage will appear the acme of romance, to another the epitome of all that is commonplace; to one a visit to a prostitute will be an exciting adventure of moral worth on account of the courage and enterprise it involves; to another it will seem merely bestial. To one a frank, emancipated girl like Sharlie Redhead in *The Romantic* will be an object of profound moral admiration; to another, a fallen creature fit only for social ostracism. To one the homosexual temperament will seem a veritable outrage against Nature; to another it will be something "Uranian," celestial. Although, therefore, it is well for dramatists, novelists and preachers to express their instinctive reactions to moral ideas for the benefit of those who tend to agree and want their feelings put into words, no ethical dispute can be settled in this way.

First, then, dealing with the question from the standpoint of higher egoistic morality we ask: *Does the practice make for the fuller realization of the personality*, or is the reverse the case? If any act is contrary to a man's conscience—*e.g.* breaking the Sabbath—it will be harmful to him. But since the question at issue is as to whether this act *ought* to be against anyone's conscience we cannot assume that it will be. In many cases it certainly is not. It is claimed on behalf of the practice:

(1) That in some cases so much energy is involved in the suppression of a natural instinct that little is left over for the rest of life and the question of chastity assumes an

altogether morbid prominence. This is strikingly illustrated in the confessions of some hermits.

(2) In some cases pre-marital celibacy, instead of leading to greater purity of heart, has a reverse effect. The suppressed impulse remains active in the unconscious part of the mind and leads to outbreaks of sexual phantasy or masturbation. These vices are more impure than intercourse inasmuch as they are exclusively concerned with the feelings and sensations of the subject, and instead of leading him out of himself to take an interest in other persons of the opposite sex they shut him off from them and imprison him in himself. His mind becomes in consequence far more oversexualized and lascivious than would have been the case if the instinct had been allowed its normal outlet.

(3) The suppression of the normal impulse may result in homosexual tendencies. A captain in the Royal Navy once remarked that he was glad when his ship got into port in order that the crew might be able to get to women. The alternative was not greater purity, but less.

(4) A celibate often impresses people as having a stunted personality. Of course this is not always the case; where a person can realize himself and fulfil his work better as a celibate the justification for a contrary course will not be present. But we have only to think of the popular conception of old maids in order to see that it is at least possible that the suppression of the sexual instinct may lead to a generally arrested development of the personality as a whole. In most cases celibacy is probably accompanied by an unconscious sense of inferiority, which is morally crippling, and it is probably true that most people are unable to attain to full manhood or womanhood without sex entered into not too late.

There are persons who need the liaison in order to learn how to love—in fact, probably many such persons. There are those who are bound to wreck the happiness of their first allegiance by some quite curable fault, such as tact-

lessness or inconsiderateness due to ignorance of the other sex; they need the lessons of failure, and then another chance. It is moral rather than sexual development that they need. But there are others in whom the capacity for love has never properly developed. The transition from infantile to adult sexuality has never been completed. They stand on the borderline of manhood or womanhood unable of their own strength to take the next step forward. These are not the persons to make spontaneous efforts to find lovers in the face of public opinion. But if at the right moment they could be encouraged to form unions it might aid them in advancing to the stage of object-love, whereas otherwise their fate might be regression or permanent fixation. If, say, the age of from twenty to twenty-five (or that age for boys and two years younger for girls) were recognized as the age of the liaison there would be fewer cases of arrested development. (Ten years later it might be too late.) And those who were unfit for married life might discover the fact in a less disastrous way than through the experience of a hopeless marriage.

(5) Even when celibacy does no positive harm it may shut a man off from an uplifting experience. Normally we are all a bit insulated. We do not penetrate to one another and hence find so little satisfaction in one another. We have been compared to ships that pass in the night. They exchange friendly signals, it may be, but each goes his own way knowing little of the other and without real contact. Sexual passion may, as it were, break down "the middle wall of partition" between soul and soul, and thus for the persons concerned remove the chronic tragedy of isolation and transform the drab commonplace world into light and romance. Let us not prohibit it except for good assignable reasons.

We will now approach the question from another standpoint. Morality usually means consideration for other people with whom we personally have to do. It is an attitude of justice, kindness, good will. When this is

our point of view, and we are considering particular individuals rather than an impersonal community, we may speak of altruistic ethics. Applying this point of view to the present problem we have to ask whether a liaison between two unmarried persons does anyone any wrong. It is obvious that all deception to secure the other party's consent involves a wrong. So does seduction—that is to say, the persuasion or enticing of the other party against his or her better judgement and conscience. The relationship, to be moral, must be quite freely and deliberately entered into by both parties. But in all such cases as those of deception or seduction the wrong lies, not in the relationship itself, but in certain attendant circumstances, which do not hold good in all instances. If it be said that a wrong must necessarily be done to the woman this will mean that there will inevitably be some danger of exposing her to the cruelties of the conventional moralists, who are the last persons entitled to be indignant thereat. And what of the further cruelty of these same moralists who refuse to lonely and unhappy people the only chance of love that may be open to them? And even apart from the obvious greater kindness of granting freedom and permitting love than in refusing these, there is all the force of the argument from the development of the personality, already considered with reference to the moral agent, to be brought under the point of view of the just claims of our neighbours. How do we know what *their* needs may not be? What right, then, have we to refuse *them* this freedom of action which may be so vitally necessary for them?

Social ethics (to apply now a third criterion) is the systematic treatment of moral questions in their bearing upon the general well-being and efficiency of the social organism. The thought here is impersonal: it is not any particular case that we have to consider, but the general influence of this or that principle or institution as promoting or hindering the welfare of society as a whole. It is from

this point of view that the strongest objections to greater sexual freedom are raised. A threat is seen in it to "the sanctity of the home." Besides, it will be urged, the practice would throw society into confusion: what an awful state of things it would be if young girls could not go about without the danger of their being approached by every young man they met!

To these objections detailed replies might be given. If it were more clearly stated in what way the home was threatened it could be shown that no such threat was implied or would be likely to result. The objection merely gives expression to a formless, unreasoned fear which cannot very well be answered till it takes a more definite shape. The idea of a general state of moral confusion has the same source in vague fear. But the danger is of a very speculative character. If the Church and society set out to realize a better social order by means of free persuasion and courageous example there would not be the remotest tendency to anything of the kind. This terrifying state of universal satyrdom simply would not happen. Social rules would adjust themselves to the new order. We are presupposing that if social custom changes it will be because society is convinced of the rightness of the change—not because of some epidemic of incontinency. If it is a spirit of defiance of all order and morality that is feared, it is a system of unconvincing insistence upon taboo rather than one of reasoned freedom which will promote such an outbreak. If a boy and girl twenty years of age pledge themselves, with the knowledge and approval of their parents, to mutual fidelity for, say, six or twelve months, a fidelity involving the renunciation of all other sexual indulgence, it is hard to see why their open liaison should be thought unsocial. If a practice is socially recognized it can be regulated by social opinion: what is clandestine cannot. I am assuming that the new order will require the raising of the age of consent to eighteen. The educational preparation of boys and girls of seventeen

would be of enormous moral value—especially to the more backward. The Church might help a good deal here, and for this purpose it would be useful if the sacrament of Confirmation were split in two. At fourteen might come the rite of admission to Holy Communion; at sixteen or seventeen a course on sex-psychology and sex-ethics with special reference to the responsibilities of the freedom which the eighteenth birthday would bring. The present rite should be connected with the latter. The proposal, therefore, is not one for unrestrained self-indulgence, but for free self-determination in place of terrorization by the frowns of society.

The chief answer to this expression of apprehension is that the fear is fear of a better social order, not of a worse. It is feared because its true nature is not realized. It is not domestic life but a false basis of domestic life that is criticized; it is not marriage, but legal sham-marriages, that are threatened. In the past the Church has preached love, but has upheld a cramping social order that militates against love. The narrower, more materialistic, love of country has made the love of all mankind a visionary's dream; social classes have largely killed the love we might have for our neighbour; the comfortably married look upon every proposal for greater freedom to love with the same dread as that with which we contemplate the possible consequences of a Labour victory at the polls; parents with daughters on their hands look with alarm at the possibility of being unable to dispose of them in marriage. But if, instead of looking so exclusively at threats to existing institutions, we thought of the unrealized possibilities of the Kingdom of God and the better institutions which might be, we should find less ground for terror and more for hope. We need a truer guiding principle upon which the ethics of our social life may rest. That principle is more real love. It must mean love open to all, married and unmarried. It must mean love that is also comradeship. It must mean love that is at once love for a woman,

for mankind, and for God. To that end freer institutions are essential. Humanity's capacity for love is, surely, not yet half actualized. There might be so much more love in the world than there is and so much more of the happiness that proceeds from love. It is at least quite thinkable that if the laws of love were better understood, if more freedom were allowed, and if there were less fear and less possessiveness, the net gain in love to every square mile of our urban areas might be enormous.

(e) *Divorce*

An essential element in a perfect union will be the will that it shall be life-long. It is only when the feeling of self-committal is absolute, an irrevocable committal made for love's sake alone, be it for better or for worse; it is only when a man and woman will to merge their separateness in a new common life; it is only when the completion of marriage in the family is sought for; that marriage is fully and completely marriage. And all this implies a will to the permanence of the married state and of the family.

This will that a union should be permanent and exclusive is a product of sexual feeling. That is to say, "Until death us do part" is inspired by sexual passion itself. Can we, from a psychological point of view, and quite apart from considerations of literary effect, imagine Herrick's song to Althea restricted by the qualification—

> And hast control of every part
> Till I get tired of thee?

All passion, all love, is would-be eternal; otherwise it is not a case of love-passion at all, though it may be one of attraction. In the same way all love-passion is from the standpoint of the moment, intrinsically monogamous, though affection is not and appetite is not. This means that marriage as it is in idea—*i.e.* as it is for people in

love—is essentially permanent. For practical purposes this does not amount to anything very important, for it presupposes that there is no desire to separate. But it may help us to see one reason why the idea of divorce strikes Churchpeople as somehow wrong in itself.

And in another way, too, marriage is intrinsically permanent. The expression and the test of love are sacrifice. Loyalty is natural to it. Love, we are told, beareth all things, believeth (the best of) all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. So that if one of the partners remains inwardly married while the other proves faithless and behaves with the utmost provocation the truly married partner will not seek divorce—at any rate not for personal reasons. And on a less heroic scale this same attitude of forbearance and loyalty will be required quite normally. The other partner is sure to be at fault sometimes, provoking sometimes. If the love and loyalty of the good partner for the time being are equal to the occasion the result will be not only a tendency towards a happy home but a great purification and ennoblement of that partner's soul. Loyalty and forbearance, that is to say, have a spiritual value as well as a happiness value. Churchpeople can see this and do not want marriage to be looked upon as a mere comfort and convenience.

But the idea of making the love-passion, with its aspirations after an eternal union, compulsory by law, or that of forcing people to be loyal and forbearing willy-nilly, is grotesque. Nothing can be spiritual which is not free. There is nothing spiritual in being tied to an unpleasant partner from whom you would gladly get away if you could. It is true that if some practice or institution is morally bad, such as duelling, vivisection, or cruelty to prisoners, a change of the law may lead to a better and more humane spirit in the community. But the humanizing influence of better laws or institutions is not an analogous case. No one suggests that compulsory companionship with repulsive persons is, in general, a humanizing agency,

and even if it were, it would be beside the point, for the ecclesiastical case against divorce rests upon an appeal to a spiritual principle which has no meaning except upon a basis of freedom.

Traditionalists admit, although, apparently, without realizing the significance of the admission, that the act of marriage is that of openly "consenting together." The Church automatically gives its blessing when this is desired and paid for, but the bond is constituted by the mutual consent of the parties openly expressed. Marriage is marriage by mutual consent. For this very reason a marriage in which the will to continuance has ceased has itself ceased to be, spiritually and sacramentally considered, a marriage at all. Whether divorce by mutual consent is desirable on general grounds or not, at any rate there can be no objection to it on the grounds of Christian principle. It may well be that the mutual desire to separate involves a renunciation of Christ's attitude towards marriage. But when it is once assumed that the parties do desire to terminate their contract there is no Christian principle in preventing their doing so. The attitude of the official Church towards divorce seems to be due to the confusion between spirit and law which runs through all ecclesiastical ethics. Jesus laid down no *law* and he was not in a position to do so. His principle presupposed conviction, insight and spiritual character. One day the Jews came to him and asked him whether he agreed with Hillel in holding that a man might legitimately divorce his wife for any mortal reason that he liked. "Certainly not," Jesus answered, "I think that a husband or wife should be absolutely loyal and true in spite of all the faults and even adulteries of the other party." "Then," said the Jews, "you are in disagreement with the Law, which permits divorce." "By no means," replied Jesus. "Divorce is permitted because of the hardness of the human heart—its lack of forbearance, of unselfishness, of sympathy with the points of view of another. All these things

are necessary to true marriage. I am not disputing the practical necessity for such a law; I am repudiating the whole attitude of Hillel and his followers to the subject. They look upon a wife as a practical convenience to be kept or thrown away at will; I want you to see that from the standpoint of the essential truth of human nature as it was in the beginning before men's hearts grew hard there is a fundamental right attitude of man and wife to one another, an attitude of unconditioned loyalty, and that it is that attitude which causes that man and that woman's union to be a union in God. Let not lower human points of view sunder those for whom such a union is possible." *

The sayings of Jesus which appear in the form of prohibitions—*e.g.* against divorce, self-defence, banks, or insurance—are really principles for the realization of the Kingdom of God upon earth. They cannot be converted without more ado into statute law for England. There are certain things that prevent the coming of the Kingdom of God. Such are the tempers and attitudes of mind which

* Mat. xix. 3 12. I think those critics are right who hold that the clause "saving for the cause of fornication" is an interpolation. The expression itself is open to suspicion: it is, by implication, inconsistent with Christ's words recorded elsewhere (Luke xvi. 16, 18), it misses the point of Christ's appeal to the truth of human nature as it was in the beginning; it assumes a legal standpoint such as the teaching of Jesus never possesses; and it spoils the point of the story. The story is that by pretending to think that he might agree with Hillel the Pharisees provoked him into a declaration that looked like a condemnation of *all* divorce, and therefore a repudiation of the Law. Since his opinions were known, this is just what the Pharisees were playing for. "Tempting him" means "with a catch-question." As the story runs it stands thus: The Jews asked him whether he agreed with Hillel. Jesus replied, "No, with Shammai." The rest of the story is then inconsequent. It is possible that those critics are right who challenge the authenticity of the words "for any and every cause." But it makes no practical difference. The followers of Hillel and Shammai were disputing a matter of law. The question was referred to Jesus who refused to give any opinion on a point of law at all, and said that if people lived according to the principles that God meant them to live by there would be no need for such a law. It is this reply which bishops and lawyers have twisted into a declaration that Shammai's legal commentary on a text in Deuteronomy possessed divine sanction for all times and all peoples. For it comes to that.

manifest themselves in divorce, retaliation, the pursuit of wealth, and cautious prudence. Get rid of those attitudes and the world will be transformed. Get rid of them, but by free conviction of their unworthiness—not by making the institutions in which they issue illegal. Besides, divorce then did not mean the same thing as it does to-day; it was a one-sided institution after the heart of Memucan.* It is not, for Christians, a question between regard and disregard for the words of Jesus, but between an unthinking, parrot-like repetition of them on the one hand, and an attempt to penetrate to their real inwardness on the other. Let us by all means try to make the laws of our land expressive of the spirit of Jesus. But to argue that this means the legal prohibition of divorce is like advocating the abolition of all banks. Jesus intended the prohibition of laying up treasure upon earth every whit as literally as the prohibition of divorce. The contrast between Moses and his own point of view is not a contrast between the Jewish past and a professedly Christian future. It is the distinction between law on the one hand and free higher principle upon the other. Although, therefore, his principles may be treated as a basis for laws and institutions, they cannot intelligently be treated as themselves laws.

I am not arguing the case for divorce. I am trying to appreciate the significance of the principle of sexual morality in relation to a number of problems and practices, one of which is divorce. For the present trouble seems to be that the apparently urgent claims of justice and mercy are set aside in the interests of an alleged spiritual point of view and an alleged loyalty to Christ. When more closely examined, however, the spirituality of the orthodox position vanishes, and the alleged loyalty is found to rest upon a demonstrably unsound exegesis. Still less am I advocating the right to break the marriage contract. It is as dishonourable to break a marriage contract as it is to break any other. But the general merits of any

* Esther i. 16–22.

given case for divorce are not the subject which we have been discussing.

(f) *Sublimation*

A brief reference to the problem of sublimation is here necessary because, among Church people, it is so indiscriminately contended that one can sublimate one's sexual impulse and so remain chaste. It is not possible to discuss the psychology of sublimation here in much detail, but roughly and generally speaking it may fairly be said that the doctrine that sex can be sublimated in social service or other activities is not true; that the substitutes for sex offered to adults (*e.g.* social service) are not cases of sublimation of the sexual impulse at all, but of the disposal of other sources of energy; that interest-energy stored up in sexuality has to be liberated before it can be disposed of, and that no amount of social or other work will release such energy when once it has become sexualized; that if by any means (such as psycho-analysis or falling in love) a certain amount of interest-energy previously stored up has been liberated it becomes diverted either to some other love-object or to something resembling, and so serving as a substitute for, the original object. "It does not lie in our power to transfer a 'disposable' energy to whatever rationally chosen object we may like." *

Quite a number of different psychical processes are comprised under the term "sublimation." These may be divided into two classes, diversions, or re-directions of relatively free, uncanalized energy, and conversions, or transformations, of the sexual impulse. Diversion applies only to energy which has not been definitely sexualized, even though it may temporarily have taken a sexual direction just as it might have taken any other.

In every instinct or emotion two factors must be distinguished. On the one hand there is a certain psychical

* C. G. Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, p. 401 (Eng. Trans.).

disposition which gives the instinct its distinctive character; on the other there is psychic energy, interest, or libido. Any given disposition, or instinct, in any person may attract to itself a greater or less volume of interest-energy.

Further, the relation of energy to disposition is a variable one. A large measure of interest may in some cases be readily detached from the disposition, in others not.

And again, within the limits of a single instinct, interest may become firmly attached to some given object or may be transferable from one to another.

Our immediate problem is that of the transference of energy from the sexual instinct as a whole to some other interest. But we may take our first illustration from the non-sexual sphere.

During the occupation of Northern Italy by British troops it was found necessary to confine our soldiers to barracks for the greater part of the day for fear of regrettable incidents. Tommy could get on with a German or even with a Frenchman, but an Italian he could not stand at any price. One of our soldiers found it impossible to keep sober under these circumstances until a certain army-doctor initiated him into the joys of bee-keeping. He became an enthusiast and was never drunk again. Here we have an example of free, disposable libido which ran first in one channel and then in another. The man's libido went to drink for lack of any stronger interest. He might equally well have taken to women and been cured in the same way. In this type of sublimation what happens is not so much that the psychical disposition is modified as that it becomes less energized than was formerly the case. The character of the sexual instinct remains, after sublimation, as it was before, but it is weaker. So much libido has been attracted from sexuality to some rival interest that the former can now be repressed without any serious consequences ensuing.

But even within the limits of diversion there seem to be more than one variety of sublimation process.

Diversion may, in the first case, result from simple rivalry or competition of interests, as in the bee-keeping case just quoted. Strong interests tend to attract to themselves free energy. It is as though libido were subject to a law of psychic gravitation. The fact that a certain amount of interest is engaged by such and such an object becomes a cause of yet further concentration of interest upon it, and a withdrawal of interest from other things. The new toy destroys the attractiveness of the old. We may call this a case of diversion through counter-attraction. Its presuppositions are the presence of a rival interest and of a sufficient amount of free, disposable interest.

A second variety of diversion is seen in cases in which the means gradually come to overshadow the end for the sake of which it existed. Stekel tells the story of a father who found his youthful son consumed with hatred for a foreign nation (England) and desirous of crossing the seas to fight it. "Then you must have a boat," said the good and wise father, and soon the interest in boat-building had quite taken the place of race-hatred.

These instances, taken from the non-sexual sphere, show that a law is at times operative according to which interest may be diverted to totally new objects. Bee-keeping is not drink in another form, nor is boat-building a variation of hatred. The higher interest is not the equivalent of the lower, but a rival alternative. On the other hand diversion may take place on the ground of similarity. Some activity resembles some sexual interest, and, not being suppressed as is the latter, becomes a substitute for it and in turn is replaced by a higher substitute. An often-quoted case is that of agriculture. Some persons are able to become engrossed in it because the digging or ploughing of the ground suggests to their Unconscious the analogy of the sexual act. Here is a third type of diversion. The symbolical significance of the new interest connects it with the old and forms a bridge, or channel,

whereby the libido may pass from its old paths to the new.*

Diversion is essentially a juvenile phenomenon. In the young there is a vast amount of free interest-power. As we grow older it becomes more and more exclusively attached to certain selected objects; everything else appears commonplace and uninteresting. That, and not years, is the essential difference between youth and age. A young soul is one possessed of much unattached interest, and so it finds everything interesting. An old soul of thirty or more years is a canalized one. Its interest-energy has become invested in this or that object or activity. In such cases diversion cannot take place to any considerable extent unless the subject can somehow be broken up and reconstituted afresh. All diversion of psychic energy which has once become fixed in instinct or habit presupposes rejuvenescence. It is vain for the middle-aged man to think that he can remain a middle-aged man and nevertheless experience a sublimation of his instinct. He must be born again and become as a little child before any such redistribution of energy is possible. In other words, an at least partial break-up of his existing mental constitution is necessary as a preliminary to reorganization.

The transformation of the sexual impulse from lower

* In such cases it *may* be true that, in the words of the leading exponent of psycho-analysis in Britain, Dr. Ernest Jones, "the later interest is not an entirely different and novel interest, as is generally supposed, but merely *another form* of the same interest, and another mode of gratifying the same instinct" (*Papers on Psycho-analysis*, 2nd ed., p. 640). One is not in a position to contradict so authoritative an opinion. But *prima facie* it looks as though the process were primarily one of suggestion through similarity; that the first substitute gained its first attraction through the faint stimulation it afforded of the sexual disposition; and that as it gained an independent interest this stimulation diminished to vanishing point; and that the later substitute was a non-sexual interest. Will Dr. Jones say (to take an example from himself [*ibid.*, p. 612]) that interest in engineering is "merely another form" of urethral eroticism? If so, hard work on irrigation schemes ought to give rise to erotic dreams from which holidays would be relatively free. Perhaps it does.

to higher forms is, within certain limits, normal. Sexual feeling manifests itself first of all as infantile sensuality. Sensuality is the direction of sexuality towards sensation pure and simple. The diffused sensuality of the infant with the partial trends, or sexual factors, which manifest themselves in childhood ultimately becomes fused and transformed into object-love. This is an enormous change which alters the whole character of the impulse. What was before sensuality becomes object-lust, and then, through a further and remarkable change, object-love. This transformation of sensuality into lust, and of lust into love, is, in its essential nature, strangely sacramental, and it forms the basis of further developments of a sacramental character.

The sexual disposition may then pass through a process of spiritualization through taking up ideal elements into itself. The earliest manifestation of this tendency is the idealization of the parents by infant children. This idealization is said to be the basis of later idealizations of the love-object. Of course in every evolutionary movement the earlier stages form the basis of the later ones. But they are not their *causes*. The earlier stage is the first manifestation of a law whose nature is more clearly exhibited in later developments. There is, moreover, no occasion here to ask for causes. We have simply to describe the higher developments of sexual feeling, and these may be described in a general way as spiritualizations of the sexual impulse. This process of the spiritualization of the libido next appears as the idealization of the love-object of adolescence or youth. Here the sexual and the moral interest are quite definitely amalgamated. The love-object is no mere woman, but a creature almost divine in her goodness, and the attitude of the devout lover towards her is a virtually religious one, as is expressed in the lines—

> To her I'll offer love's sweet frankincense
> And worship her in distant reverence.

Moreover, the lover's own spirituality is enhanced while he loves, and he finds it impossible to entertain any base passion while the spell of a sacred love is upon him.

A further spiritualization of sexual feeling appears when the love is directed towards God, or towards a god. Such a direction of love may take either of two forms. The first of these is called by Pfister an elevation. Here a mental image of the deity is constructed out of sense-material—form, colour, and the like—and conceived in a very anthropomorphic way. But in this love-object there is a marked predominance of the moral and spiritual interest over the sexual. He is worshipped through purity of heart, through moral goodness, through love to one's fellow-men. The sexual element is so much in the background that its presence is not generally recognized. What calls forth devotion is the superhuman goodness of the deity, not his bodily form, the beauty of which is seldom insisted upon. It is a common enough thing for writers to call attention to this, that, or the other sexual expression or element of feeling in religious devotion such as this. But the really remarkable and significant thing is not so much the survival of sexual metaphors or sexual attitudes in religion as the subordination of sexuality to Spirit. Sex has become a source of energy only; it is no longer a controlling instinct. It is transformed out of all recognition. The moral idealization of a human love-object is striking enough, but in the case of an " elevation " the process is a much more spiritualized one and the sensuous element, the mental imagery, the mythology, and the sexual touches are present only for the sake of the stronger realization of the object of worship in consciousness.

Finally the sense-image, the particularity, and the mythology in the religious object may be dropped, and therewith the last elements of sexuality in the worshipper's love. In most cases the love itself then becomes very " weak and faint." But in some cases this is far from being

the case. As an example of such love we may quote the following passage from Ruysbroeck :

" God speaking to us saith, ' Love Me as I love thee, and have loved thee from all Eternity.' This voice and that inward beseeching are so terrible to experience that all is overthrown in a tempest of love, and the powers of the soul make answer and say to one another : ' Let us love this fathomless Love which hath loved us from all Eternity.' The heart expandeth in desire, and all the powers of the senses follow after, in the realization of love towards God. . . .

" All that is born of God *is* God and Spirit. It is God with God, one Love and one Life in His eternal manifestation. It is also Spirit and like to God by grace and a loving cleaving unto Him. It is holy, and strong, and free, and triumphant over all in the observances of love. . . . And thus this mode of loving is a state of emptiness, made one with God in bare love and in Divine light, free and empty of all the observances of love, above actions, and enduring a pure and simple love, which consumeth and annihilateth in itself the spirit of a man, so that he forgetteth himself and knoweth neither himself nor God nor any creature nor aught else but Love alone, which he tasteth and feeleth and possesseth in simple emptiness. He feeleth himself one breadth with Love, which is measureless, comprehending all things, and Itself remaineth for ever incomprehensible."*

Here we have the extreme limit of sublimation. It is the state aimed at and in many cases realized by the mystics. It is the state which they designated as Pure Love. Pure Love is God; indeed God is sometimes called by the mystics simply " Love." The soul attains to love through purification, *i.e.* through the shedding of all elements of sensuality and lust. What is left is God, so that when union with God is realized a mystic could say with St. Catherine of Genoa : " My self is God, nor know I other selfhood, save my God alone." The common expression of the more extreme mystics was to speak of being transformed into God. Amalrich, Eckhart, St. Catherine of

* *The Book of the Twelve Béguines*, ch. xiv. (Trans. by J. Francis).

Siena, St. Catherine of Genoa, Tauler, Ruysbroeck, and probably many others use this expression.

This is the desexualized culmination of the sexual passion. The great love-object is loved with all the heart, with all the mind, with all the soul, and with all the strength. In loving him all else is loved, so that in the mystic passion the love-object is at once concretely universal and spiritually One. It is defined in its own terms as Spirit and as Love and therefore as implying an object—and a universal object—over and above itself.

"The love, therefore, of our neighbour, is only a branch of our love to God. For when we love God with all our hearts, and with all our souls, and with all our strength, we shall necessarily love those things that are so nearly related to God, that have everything from Him, and are created by Him to be objects of His own eternal love. If I hate or despise *any one man in the world* I hate something that God cannot hate, and despise that which He loves. . . . These reasons sufficiently show us that no love is holy or religious till it becomes universal. . . . The sin, therefore, of hating or despising any one man is like the sin of hating all God's creation; and the necessity of loving any one man is the same necessity of loving every man in the world. And though many people may appear to us ever so sinful, odious, or extravagant in their conduct, we must never look upon that as the least motive for any contempt or disregard of them, but look upon them with the greater compassion as being in the most pitiable condition that can be." *

From the case of the mystics we may perhaps infer that the prerequisites of such sublimation as this are on the one hand a narcissistic ideal of perfection and on the other a past or renounced object-love or elevation. In the interesting case of St. Clare we see her spiritualization developing out of her natural passion for St. Francis. In St. Kate a past elevation for Jesus in childhood together with a past ideal of perfection through the cloister suddenly broke

* Law's *Serious Call*, S.P.C.K. edition (Manuals of the Inner Life Series), § 45.

out, years later, in a pure spiritualization which, after its first onset, had nothing of the imaginal character of an elevation, accompanied by perfect universalization. In St. Augustine, St. Francis, and others the object-love and the ideal had both been present. Instances, like that of St. Catherine of Siena, which exhibit an elevation at the basis of their mysticism show that an elevation is not the purely pathological thing we might be tempted to think it, but a step towards spiritualization and universalization in the absence of a worthy human love-object, loved and renounced. It—the elevation—becomes pathological when the mystical development is arrested at that stage and love begins to incorporate regressive elements within itself. For every love-object is a growing, changing thing. It may expand and be purified in a direction which is, virtually even when not confessedly, mystical and religious. Or it may represent the focus of a regressive tendency, as in the case of the more morbid forms of idolatrous devotion. Or it may become more and more an object of mere physical comfort and social convenience, as normally happens after marriage. There must be an element of mysticism in love to obviate this last tendency when the love-object is a living human being, and an element of human love to save the mystic from regression.

These facts justify our contemplating the sexual passion as an energy which possesses no one single form or function. It displays itself rather as a series commencing with infantile sensuality (anal eroticism and the like) and culminating, in one line of its development, in the mystical love of God and of all creatures. It is as though a primal, transcendental, all-comprehensive libido were manifesting itself serially in creation, and progressively exhibiting its true nature as Pure Love. For the purpose of creation it has to become incarnate as blind appetition and as sensuality, but the spiritual elements which it later displays are elements within itself. The propagation of the race is not the function of sex; it is the function of certain forms

of sex; sex has other functions as well, and in estimating those functions all its forms have to be taken into account.

There is one branch-development to be noted in passing. This is a universal love for all mankind without its focus in love for God. I believe, however, when we confine our attention strictly to the scrutiny of facts and avoid mere propaganda for favourite ideas, that universal love without love for God tends to be either a lame affair or to support itself with emotions which are not love at all, but rather expressions of partisanship, and that the universality tends to give way to special likings for restricted classes—such as children, the labouring classes, animals, or some particular coloured race.

Distinct alike from diversion and from conversion are two processes both of which generally seem to be called reaction-formations. First there is reaction-formation in the proper sense of the word. Here one instinctive tendency opposes another, holds it in check, and perhaps suppresses it. The control of anal-erotic interests by disgust is an instance. The disgust may be fostered by educational influences, but it is none the less an innate tendency, or latent capacity, of the subject. The disgust is instinctive in the sense that it becomes a spontaneous function of the self independent alike of external pressure and of deliberate principle or effort. There does seem to be a natural counter-tendency to sex, a kind of anti-sexual trend, and this may become directed either towards all sexuality or towards some particular kind or degree of it. Perhaps products of this tendency might be called obversions. Its function seems to be to aid in the spiritualization of sexuality: disgust for lower forms of sex promoting the conversion of the impulse into some other and higher form. But it is in place, in sexual matters, only when directed towards the lower of two real and competing alternatives.*

* It acquires a very morbid prominence in Buddhist ethics.

Contrasted with obversion are counter-formations which lack the instinctive basis of obversions. Such volitional counter-formations rest either upon respect for taboo or upon willed principle. Both of these may have become so ingrained as to be virtually instinctive, but they are not forms of sexual or anti-sexual feeling. They have reference to rules of conduct as such, and need not, then, in this connexion, be further considered.

From the consideration of these facts one or two conclusions emerge which are of some significance for ethics. The first is the conclusion that the higher developments—whether love for a sweetheart, or wife, or God, or all mankind—presuppose object-lust, or sexual desire for another person. The object-lust need not have been acted upon in all cases, but it must have been experienced. Without object-lust no object-love, and without object-love no love for God or for mankind. No real passion for God or for mankind, that is to say; we are not considering mere principle, practical benevolence, or anything which is not psychologically love. If the development of object-lust is thwarted, as it may be by sexual fear, by Puritanism, by extravagant spiritual ambitions and the like—*i.e.* by causes which to the person concerned would appear as highly moral motives—the result will be a fixation of the auto-erotic or sensuality stage. In aiming at absolute purity the person may be unconsciously clinging to an infantile sensuality; his celibate ideals have then the significance of rationalizations; they will be the reasons he gives his own conscience for a course of conduct which, all unconsciously, is in fact very differently motivated. And even when Puritanism is not a free choice, but is imposed by circumstances, its effect may be to check a true development. When once a person has fallen heartily in love let him try to place Spirit first. But until a person has loved, beware of too indiscriminate a morality. Eschew sensuality, self-abuse, phantasy, if you can, but love is the best thing in human life and the way to love is through

lust—*i.e.* sexual feeling for another person, with desire for its natural expression. If you fear lust too much you will lose love and remain the slave of sensuality.

From the plane of narcissism, or introversion, without object-love there can be no path to sublimation. There can be no diversion because we are supposing the energy to be already sexualized, already invested in a definite interest. And there can be no transformation, or conversion, because all conversion takes place upon the plane of object-love.

The second conclusion is the need for a spiritual ideal, and this presupposes narcissism. From the plane of lust without some kind of ideal there can be no perfection of sex itself

> "I could not love thee, dear, so much
> Loved I not honour more."

The sexual element finds its goal only through the absorption of ideal elements.

Practical ethics should therefore aim at the development in every individual of the right balance of interests within the sexual and moral sphere. Perhaps one might speak of an ortho-erotic system, or complex of sexual and moral interests, in harmonious interaction, whereby each component impulse and feeling becomes modified by the others. There must be love for humanity, love for the ideal, love for God. But there must also be sexual love for a member of the opposite sex and comradeship with that person on the basis of common interests and ideals. We need not here consider the case of mysticism—*i.e.* the compulsive renunciation of early interests and loves for the sake of the love of God; that is only genuine when it is compulsive, and that is very rarely. Normally all men and women, whether married or unmarried, should aim at the acquisition of an ortho-erotic system, with sexual life and moral ideals in due co-operation. If the sexual element is not duly recognized it will become a disreputable outcast from the ordered polity of the soul, an unmoralized hooligan inhabit-

ing the dark places of the unconscious, and behaving more like a poltergeist than like what it is meant by Creation to be—the vehicle of God among men.

I trust therefore that no one will regard what I have said as an advocacy of the substitution of a naturalistic or biological ethic for the ethics of the Spirit, or assume that my aim has been to argue that " there is no harm in " this or that form of self-indulgence. That is not at all my purpose. It is a question far more of the way than of the goal, of the means rather than of the end. But how is a genuinely spiritual level of mentality to be reached? What are the laws of spiritual development? Those laws the Church has yet to discover. It is far too ready to assume that it possesses a knowledge which it does not yet possess, and to repel criticism without regard to its object. Only through an open-minded investigation of the right relation of Nature to Spirit at all stages of its development can the former become sacramental in fact and not merely in name. And that right relation *for persons of such and such a given type* can be found only through experience and study. It cannot be postulated on the strength of current tradition.

§ 4. The Ethics of Mysticism

(a) *The Mystic Passion*

But there is yet another side to the Christian ideal, expressed in another aspect of the idea of the Kingdom of God. The Realm of God (as we might call it when this aspect is emphasized) is a phase of spirit in which all true life is contained—an inward realm other than that of our normal self, but which is capable of being discovered, felt, apprehended and expressed in life—a plane of being which is the informing principle of the higher realities. It is not just a possibility of emotions. It is a real world seeking expression in and through Nature, transforming it, harmonizing it, spiritualizing it. But first it must be

found within. Here we pass to the mystical side of Christianity.*

With the development of the mystical elements in the religious consciousness there results a new type of morality altogether. This is marked by a tendency towards extremes. The *whole* life in every department of it must be dedicated to God and not even the least little concession be allowed to one's own frailties. It must be All or

* The term "mysticism" stands for two entirely different things and it is misused in yet other senses. In one sense of the word mysticism means a peculiar sensibility in virtue of which material things, and especially Nature, feel as though they were alive with an unseen presence, or presences, in them. This is sometimes called Nature-mysticism, but in some cases the feeling is that of a living presence about and overshadowing oneself rather than as dwelling in any natural objects. It is not primarily a belief or idea, but a feeling. Among the best-known expressions of this feeling are Wordsworth's poem on Tintern Abbey and Walt Whitman's lines

> You air . . . you objects . . . you light . . . you paths . . .
> I believe you are latent with unseen existences,
> You are so dear to me.

Then there is transcendental mysticism, or mysticism proper. This is not so much a form of sensibility as a passion. It has been called "the passion for the Absolute." In mysticism the libido is drawn, not primarily to individual objects or persons, but to the One, the Ultimate, the Absolute Reality, the Universal. The soul of the mystic is metamorphosed from "psyche" into "pneuma." Feeling is no longer egoistic. The supreme love-object is the ground and animating principle of the whole, *i.e.* God, and in and through God all men and all creatures are loved. Along with this love-trend goes an intellectual tendency to conceive Being along lines that harmonize with it, and this usually results in a Christianized Neoplatonism.

Thirdly, the word "mysticism" may stand for mystery-making, in which symbolical language is used to express moral or sexual ideas. This should be called "mysterism" rather than "mysticism." Silberer's book on *The Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism* is not about mysticism at all, but about mysterism. The symbolism of the mystery-makers is something entirely different from the metaphorical language of the mystic. The latter aims at exact and literal expression, but words often fail him and he resorts to metaphor. The mystery-writer, on the other hand, employs a style and language which is deliberately enigmatic, but the thought behind it, unlike that of the mystic, may be very ordinary, or it may regress towards the level of infantile fancies analogous to the thoughts of dreamland.

Nothing. God or Mammon; no compromise can be tolerated. This does not simply mean that we ought to suppress all worldly desires. The real mystic does not have them, for they have been completely metamorphosed into passions of a new order. What the mystic craves for is not comfort, or security, or a little plot of land, but God, the Infinite, the enveloping passion of world-embracing Love.*

Christian ethics are very much affected by the uncertain relation of popular religion to mysticism. Religion—primary religion—is a dash of mysticism; it is mild mysticism upon a basis of normality; it is regulative, as opposed to constitutive mysticism. The normal instincts are present unimpaired, but they are interwoven with mystical elements which exercise a controlling and purifying influence. These two orders of psychic factors may be organized in perfect harmony and life remain, as it were, both normal and yet abnormally elevated. This outcome is promoted by a moderate ecclesiasticism, the function of which is to effect such a reconciliation of the natural and the supernatural, the normal and the mystical. At other times a state of stress arises and there results the condition of "the sick soul."

In mysticism proper the mystical factors become dominant. Real mysticism is constitutive, as opposed to regulative, mysticism. The partial trends of mysticism

* For the subject of Absolute Christian Ethics I must refer my readers to Law's *Serious Call*. In spite of the impropriety due to the fact that I edited it, I would strongly recommend the S.P.C.K. edition with an introduction dealing with the ethical and mystical aspects of the *Serious Call* and a few passages from Law's later works. The *Serious Call* itself is here reduced to not much more than a quarter of its original length and yet it contains the whole gist of the unabbreviated book. Law's work is such a wonderful and unique exposition of Christian Ethics that it is as important for this purpose as the New Testament itself. It ought to be read in churches. But somehow the reading of the unabbreviated book is usually itself abbreviated, and a bird's-eye view of the character of its ethics is not so readily gained. Ibsen's *Brand* is a study of one side of the ethics of Christian mysticism without its basis—*i.e.* without the mysticism itself.

now become merged in a passion for shattering the normal psyche to bits and remoulding it in God. The soul becomes filled with God, one with God, becomes God himself. And it is only in relation to this dominant passion that the subordinate features of mysticism can be understood. Thus, for instance, it is rather misleading to speak of the masochism of mystics. For the suggestion here is that a certain element in normal sexuality becomes morbidly independent and provides substitute gratifications as ends in themselves by means of what would for healthy persons be unpleasant experiences. But in mysticism masochism does not operate as an independent trend which has broken loose. It becomes an element within the mystical passion for the reconstitution of the soul in God. It expresses the negative or destructive aspect of the mystic impulse, an impulse which commences to operate in spite of an extreme distaste for the unpleasantness so caused. The essential thing is not the masochistic trend in itself, but the question whether it functions as a factor within the normal sexual instinct, or as a factor within the mystic instinct, or whether it operates in morbid, inorganic independence. St. Paul took pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities; was he therefore a masochist? Read the whole passage (2 Cor. xii. 7–10) and it becomes evident that it was by no means a case of craving for the unpleasant. He heartily disliked his thorn in the flesh and besought the Lord thrice that it might depart from him. But he discovered that his trouble was a means to the development of a higher consciousness within him, and *then* he came to rejoice in his infirmities, " for when I (my normal ego) am weak then am I (my divine self) strong."

The ethics of mysticism are in a special sense the ethics of Spirit. An ancient school of Christian theologians recognized three types of man, the " hylic," the " psychic " and the " pneumatic." We need not here enter into an historical exposition of the original use of these terms beyond noting that they represent a distinction of the

greatest importance for Christian thought. The "hylic" man stands for man so far as he is under the sway of primitive instincts—self-assertion, resentment, lust, greed of gain, and the like. He represents man on the animal, the instinctive, materialistic stage of existence. His goods are those things which appeal to those instincts. Freud and Adler have rediscovered him in us all.

The "psychic" man is civilized, moralized, rational; he is interested in tracing connexions, causal and logical, and estimating consequences. A constructive, formative principle which some philosophers call Reason (with a big R) is operative in him: we have in consequence law, morals, States, Governments, science, civilization. To direct introspection he seems to possess free will, and no longer to be the plaything of blind elemental forces like the "hylic" or instinctive man. But his goods are still in the main those of the latter. He may regulate his appetites by moral rules, laws, treaties, and so on, but his civilization is still primarily just a refined and orderly way of seeking the same kind of ends as those which dominate the instinctive man. When, for instance, we speak of the danger of Europe's "relapsing into barbarism," we mean that there is a danger of a breakdown of this regulative system which we call civilization, with results comparable to those which follow upon injury to the "higher," regulative, or co-ordinative centres of the human brain. But the driving forces in primitive and in rational, or "psychic," man are in the main the same.

Pneuma, or Spirit, is a mode of mentality which has manifested itself chiefly in the great saints, mystics and prophets of mankind. It is the source of instincts of a new order very largely antithetic to those of Nature. They are felt as something superpersonal, and under their influence the individual seems to lose the free-will which he once possessed upon the plane of Reason and Culture. He lives no longer as himself, a separate individual; something is living and working within him. He is carried by the

Spirit, driven by the Spirit, receives from the Spirit his life-purpose, and woe to him if he refuse to obey! In its practical expression Spirit appears as a kind of transfigured, etherialized goodness, characterized by a tendency to push things to apparently impracticable extremes. It exhibits itself most prominently as a passion for purity and as love.

Purity is freedom from all determination by animal impulses. Nature is simply to be the medium through which Spirit realizes itself; it is never to be desired for its own sake. Until the sovereignty of the Spirit is established "the Spirit lusteth against the flesh" and is fiercely antagonistic to all self-indulgence. This latter is sheer bondage to Nature, but "where Spirit is sovereign there is liberty."* The positive antagonism of Spirit to Nature and to Culture, to the flesh and to the wisdom of the world, is, however reprehensible or paradoxical we may think it, a given fact.

Real mysticism, carried to completion, is divinity. The divinity of Jesus denotes the fact that the mystical elements in his consciousness did not operate in a disorganized, independent way, but were fused in the unity of a perfect mystical self-hood or superpersonality.

Thirdly, and as contrasted both with mysticism and with natural religiousness upon a basis of normality there is a kind of induced mysticism, or mysticoidism, in which emotions and ideas approximating to, or simulating, those of mysticism are induced by means of suggestion, contagion of feeling and the like. The conversions effected by revivalist meetings are instances of this kind. Sometimes the moral change produced may be permanent, at other times not. But the differentia of this type of consciousness is that the mysticism results, not from a transformation of the instincts from within, but from a more or less artificial induction from without.

* 2 Cor. iii. 17. Westcott and Hort remark that the word Κυρίου (of the Lord) in this verse is probably a primitive error for κύριον (sovereign, supreme, paramount).

(b) *Mock-Mysticism*

All this has a considerable bearing upon the subject of Christian ethics. For the classical utterances of Christian prophets have been those of mystics, and the morality of mysticism differs widely from that of the non-mystic. Each type has a moral order in accordance with the laws of its own being. But nothing but unreality can result from the insistence upon a morality of mysticism for normal persons coupled with all sorts of evasions to mask the fact that it will not work. Rather should one recognize that there is a three-fold Christian morality—the higher Christian morality of the mystic, the lower, but still genuine, Christian morality of the normal man, and the pseudo-Christian morality of conventionalism tinged with the language of mysticism. In this last type the ethics, without the mentality, of the saint become traditional, and persons dominated by the most commonplace passions and prejudices learn to think, and perhaps to speak, in the language of absolute devotion. They do, indeed, acknowledge that they have, in an abstract and undefined way, sinned grievously. But they have returned, penitent and forgiven, to offer themselves a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable unto God, and to maintain a life controlled by points of view which have not the remotest claim to be called Christian.

We Church-people seldom realize how verbal and unreal our moral custom is. We allow sentiment and idea to take the place of moral achievement. I veritably believe that at this present moment I am talking about reality instead of being real - my opinions and words function psychologically as a substitute for reality in life. And so interest in religion takes the place of religion itself, moral interests the place of moral action. Thence proceeds hypocrisy, the besetting sin of our nation.

We need not think only of those occasions on which some courage or self-sacrifice would be required in order to

be real. I wish rather to emphasize the obvious fact that for Church-goers there exists a sphere in which, through sermon, lessons, hymns and prayers, high moral feeling can find free play without coming into contact with anything concrete. In old Evangelical churches the congregation would join in the prayer "Give us that due sense of all thy mercies, that our hearts may be unfeignedly thankful, and that we show forth thy praise, not only with our lips, but in our lives, by giving up ourselves to thy service" with the utmost gusto. But it made not a bit of difference to their actions or to their outlook upon life. I am not speaking of pathological cases of obstructed will due to the psychical constitution of the persons in question, but of the simple fact that the highest ideals of Christian ethics, accepted by persons not morally ready for them, tend to result, not in their partial and imperfect realization, but in the substitution of sentiment and ideas for life and action.

It is not so much that we are conscious humbugs or wish to give a false impression of superior morality, but that we make words and ideas instead of action the organ of the moral consciousness. In such cases it is hardly true even to speak of a dissociation of action from ideals. Even definite ideals are not formed. A complex of beautiful words and feelings of elevation takes their place. Thus the words "on earth peace" seldom used so much as to suggest the ideal of international arbitration as a substitute for war. It did not suggest anything definite at all. It was simply a beautiful phrase.

If Christian ethics are studied in their concrete applications and upon a basis of freedom they will revolutionize the world. But if we repeat the phrases of saintliness when we are not saints at all, we shall relapse into verbalism and become as estranged from the moral as from the intellectual progress of mankind.

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CHAPTER V

METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY

§ 1. Theism

(a) *Religion and Metaphysics*

In the preceding chapters we have discussed some of the ways in which the idea of God arises, the content which it possesses, the attitudes of mind to which it is correlative, and the extent to which it operates *as though* it were true. But is it really true? Is there really a being who is such as religion describes? Or at least is the religious idea of God the nearest approach to ultimate truth that our minds are capable of? When we ask such questions we are talking metaphysics, and whatever answers we give we are talking metaphysics in giving them. When we ask no questions at all, but simply say that we believe in God, we are talking metaphysics. When we say we can know nothing except what science teaches us we are talking metaphysics. Thus the bare fact that religion exists turns us all, believers and unbelievers, learned and ignorant alike, into metaphysicians of a sort. It puts before us ideas as to ultimate truth and reality towards which we must adopt some attitude or other, and all such attitudes, as soon as they are thought about, become metaphysical theories. For religion asserts that God is first and foremost the supreme reality. Beyond the world of empirical reality there is one so Real that in comparison with Him all else is but fleeting shadow. Whatever reality and being anything may have it derives it all from God. For God is not merely *a* reality; He is the ground

of all reality, or, in the language of tradition, He is " maker of heaven and earth and of all things visible and invisible."

The term " metaphysical theology " at the head of this chapter is meant to suggest the idea that, like all metaphysics, it is concerned with reality as such. Its interest is ontological truth, and to this end it employs the theistic hypothesis in the belief that the idea of God will help us to frame a world-view more rational, more intellectually satisfying, more in harmony with the whole of reality, than any which could be constructed without it. The Athanasian Creed, on the other hand, is not in the least metaphysical, though some people would so call it. It is not metaphysical (or ontological) because it is not an attempt to grasp and interpret reality as a whole, and because it rests upon Scriptural authority. Its aim is not the discovery of intellectual truth, but the more precise definition of dogma. The creed is metaphysical neither in spirit nor in method. Take, for instance, the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Ghost, spun out of the chance occurrence of a word in a sacred book : that is not philosophy; that is not metaphysics. It may be transcendental theology, but it is not metaphysical. Really metaphysical theology means that the idea of God is honestly treated as an hypothesis to explain actual fact. If it prove unsatisfactory from a purely philosophical point of view it must be modified, or abandoned—unless, of course, theology abandons its claim to metaphysical validity.

On the other hand, once assured of its metaphysical validity, theology is bound to consider practical purposes. Its aim is not so much to think truly as to respond to truth. It is a question of the reaction of the whole personality to a world-view—not the bare conception of it. For this reason long discussion must be avoided. What is required is a true world-picture, sketched as briefly but as vividly as possible. It is perfectly possible to aim at such a conceptual world-picture, but yet to scrutinize every

feature in it with a view to its validity and metaphysical truth.

It is not necessary that we should enter upon a discussion as to whether a knowledge of reality is epistemologically possible, because, for religion, the metaphysical, or ontological, standpoint is *given*. As already pointed out, we find ourselves with ontological propositions on our hands from the very first. More will be said on the subject of epistemology below; it is not necessary in this place.

(b) *Deism*

The word "Theism" is used in more senses than one. The same is true of the terms "Deism" and "Pantheism" with which it is contrasted. Nevertheless the three types of thought are sufficiently distinct, whatever the names by which they are indicated.

"Deism" is the name for any view according to which the relations of God to the world are of an external character. That is to say, God and the universe do not constitute an organic whole, but are two distinct and separate existences, so that their relations to one another are conceived upon the analogy of things held to be entirely external to one another, such as the relation of a potter to the vessels that he makes, or that of a governor to the province that he rules. The world, according to Deism, originated in time through the action of a being who is wholly transcendental to it. God is thus the efficient cause of the world—δι' αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα—and His immanence in it simply means that His power is in touch with the internal as well as with the external side of things. And since these are all, as it were, present before Him and open to His gaze He may be said to be in some sense omnipresent. But the divine immanence, or omnipresence, is not taken seriously by Deism; Christian tradition is committed to these words and therefore something has to be made of them. But the deistic tendency is to conceive

of God as in every way removed from the world. He is in heaven, and heaven is essentially the blessed place which is in every way distinct from, remote from, and different from earth. Being wholly other and distinct from the world God can act upon it from without. The record of miracles is especially treasured as evidence of such action—transitive action which passes over from a subject to an object not itself. God may be prevailed upon by prayer to intervene in this way so that causes need not always produce their effects inasmuch as God may interpose and stop them. He can be moved to act in the same external, interpersonal way that one man may induce another to do something. He helps, saves, gives grace in this same social and external way because He wishes to do so and desires to encourage people to pray to Him. Grace is dependent, not on the laws of the recipient's being, but upon the social relation in which he stands to a God who is wholly other than, and external to, himself. It is given because God specifically wills that it should be given, witheld because God specifically wills that it should be withheld. For God can do whatever He likes; He is omnipotent. If He allows calamities to happen it is in His, often inscrutable, wisdom which understands far better than we what ought to be. They are due either to His justice which punishes wrongdoing, or to His knowledge that man needs the discipline of sorrow, or to His unwillingness to revoke the high gift of free-will.* All the sufferings of humanity are the result either of its abuse of free-will or of other defects of mind or character which make this discipline necessary. Apart from the consequences of man's wilful cruelty, animals do not suffer much. The general relation of man to God is that of a subject to a despot. His duty is to obey, and sin is disobedience,

* This insistence upon the sacredness of free-will is a bit of modern apologetic not taken very seriously by its authors, who are concerned for the authority of the Church and of the State far more than for freedom. Yet if God is such a believer in freedom why should not the Church be so too?

wilful lawlessness. Very heinous is the transgression of the laws of such a glorious king.

Deism is clearly not an attempt at an interpretation of reality. It is the expression of religious feeling in the terms of monarchist metaphor, and its doctrines are simply explications of this metaphor. Absolute monarchs, however, are nothing accounted of in these days, and so the metaphor is more and more failing to appeal to people's feelings. For this reason the deistic language of the prayers and worship of the Church awakens less and less response and creates an increasing sense of unreality.

From the standpoint of rational thought deism is quite untenable. The existence of such a God, even if we assume that He exists, could never be inferred inasmuch as the conditions of valid inference are not present. There is no ground of inference from anything to anything else except the nature of the system to which they both belong, and all inference is from element to element within that system. Everything, therefore, in the universe is evidence only of the nature of the universe and of the relation of one factor within it to another. Nothing in the universe can be evidence of anything or any person outside it. It is therefore logically impossible to infer the existence of a God deistically conceived. For Deism means a God outside the system of the evidences which we call the universe and therefore outside the sphere of inference. The only facts which might justify such an inference would be sequences known to be without basis in the laws of Nature and therefore capable of being regarded as evidences of interference from without. But such interference would be almost impossible to prove. An inexplicable phenomenon apparently incompatible with the laws of Nature so far as these are known merely calls for further research. Poltergeists are an example.

It would indeed be possible, if the deistic view held good, that the interaction of God with men should give rise to a social system from the phenomena of which the existence

of such a God could be inferred, since He himself would be a factor in it. Thus if some moral cause, such as an act of perjury, were regularly followed by some physical effect, such as death by lightning, the hypothesis of an external moral governor would be suggested, because perjury and electricity do not belong to any common system unless there is one constituted by the action of one who rules alike Nature and the world of men. But such sequences do not seem to occur.* The necessary peculiarity of them would be that the antecedent was significant only on the assumption of a social relation between man and God and the consequent manifestly of a kind which no psychological or physiological laws could account for.

Let it be clear, therefore, that we cannot set out to prove the existence of God and then raise the subsequent question of his relation to the world. By the very process of inferring God's existence we have discarded Deism and have accepted the view that God is organically one with the universe. In other words, we have not inferred the existence of anything outside the universe, but have inferred that the universe possesses a godlike consciousness. That, in the absence of clear marks of purposive intervention from without, is the utmost that can logically be proved. And since there is but very slight reason (apart from certain legends of non-recurrent miracles in the various Scriptures of the world) for assuming such intervention to have taken place, all deistic ideas may be *in limine* rejected as incompatible with rational theology.

* The only nature-miracle in modern times of which I am aware is the following: The ship in which Hudson Taylor was sailing was becalmed and drifting upon a dangerous reef. Hudson Taylor, the Captain, and the ship's carpenter, prayed earnestly for wind. A faint breeze sprang up, just sufficient to carry the vessel past the reef and then died away, and the calm continued. If such cases were at all common they would certainly be of extraordinary significance for philosophy as well as for religion. But they are at best so rare that we are not justified in believing in them without further evidence. To do so would be a regression to the standpoint of the old wish and phantasy theology.

(c) *Theistic Monism*

When we come to realize that a deistic conception of God is rationally untenable, we turn to the rival idea of Him which regards Him as organically one with the world. Of this general conception there are several varieties, and it will be understood that in what follows I am not describing the only possible type of theistic monism. But, whatever the precise type, the view which we have now to test must be a real monism—that is to say a view which regards all existence as ultimately One. For the logical difficulties of deism, we found, were connected with the fact that, for it, God and the world were not elements within a single system. For, *ex hypothesi*, God and the world were not organically one, as elements in a single individual, and although it is true that they were supposed to constitute a social group, the necessary evidence for such an assumption was almost totally lacking.

Monistic world-views into which the idea of God enters at all may be either theistic or pantheistic. Theism tends towards the attribution of personality to God, pantheism to deny this. I say "tends to" in order to avoid verbalism and to keep in closer touch with reality. We have to ask what facts there are which suggest that the One possesses self-consciousness and the other attributes of personality. Has it determinate character? Has it purpose and will? Is it capable of deliberate action? Does it interact with the world in any way? Can it hold personal relations with men? In proportion as we give affirmative answers to these questions our view is theistic, while the less we are able to do so the more nearly do we approach to pantheism. But to construct a concept of personality in the abstract, and then, on the evidence of some slight indication of personality in the Ultimately Real to attribute, *ex vi termini*, the whole connotation of the term "personality" to the Absolute, is surely mere concept-spinning.

The term "pantheism" seems to stand for one of three

things. It may mean either a belief that the universe is suffused with some lofty element in virtue of which all things tend to perfection; or it may mean that, though the universe may possess no distinctively divine character, yet it is the proper object of religious emotion; or it may stand for absolute idealism—the view that the universe is a timeless whole which can be described in terms of mind. There is no specific object for veneration in pantheism, other than the whole as such. If something —if anything—in the universe stood forth as the proper object of adoration we should have the beginnings of theism.

We will now attempt to sketch, in very brief outline, a theistic, or, as some would call it, a theomonistic,* world-view.

(*a*) There is one all-inclusive reality, or substance, of which all individuals are modifications or elements. The One, the all-inclusive reality, may be called the Absolute, because, as the Whole, it has no environment on which it depends, by which it is conditioned, or to which it is relative. I am here using the term simply to denote existence in its entirety as a whole, without reference to distinctions between appearance and reality, Nature and transcendent being, knowable and unknowable, and the like.

(*b*) The Absolute is determinate in character. This is self-evident, for from an ultimate Indeterminate nothing could proceed, and a characterful world, or world of any

* The term "theism" may either stand for all kinds of belief in God, including, therefore, deism, or it may denote a creed intermediate between deism and pantheism. There is a term "theomonism," used by Rülf and referred to by Ballard (from whom this reference is taken), which looks as though it might be suitable as a more precise term less likely than "theism" to be confounded with deism. It is said to stand for a form of monism which effects a threefold synthesis of mind and matter, allness and personality, and of religion and philosophy. It occurs in a book, or section, called *Gotteseinheit*, which is part of his *Metaphysik*. I admit that I have not read it, or any summary of it, but these are just the problems which metaphysical theology needs most to consider.

kind, would be impossible. Indeterminateness cannot provide any principle of determination; nor can you explain the definite thusness of anything in particular by appealing to the indefiniteness of everything in general. The idea, therefore, that the Absolute must be infinite in the sense of having no definite character (on the ground that that would imply limitation, and so finiteness) is a hypostasization, not merely of an abstraction, but of the very idea of abstractness itself. The Absolute is infinite in the sense of possessing inexhaustible content and also in the sense of freedom from externally imposed limitation; not in the sense of indeterminate being.

(*c*) The Absolute is an organism. If a thing is a unity (and we are presupposing monism) it must be an organized, systematized whole, and a systematized, living whole is an organism. (We are at liberty to insert this word "living" because the only part of existence that we know is full of life, and so, *prima facie*, the universe may be held to be a living thing.) In popular practice we tend to look upon all order and organization as nothing more than local patches of equilibrium in the midst of a chaos of undirected forces. The organization of a solar system, a plant, a mind, an empire, is half-consciously looked upon *merely* as the product of innumerable bumps. The fundamental nature of reality is to barge about blindly; where conditions are settled the evolution of higher forms can proceed; but those conditions and evolutionary forces themselves are the products of chaos. It is not *called* chaos, but that is the actual thought; it seems to be the terminal concept of the genetic method. So far as I am aware Materialism accepts this doctrine of Primal Chaos.

As against this idea of chaos it is here suggested that when we look upon the universe as it exists, rather than in terms of the elements into which science may analyse it and from which the origin of particular things may be traced, we shall get the impression that it is an interconnected sphere of organisms within organisms, indi-

viduals within individuals. And the terminal concept of this impression is that of an all-comprehensive organism, a superindividual, whose structure is reflected, in varying degrees of adequacy, or reproduced, in every creature in the world.

(*d*) The Absolute possesses an expression and a structure, constitution, or basis. The expression of the Absolute is the universe. The universe comprises God, any heaven which there may be, and the world. The world comprises the visible world and any astral planes, or the like, which may exist. These are all modes in which the Absolute is expressed. The unexpressed side of the Absolute—the stuff it is made of as opposed to the forms which it assumes —possesses a certain character and structure in virtue of which it may be called the Soul. Something must exist as the last term of our thought, and since that ultimate world-stuff and world-principle must have some definite character we have to ask what character? The term which expresses the character of known existence most comprehensively is "soul." Soul is that entity of which organization, life, mentality, personality, and the like, are functions, or activities, and it has often been suspected that it is the source of all order. In taking this step of identifying the Absolute with soul we are, in the first place, guessing that matter will be found to possess a secondary, derivative, more relative nature than soul, and secondly that the realm of the animate is probably far more widely extended than does at first sight appear. These assumptions will, for the moment, pass simply as guesses. In speaking of "the Soul" we are talking in terms not of knowing but of being. It is animism that we are perpetrating, rather than idealism.

(*e*) The Soul possesses a trend towards perfection—towards completer, richer, intrinsically better forms of existence. This striving towards perfection has been recognized by some biologists as a characteristic of Nature, and by some ethical writers as the principle of the

moral life, and in both cases regarded as transcendentally grounded. It has called into being the human personality and has manifested itself within it in a great variety of forms, moral, social, æsthetic, intellectual, mechanical. And it is sometimes experienced as apparently hypostatic, as an element of a higher order within us and yet above us, in some ways seeming the most intimate and essential part of ourselves, as our own true self, and yet disengaging itself from us as a not-ourselves, a higher something standing over against our actual selves. This is the Indwelling Christ, the divine Spirit immanent in man. An immanent God means a God Who is *an element in ourselves* and yet somehow not ourselves. It is what we call "God."

One of the functions of this urge towards more perfect being is the production of personality. Not only has it led to the development of a rational, moral, religious personality, in a certain race of animals, but it sometimes takes personal form within persons. When the higher spiritual element has disengaged itself from our normal selves it acts, speaks, and possesses specific character and continuity as itself a person. Instances of this are common among mystics and a few have been quoted above. Thus within the limits of actual experience man may find God existent within him in two modalities first as a structural element running through him, giving rise to his capacity for a Better, and gradually emerging into consciousness as an impersonal something moulding him, influencing him, and yet essentially part of himself; secondly as a personality other than himself with whom he can stand in very definite personal relations.

In these facts we may see a manifestation of a deep trend within the Absolute. It makes for perfect being in personal form. And if so, unless thwarted by some strange internal weakness, the Absolute itself will have its own theoid personality in which all its capacities for perfection find expression in actuality. This perfect and personal being in which all existence culminates is God. God, as

opposed to the Absolute, thus exists in three modalities—as immanent in man as an element in his nature; as transcendent beyond the individual self-consciousness as a theoid personality other than he, yet immanent within his total individuality as part of it; and thirdly as the God of the universe transcendent beyond it as the theoid personality and self-distinguishing consciousness (the two here coinciding) of the All.*

In so far as God is identical with the Absolute we can say ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα—the universe is derived from Him. And in so far as God is that in which the urge towards perfection finds its final expression we can say εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα—He is that being in which the goal of the universe is realized. The primal content and nature of the One vindicates itself and makes good through Him. This is the *rationale* of the whole world-process; God is the final cause † of the world. But it would be quite possible to challenge the propriety of this emphasis which treats the Absolute as metaphysically (though not chronologically) prior to God, as the ground of His being. It may be truer to say that the Absolute, and therewith the world, may exist as a means to God's end—as a means to His own self-realization. Thus whereas one may say that the human personality exists as a function of the human organism, it is equally possible to reverse the emphasis

* These remarks have no intentional connexion with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, the discussion of which lies beyond the scope of this book. For this subject see Lecture VIII. in the Bishop of Manchester's (W. Temple's) little book on *The Nature of Personality*, and several writings of Dean Rashdall's. It is more than abundantly clear that the popular idea of a society of three divine persons is unorthodox and also that it misses the religious significance of the doctrine. Contrast these two propositions: (1) "The holy disposition is God Himself." (2) "God the Holy Ghost is a person standing in social relations with God the Father and God the Son." It is obvious that (2) destroys much of the significance of (1). ("The Holy Disposition" is an expression used by Dr. Johnstone Ross.) The only effectual means of countering the tritheistic heresy would be an official retranslation of the term ὑπόστασις.

† "Final cause," an Aristotelian and Scholastic expression meaning *raison d'être*. It does not mean "first cause."

and say that the human organism is a means towards, and instrument of, the human personality. The Absolute has no will or initiative of its own other than that of God. It is through His will that the Whole (and therewith He Himself) subsists. He is therefore the efficient as well as the material and final cause of all things. "For of Him, and through Him, and unto Him are all things. To Him be the glory for ever!" * This is the formula of theism as an ontological theory. Or, if the word theism be too indefinite, of theomonism, or theistic monism.

(*f*) God and His world form one organic whole and neither can rationally be conceived without the other, the world being imagined as the body of which God is the soul.† For God and the world stand in functional interdependence, as do soul and body in man, and both are modal—*i.e.* modifications of the one all-embracing Soul. All parts of the Whole are essential: all are ends in themselves, as expressions of the Absolute, as well as means to the existence of other parts. The world, God, and any ideal realms or supernatural beings which may exist are all elements in the system of being. All are members in the body of the Absolute. None are incidental or epiphenomenal; none are self-sufficient, not even God.

There is a poem of Browning's which says that although rational thought has dispelled the idea of a deistically imagined God, yet the truth is, not that the conception of God has become impossible, but rather that, for one who can see with the eyes of the poet, it has expanded into that of a "universe that feels and knows." Heaven and earth,

* Rom. xi. 36.

† If this expression is used it should be in the sense that God is the self-conscious personality of the universe, not merely its animating principle; that the world, or Nature, in this connexion includes finite mentality as well as matter, and that if pressed we should say that it was psychical rather than material Nature which constituted the body of God. As brain (whatever, in ultimate analysis that may be) is to mind so are finite minds throughout the universe to God. The thought which I suggest is by no means that of Pope, with its ethical indifferentism, but more nearly that of Ramanuja.

high and low, a personal God and an impersonal Nature, are "intertwined" in the unity of a single whole.* It is to this intuition of reality as a living concrete whole that we must now try to return.

The Soul is thus the one Existent, organized in myriad modes each of which is an individual, or group of individuals from electrons to God. They are related to one another and can act upon one another through the Soul, their common basis. The laws of Nature and the whole system of mechanism are there for the same reason that spiritual forces are there; all are teleological in character; they are means to the organization of the Soul's resources for the production of ever higher and richer forms of individuality. The whole constitutes one immeasurably complex fact—God and the world, Spirit and Nature, all is ultimately One, and every isolated fact, such as Nature apart from God, or God apart from Nature, is to some extent an abstraction. Two analogies may make this view more easily imaginable. Man is a body inhabited by a mind, soul, or personality; so may the universe be. If you examine the relations of the parts of his body to one another—of brain to nerve, of nerve to muscle, of muscle to sinew, of sinew to bone—you find nothing but mechanism; by watching a living brain we can no more see the spirit that is "within," than by watching the stars can we see God; we can discover there nothing but physical matter and its laws. So may the mechanical processes of the universe and the psychological processes of our minds hide beneath them the Soul of the All, the Soul of souls, undiscoverable, but ever present. As every occasion in which so much as a muscle twitches because a man wishes, or hopes, or feels, a miracle takes place and the laws of Nature are violated, so may there be an element of miracle in many apparently natural causes. As man is partly conscious of his body and partly unconscious, controlling some of his bodily functions but not others, so may the course

* Epilogue to *Dramatis Personæ*.

of Nature be partially controlled, but not wholly determined, by the mind of God. And as a man's thoughts may make his body thin and haggard or produce the phenomena of hysteria or hypnosis, or may strengthen it to resist disease, so may the world-creating and world-moulding energies of the universe proceed from a Mind and Will within. If such is the nature of man, who, as microcosm reproduces the universe on a scale small enough to read, is it not reasonable, in default of good reasons to the contrary, to think of the great universe as the temple of an all-creative Soul? *

A second analogy which may help us is that which subsists between the organized self, the formed personality and self-consciousness of a man, on the one hand, and the contents of the Unconscious on the other. In the same way the Soul, the universal Psyche, may be regarded as having a conscious self, which is God, and an Unconscious, the contents of which constitute the world. If we could take our stand below the threshold of our own consciousness, our own personality—the great self presiding over our psychical system—would have disappeared. Our world would be a wild and godless world, though organized in its own way, with little to suggest that there was anything of a higher character above it. And yet our view of ourselves derived solely from unconscious mind, with all reference to our conscious selfhood left out, would be a very inadequate one. In some way the world may be a process taking place within the subconscious mind of God, the laws of Nature and of finite mind being the laws of the factors, or partial trends, of the Absolute Mind—not inventions, devices or ideas conceived by the latter.

Thus within the unity of man there is a material system with its own mechanical laws, a lower mentality, and a self-conscious personality. And if man be truly a micro-

* See the Essay of Dr. Le Conte in *The Conception of God*, by Royce, Le Conte, Howison, & Mezes (Macmillan).

cosmos, an epitome of the universe, this too will have its supreme personality, God.

This hypothesis of the nature of the universe as a spiritual organism, ever developing fresh centres of finite subjectivity presided over by an arch-personality, may strike philosophers as too simple and easy to be true and too old-fashioned to be interesting. And of course the application to the Absolute of categories derived from mundane experience must at best be only rough. But surely the main question is as to whether this conception serves well, or whether it does not serve well, as an instrument to enable people the better to enter into and possess the universe and to see God in all things and all things in God. And to answer that question we must compare this with other world-views. It has certain advantages. It is in harmony with religion in that it recognizes a Supreme Person who is both one with ourselves and with the universe and other than ourselves and than the universe, while at the same time escaping the distressing conflicts with experience and with reason to which deism is so liable. It is in harmony with moral feeling in its recognition of differences in intrinsic value in the elements within the Absolute (as judged by the degree to which they can be taken up into the selfhood of the supreme personality). It is in harmony with philosophy in that the conception is arrived at without any appeal to the alleged requirements of the religious consciousness and purely as the result of an attempt at a consistent synthesis of all science and experience. It is formulated on lines sufficiently near to those of the sciences to enable it to take specific account of the particular results arrived at by them, and sufficiently simple and imaginable to enable it, if otherwise satisfactory, to enter into popular thought and exercise an influence as a spiritualizing factor in civilization. All these considerations, however, though they make this world-view rational antecedently to the examination experience, cannot serve as a substitute for the latter. Theomonism must be tested and re-tested. It is

not elaborated like the Athanasian Creed, *in vacuo*, but challenges refutation or verification from every fact of Nature and of civilization.

§ 2. The Universe

(a) *Creation*

The following section represents an attempt to introduce a little more detail into the bare outlines of theomonism sketched above. I am quite conscious that I shall be talking what many will regard as pseudometaphysical phantasies. I believe, however, that a certain amount of concrete detail in our world-view is necessary to the vitality of religion. Most religious people would welcome any reasonable substitute for the lost myths of sudden creation by divine word of command, of the diabolical origin of evil, and of the incursion view of divine action. Any plausible speculations on such subjects would help us in more ways than one. In the first place they would help to reconstruct our cosmic imagery, and this is emotionally necessary, or at least desirable, for religion. Secondly, they may supply points at which an attempt could be made to bring together the ideas of God and of Nature in the unity of a coherent world-view. The usual tendency of religious philosophy is to deal with the idea of God in such abstraction from the details of Nature that a real synthesis of them is impossible. It discusses God and the world in general, but not God and the quantum theory, God and symbiosis, God and the unconscious. Surely this is unsatisfactory. Religion seeks to see God in all things—quanta, symbiosis, and so forth. And if there is no scientific method of dealing with his relation to such things resort must be had to the best available substitute for one, even if that substitute be nothing more than hypotheses based on doubtful analogies. The compatibility of such hypotheses with the results of science and with the facts of common experi-

ence could at least be examined, and God would be back in the world again. I do not mean that I am myself proposing to deal with any detail such as symbiosis, but I do mean that the creation-myth which I am about to suggest could form one pier of a possible bridge between the idea of God and facts such as these. The reunion of the ideas of God and of Nature must be effected by approaches both from above and from below. And those who are attempting the road from the transcendental to the empirical must be allowed methods less rigorous than the canons of induction. Moreover scientists themselves resort to mythology, and nothing that I shall have to say will possess a more mythical character than, for instance, do the speculations regarding the origin of life and its chase after death, or the inheritance of the guilty conscience of prehistoric parricides, as formulated in the interests of science by Freud. These speculations are thoroughly legitimate for their purpose, but not more so than the speculations of a theology which also is concerned with the pursuit of rational truth.

If in the idea of God we possess the first principle of all existence we ought to be able to show that it illuminates all facts of Nature. The possibility of conditions approximating to those of "diffuse, incoherent homogeneity" and likewise the occurrence of the particular kinds of heterogeneity which supervene, with all the material, vital and psychical phenomena of Nature and all the laws which they exhibit—all ought to be illuminated by it. The paths of the planets and the ways of wild creatures, the beauty of autumn mists and the songs of nightingales, "ex uno Verbo omnia, et unum loquuntur omnia: et hoc est principium, quod et loquitur nobis. Nemo sine illo intelligit aut recte judicat. Cui omnia unum sunt, quique ad unum omnia trahit et omnia in uno videt, potest stabilis corde esse atque in Deo pacificus permanere." There are other things—those, namely, which are connected with the human personality

—which need illuminating too. But these do not constitute the great difficulty for theists. The beam in our eye is Nature. The problem of moral evil is merely an incidental difficulty like the sinful behaviour of the moons of Uranus, which go round the wrong way. But the bare fact of Nature is matter for incredulous amazement, like a man walking along without a head. For a transition from the idea of God to that of Nature seems, for strict thinking, to be almost impossible. Leave all that is cruel and ugly in Nature out of account; take only what is attractive, or at least inoffensive, such as a robin or a rabbit; it is still very hard to think the connexion between it and God. For even if some creative act could be imagined whereby a world of some kind or other arose, how can we account for the actual laws of matter, the processes of vegetable and animal existence, and the basic passions of human life? Take the daily life of any creature whatsoever, or the movements of any piece of matter. How is it to be related to the idea of God? God and the world seem so incommensurate with one another. We expect to find in Nature a manifestation of Him Who is invisible; in God, an illumination of Nature. But do we really?

Two answers, on opposite lines, suggest themselves, according to whether or not we regard the activities of the Absolute as being in all cases conditioned, directly or indirectly, by an act of its conscious personality—*i.e.* by God. Does God create the world or does He not? I am here assuming the doctrine of creation, although there is such a thing as theism without the idea of creation. But this doctrine cannot, on monistic principles, mean that God has somehow called into being something wholly other than, and separate from, Himself. The one Existent, the Absolute, is organized in different ways. God is the Absolute in its perfect self-expression; He is the universal Soul in its absolutely right attitude; He is the Real in spirituality and unity. Nature is that same Absolute

in quite another mode of organization. We have therefore to think of the Absolute as at once divinely and naturalistically determined. It is like a stream flowing in opposite directions at the same time. The idea of creation, then, means that the lower of these two determinations of the Absolute, namely Nature, itself results from an attitude or activity of the higher determination, namely God. How can such an activity be conceived?

God's self-consciousness can be described, in the language of German idealism, by saying that the Absolute posits itself as God by the self-declaratory mental act "I am I." He is self-conscious in relation to the idea of a world, a non-ego, which does not yet (*i.e.* prior to creation) exist, except in the thought of God, and that thought does not *ipso facto* bring its object into real existence. He conceives of a world, and His heart goes out to it as it were in love. He wills that there should be a universe, but this means that it, the Absolute, should be a universe—a connected manifold which is not God. Thus the Absolute wills the surrender of its godhead—its unity, its self-consciousness, its perfection, and the actual characteristics of finite existence arise from this double source—an original self-positing and an original self-abandonment. These two acts of God, or of the Absolute (the two concepts here, *i.e.* in metaphysical priority to the universe, coinciding)—the act of self-declaration whereby He is God and the act of self-renunciation whereby He falls into a manifold—are the first two steps of the dialectic of the universe.

Whether or not, however, the categories of self-positing and renunciation are the most suitable by means of which to describe the divine acts which lie behind a theistic universe, in any case some kind of double attitude on the part of the Absolute appears to be a necessary implication of the doctrine of creation. And to say that God is self-conscious is the same thing as saying that He posits Himself as "I am what I am." The only further step is

one which will connect this aspect of the Existent with the fact of the world as it is. If there be a God, as we do believe, the fulness of divinity and the indeterminate promiscuousness of Nature (I mean its readiness to develop in any direction regardless of character and consequences) are given as two mutually complementary sides, poles, or modes of organization, of the same universe. To this given state of things we have to supply, on any theistic principles, some conception of divine activity in virtue of which the two can be thought together.

This view comes very close to the orthodox doctrine that God, in His second person, "emptied Himself," ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν, while at the same time maintaining the fulness of His godhead in His first person. Creation is incarnation, and incarnation is sacrifice, surrender, self-depotentiation.

As a result of this act of creation there comes into being a world without form, and void, and in a condition of diffuse homogeneity, having as its subjective side a mind which herewith becomes differentiated from the divine consciousness. For the world is within the Soul, and of it. It is immanent in it as elements rejected by the conscious self are still present in the individual mind. It therefore still possesses a certain original subjectivity, which now becomes split off from the Supreme consciousness. This secondary subjectivity is the world-omniscience, or universal telæsthetic subject. Its object is Nature: it involves, as such,* no consciousness of God Himself or of heavenly things, and it is unconnected with any moral or other preferences. We will call this secondary subjectivity of the Absolute "the Omniscient." It is perhaps substantially the same idea as that of Kant's Consciousness in General. It may also be called "the world-soul" if we understand that this term has not the same meaning as "the Soul," *i.e.* "the Absolute."

* "As such," *i.e.* apart from the possibility of the penetration of it by that higher cosmic activity which we call Spirit.

But the world-soul is not to be thought of solely as knower, but also as the stream of this world's life, the spring of all its striving and source of all its desire. Further, the spiritual content of the Absolute is not annihilated by the divine act of self-withdrawal; it is repressed and rendered latent in order to free the lower factors in the Absolute for their creative work. Spirit thus becomes a recessive element in the world-soul. This latter still possesses those potentialities which are due to the original divine nature of the Soul prior to the great *kenosis*, and Nature is in organic union with Spirit. And so when the world reaches a certain point of development its higher spiritual elements begin to emerge. But herewith we pass beyond the realm of sheer Nature, for Nature means existence so far as these higher elements have not yet effectively supervened. It is in the human sphere that the latent trends which Spirit, immanent in Nature, possesses in virtue of the fact that it is the substance of a personal God operate as higher causes, or spiritual determinants.

It is as though there were two drifts within the world-soul. One is "Nature," the other Spirit. "Nature" tends to maintain existent modes of being or to revert to earlier types. It involves a tendency to repetition, to habit, to fixed character, but at the same time a tendency towards regression and death. Spirit is a controlling agency in virtue of which these tendencies are checked and the higher is evolved from the lower. In its perfect form it is the selfhood of God.

Thus the Absolute exists in several determinations. Its first determination is that in which its character is actual, unified, personal; we call it God. Its second determination is that in which its divine character has been lost, and what is left is the Soul as omniscient unconsciousness, bursting with impulse which has now become indeterminate; we call the Absolute in this determination "the world-soul." The second determina-

tion of the Soul results from the first through the act of creation, here conceived as an act of surrender of attributes. That which is surrendered, or inhibited, is Spirit. Spirit is the treasure which the world has lost; it is the divine character existent, not as the attributes of an actual person, but as a trend within the Absolute which, relatively to the actual world, is suppressed. The suppression of Spirit gives rise to an inverse trend towards multiplicity, inorganic character, externality, matter. This inverse trend towards inorganic character, etc., we may call "Nature" if we do not use this term as quite synonymous with "empirical actuality." Empirical actuality for us is that plane of being for which "Nature" * is dominant, Spirit recessive, and God transcendent. The fourth determination of the Real (if we count empirical actuality as the third determination) is that which results from the completed union of Spirit and Nature. This is the Realm of Ends, the Realm of the Ideal, the purpose of creation realized. For it Spirit is dominant, "Nature" recessive, and God empirically real.

The existence of a world-soul is not assumed solely for theological reasons. This "second determination" of the universe seems to me to be the *prius* of all knowledge and especially of the phenomena investigated by the Society for Psychical Research, such as telepathy, telæsthesia, precognition, and what seem to me to be group minds (such as those of research circles) functioning as "organizing intelligences" upon levels at which the individuals of which they are composed are not conscious. The world-soul represents the will to live of Schopenhauer, the Vital Impulse of Bergson, and Jung's Collective Psyche. I do not mean that all these conceptions are to be identified, but simply that they may all be grouped

* When using the term "Nature" in the sense of "the trend towards natural law, fixed character, repetition," I have employed inverted commas. Since this tendency is the predominant characteristic of Nature, *i.e.* empirical actuality, the same word may cover both.

under the term "world-soul," and that this, when ontologically criticized, will prove to be something which is not ultimate, but a phase of existence intermediate between the Ultimate and Empirical reality.

The world-factor we call Spirit is the apparent *prius* of moral self-consciousness; of the facts upon which Eucken's doctrine of "the independence of the spiritual life" rests; of the evolution of mind; of biological entelechies, "*nisus* towards perfection," etc.; of the possibility of, and tendency towards, sublimation in the development of the human individual; and of historical events which make the impression of being movements towards the realization of an Idea.

The third determination of the Real, namely Nature, is sufficiently a given fact to require no discussion except as regards its connexion with the other determinations. The first determination, the transcendent Deity—*i.e.* Deity transcendent beyond the planes of Nature and empirical actuality, but not, of course, beyond the One Existent—is the *prius* of the others, which are ontologically unthinkable without it. The idea of a distinction between God and the Absolute goes back to Eckhart; that of the synthesis of a number of determinations, or "cross-sections" of the Real (*μέρισμοι τῆς φυσέως*) within the unity of the Existent, to Erigena. The world-view here presented is therefore neither an original one nor the product of a phantasy devoid of rational basis. It is simply a broadly sketched synthesis of apparent phases of the Existent, together with one or two speculative links to connect them together.

The principal difficulty of this, as of all spiritualistic world-views, is the difficulty of accounting for the existence and characteristics of the world as described by physics and mathematics. How are space and matter to be explained? To many of us the most interesting answer to this question is Bergson's, and it is a view elaborated upon some such lines as his that, personally, I accept.

But possibly Bergson's view (I speak as an ill-informed critic) suffers from an over-simplification of its first principle. The Vital Impulse, illuminating as it is as the first principle of a new metaphysic, is perhaps rather too narrow as a ground of explanation. It is difficult to see why the process of inversion, or interruption, should ever take place. The universe seems to be due to a strange failure of the principle of all reality to be itself. There is nothing in its nature to explain it and nothing to explain the curiously teleological character of this *felix culpa* on its part. For were it not for the fact that ultimate reality is always nodding and forgetting itself as well as wakefully leaping forward there would not be a universe at all. And further, the double position of intelligence as the child of death and twin brother of matter, on the one hand, and as a brilliant improvization of life's for dealing with matter and death in its (life's) own interests, on the other, is rather strange. Above all, the unity of the material universe seems to require as its correlate a one, universal, geometrizing intellect such as M. Bergson has not acknowledged. In other words, the processes of which M. Bergson speaks would be more intelligible if they were conceived as mutually supplementary functions of a world-soul. And if the world-soul itself were thought of as a secondary personality, or Unconscious, of the Absolute which comes into being through a purposive act of self-inhibition on the part of the higher personality of the Absolute, the negative features of "creative evolution" (such as relaxation, inversion, inertness), and also its marked, but unbargained-for teleology, would for the first time become explicable.

To discuss these questions in further detail would not here be practicable. Lest, however, any Sturdy Common Sense reader should dismiss the views of such writers as Bergson as palpable nonsense, I will quote a remarkable experiment which I have seen and performed, and which may perhaps be a well-known fact. If a needle be suspended under a bell-glass it can be made to turn round a

considerable number of degrees without contact, if a person standing beside the bell-glass wills very hard that it should do so. Since, therefore, in some cases real motion through space can be derived from the willed idea of motion through psychological space, the doctrine of a spiritual source of all motion and space is at least not palpable nonsense.

(b) *Higher Causes*

But if Spirit can act as a determining influence under ordinary conditions it is intelligible that under special conditions it should operate in exceptionally striking ways. If the right attitude is forthcoming on the part of the persons concerned Spirit may become more powerfully effective. "The laws of Nature" will then change their character. For the laws of Nature governing human life are really the laws of despiritualized Soul in union with Spirit. That is to say, the human world is really a complex of "Nature" (in the narrower sense) and Spirit; if the balance of these two factors is changed the reactions, or "laws," of the complex as a whole will also change. This consideration has a considerable bearing upon the question as to whether God can and will interfere to counteract the operation of the law of causation.

Causation is usually spoken of as though it were an exclusive relation between some separable antecedent and some separable consequent. But an event is not simply and solely an event serially and causally connected with its antecedents and its consequents. It is part of the self-expression of the universe. The antecedent in any given case is the universe of all actual and possible relations. What all those possible relations are we simply do not know. We may know that, taken in abstraction from its environment, matter tends to behave in such and such a way. As part of a living organism it may behave differently, and when in connexion with energetic spiritual

processes in yet another fashion. The laws of Nature are all abstractions; they are all formulations of the ways in which things tend to be active when taken apart from modifying conditions. But these formulations cannot tell us whether among those possible modifying conditions there is to be reckoned Spirit.

Further, causation is popularly thought of as a single law, all consequents following from their antecedents by the same kind of necessity. Having therefore once got the idea that a cause is invariably followed by its effect we conclude that this must hold good in all spheres alike and that it is therefore vain to seek for divine "interference" with the operation of this law.* But "Causation" may be a generic term comprising several species of a diverse character, and some of them may be more mechanically exclusive of the possibility of spiritual interference than others.

The first kind of causation is physical and mechanical. This consists of a redistribution of energy and alterations of position in bodies in constant proportions. Secondly, there is psychophysical causation, or interaction, which involves a direct violation of the laws of mechanical causation. The third is instinctive causation, according to which a given mental state tends to be followed by another. This is not a causal relation in the mechanical

* A clergyman writes: "I am in doctrinal divergence from the Prayer Book, not in the matter of the Creeds, but in the Prayers. These are based upon the assumption that God can and will, if asked, interfere with the normal working of things in such a way as to produce results quite different from those which would originally ensue, or at any rate to sterilize causes. Take e.g. the prayer for a Parliament elected under the conditions of the last. [The Election of December 1918.] Only the results that followed could have been expected: they were the inevitable results: yet the Church prays as if God would nullify those results and endue with wisdom and foresight a group of men gathered together only for selfish interests. Now this is simply to hold the Law of Causation in suspension. To my mind the only hope of progress lies in recognition of the Law of Causation: that is in people understanding that what happens to-day has been made yesterday and that to-day they are settling the fate of to-morrow."

sense of an event in which a redistribution of energy has taken place. An emotion may be evoked by a percept and be followed by some impulsive act. But the three are all parts of a series which can be just as well viewed as a whole as it can discretely. It is like the path of a body moving through empty space; the fact of passing any given point in that path can be called the cause of its passing the next point only in an extended sense of the term. Fourthly, there is personal causation which differs from the last in that any given act is the outcome of a whole personality, rather than merely the next term of a natural psychical series.*

A fifth kind of causation occurs in prayer. I am not thinking of "answers to," but of effects of, prayer. There are spiritual forces latent in humanity which may be brought into play by deliberate acts of prayer (provided, of course, that the person praying has developed his powers of prayer in the right way). Thus a diseased state of the body may be such that if left to operate alone it would be fatal. But right prayer, whether on the part of the sufferer or on that of another, may result in recovery. To describe this as "interference with" or "violation of" natural laws is misleading; what has happened is that certain new antecedents have been introduced; certain latent possibilities have been made empirically operative. Sixthly, there is providential causation. If a person is actively devoted to the pure ideal (or to God) and trusts himself thereto events, *independently initiated*, tend to occur in assistance of that person. This might be called the law of Providence; we are assuming for the moment that it holds good. Finally there is interpersonal causation which means that one person may induce another to intervene to help him.

Instinctive, personal and spiritual causation differ in respect of the depth of the reaction evoked. Each individual may be regarded as a system of energies, actual

* Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book II.

and latent. In the case of instinctive, or ordinary psychological, causation; in personal or moral causation; and sometimes in spiritual, or prayer-, causation, the antecedents are all within the same subject, the same person, as the act or event caused. Personal causation involves elements less phenomenal than does instinctive causation; the whole self is mobilized and the act, instead of being the natural consequent of the stimulus, becomes an expression of the relatively transcendental fact, the self. In spiritual causation still further tendencies, such as the power of healing, are brought into action, and in the case of intercessory prayer the latent energies of the sufferer become reinforced or stimulated by those of the person praying. He is stimulated and helped to cure himself. The energies by which he is cured are ultimately either his own or his own and his intercessor's forming a group of energies acting as a single whole. But in *inter*personal causation the result follows solely from an alien source. You send for a doctor and a cure is effected by his drugs acting from without and not entirely by your own immanent forces. Still more obviously is this the case when you induce a benevolent stranger to give you a coin as a simple result of begging. The enrichment is due wholly to the stranger's system of energies, your begging being a separate, antecedent act.

Now when the question is raised as to whether or not God will interfere to prevent causes from producing their effects, the question is what kind of causation we are thinking of, for spiritual causation (*i.e.* prayer causation), providential causation, and interpersonal causation may all be attributed to Him. The answer is that apparently interpersonal causation in which the actually efficient agency is God does not occur. Spiritual causation certainly does occur and its ground in the omnipresence of the Spirit—God latent in humanity—seems to be theoretically involved. Whether providential causation actually does occur or not would be very hard to prove; an impression

of its occurrence very different from a mere belief in it on authority is exceedingly common. Theoretically it is in line with personal and spiritual causation in that it is a still more striking instance of the modification of the actual by means of the evoking and organization of relatively transcendental powers.

The antecedent to any given effect is, as already remarked, the entire universe, not merely some particular phenomenal causes. Do the right thing and all things visible and invisible will flock to your assistance. By the "right thing" I do not mean that which your own conscience or that of Society or of the Church considers so to be, but the thing best adapted to calling forth the response of the universe. In any given case a person's conscience and theory of prayer may be so ill-adjusted to reality as to obstruct rather than to stimulate this response. But given the cosmically right attitude on the part of the persons concerned and the formula that cause A is followed by effect B is false, because the universe comes in between A and B. That intervention of the universe means that the original actors have become elements in a greater complex of partly phenomenal, partly transcendental factors and effect C follows from that complex as its cause instead of B as would have followed had the purely phenomenal factors alone been present.

All this amounts to saying that divine causation is immanent, as a latent capacity, in man, and that divine causation from without does not, unless very exceptionally, take place. The reason why divine interpersonal causation does not, at any rate normally, occur is that the individual and God are not usually members of a system. God is not ordinarily in perceptible contact with Nature. It is only on the higher spiritual plane (which may be equivalent to saying "in cases of mysticism") that God interacts with man through man's theoid function. But normally the human mind is too much a subsphere of Nature and too little differentiated from it as

the sphere of Spirit for God to be causally responsive to any marked extent.

(c) *Evil*

We are not here about to discuss questions as to whether the universe, or any particular things in it, are good or bad. Judgements of approval or disapproval express personal reactions, not matters of fact. Such expressions of feeling do not constitute objective thinking, and hardly come within the scope of a theology which aims at approximation to the objectivity of science. But there is a sense in which evil is a matter of fact, and in which statements with regard to it may be independent of any feelings which one may entertain. The world contains many things which are generally regarded as horrible, reprehensible, or otherwise regrettable, and these, taken collectively, are called "evil." The problem of evil is the problem of the existence of such things, whether they are really bad or not. Whether or not, for instance, cruelty, pain, misery, degradation, futility, and the like, are rightly regarded as evil, at any rate such things do occur and rightly or wrongly are often regarded as incompatible with the existence of God. Which particular things, however, if any, should be looked upon as bad is a question of fashion and temperament. Martineau quotes an eighteenth-century opinion to the effect that the rugged outlines of the Alps are so inartistic that they could not possibly be the handiwork of any good God. "Evil," therefore, must mean "things to-day generally thought bad." Such things are so heterogeneous that it will be better to consider certain kinds, or aspects, of evil separately, regardless as to whether these overlap or not. Of these we will select three for closer examination: disharmony and its consequences; egoism, or self-seeking, and its consequences; and chance disasters due to the blind play of natural forces.

It is usually urged by apologists that "God permits"

evil for such and such reasons. Such language is open to objection on two grounds. In the first place it implies a deistic world-view, and deism, as we have already seen, is untenable. And secondly, it is groundless assertion, or at best shaky deduction based upon shaky analogies. How can one expect religious thought to be taken seriously when, in the interests of feeling, it ignores the necessity for having grounds for what it affirms? As against this permission-theology I would urge that the speculative problem of evil is primarily a causal one. Creation is, in any case, a complex of transformation processes, and evil is one of the products of these transformations. Ultimate cosmic principle A becomes partially transformed into world-material B, which in turn gives rise to phenomena *p*, *q*, *r*, and these we look upon as good, bad, and indifferent respectively. Can we fairly, and without strained explanations, so view the creative self-transformation of God into world that all phenomena alike, whether regarded as good or bad are seen to indicate him as the ultimate ground of all that is?

This line of thought finds confirmation in the conception of a God in three modalities, or modes of subsistence in which God (I do not mean the Absolute) appears to the religious consciousness to exist. Such a conception has already been implied above. The first modality of God is the self-conscious personality of the universe. The second is Spirit—*i.e.* the personality of God latent in His creatures. The third is the God of the individual—a secondary theoid personality of a human individual in which the latent divinity is brought to a focus and raised to higher functioning power.

Now the aim and purpose of the Hidden Self, the second modality of God, is the production of ever higher and more spiritual modes of life. It is not the happiness of existing individuals except in so far as joy is one of the fruits of the spiritual life. It does not control events, but prompts us to react worthily to whatever may happen.

The functions of the third modality of God, the God of the individual, does include a beneficent providence. But it is very individual in character. It does not control the course of Nature or history so much as enable the individual to escape its dangers. And in most of us it is so undeveloped that it often fails to do even that. (Of its successes we know nothing beyond, perhaps, a fortunate coincidence here and there.) There is no reason why a group-mind belonging, perhaps, to a little band of fellow-workers in some high cause should not develop providential functions. But normally the providence-machine is a function of the individual psyche and is too weak to contend with the consequences of the passions let loose upon a large scale. The providence, for instance, of a Viennese child might be inadequate to cope with the consequences of Europe's failure to find and apply God.

The functions of God in his transcendental consciousness (the first modality of God) are beyond the reach of anything beyond doubtful speculation. The first modality is the logical *prius* of the second, as the second is of the third. We need the idea of a transcendent personal God in order both to account for and to worship the God discovered in Nature and in ourselves. But from the existence of such a being we cannot infer that wars and famines will not occur, for He dwells beyond the great *kenosis* which is the primal act of creation. The existence of evil, therefore, is no logical objection to this world-view, however fatal it may be to traditional deism.

We now turn to the three forms of evil selected for special consideration.

(i) *Disharmony.*—The facts that the evolution of higher types has proceeded through integration and that evil so often bears the character of disintegration suggest the hypothesis that the Absolute is by nature a unity. And if that be so the simplest and most natural hypothesis, in the absence of sufficient grounds for a contrary opinion, will be that it possesses that kind of unity which is the

most perfect form of unity known to us, namely selfhood. The law of integration, that is to say, is more intelligible if the Absolute, in its ultimate structure, is a self than it would be did the universe represent a mere equilibrium of separate elements. But if the Absolute is a natural unity the resolution of it into plurality will manifest the character of disunion, disharmony, evil. And such a resolution of a higher unity into a lower manifold is, we are supposing, just what creation is. Disunion is evil because it bears upon the face of it the character of a Fall, a fall from higher unity.

Let us imagine the case of a good man in process of mental and moral disintegration through loss of central control. Evil would immediately make its appearance. Psychical elements involved in the higher complex emotions would manifest themselves as unregulated, independent forces. For goodness is exhibited only when these elements are organized in a certain way in the unity of the person. They are good only when combined in a perfect self. For instance, the sense of freedom and independence is essential to perfect selfhood. But in an otherwise bad character it will merely make a person resemble the unjust judge who feared not God neither regarded man. Just so may the constituent elements in an all-good Being produce, as independent agents, a disorder which can only be remedied by the regulative idea of the Divine Whole.

We have but to apply the word "pathological" and this view at once assumes the aspect of orthodox science. Insanity, dissociation, compulsive appetites, disproportionate reactions, morbid and vicious passions, criminality and the like, are recognized as due to failure to attain normal personality. Partial trends fail to become integrated and operate in chaotic independence. Human nature minus normal selfhood is a mass of disordered affection, criminal impulses, and utter petty-mindedness. As these neurotic or debased types are to the normal, so

is the normal to the divine. As these cases of evil are due to lack of selfhood, so is all moral evil and imperfection due to that *kenosis* or withdrawal of divine selfhood which is involved in the process of creation. And just as crime and neurosis bear witness to a self unrealized, so does all evil bear witness to a divine Self which is striving to integrate and sublimate our normal egoism into union with itself in the Kingdom of God.

Let us take as an example of moral and physical evil the Great War. The primary unit concerned was Europe. Life in Europe had all the possibilities of happiness and achievement. It possessed vast material resources, scientific knowledge, and the means to beautify and enrich human existence. It might have become integrated into an international commonwealth organized for the common good. But corporate selfhood was lacking. The elements of which Europe was composed went each its own way pursuing by force or fraud, when better methods failed, its own end. There was not the right attitude, the right spirit, the big point of view. This absence of corporate personality in Europe made every nation, in proportion to the extent of its stakes and the crisis of its fortunes, a potential criminal.

(ii) *Egoism.*—The process of creation is one of differentiation and individuation. Through whatever stages, from the One there arises the Many, and each is in continual process of self-formation. This must lead to selfishness, greed, strife, cruelty. Creation not only does, but must, mean individuality-making, and this not only does, but must, mean egoism, and egoism evil. For rudimentary individuality *is* egoism. It may be expressed by the formula "The universe = Me." A manifold of rudimentary, developing individuals must necessarily involve greed, strife, cruelty, and the more obviously so because each individual is a reproduction of a personal source. Egoism is personality without character. Personality reproduced upon a sufficiently low level of existence will

appear as selfishness and self-assertiveness. Evil, so caused, is an argument not against, but for, belief in an immanent creator. Whether, therefore, we contemplate the tiger gleaming bright, or that "vollendeter Egoist," the human baby, or some act of national brutality, otherwise called "sacro egoismo," there is nothing in any of them that is incompatible with the doctrine of the self-reproduction of God in creation. The only assumption that has to be made is that the process of creation must needs be evolutionary, and not a sudden birth of perfect worlds sprung, like Athene, from the head of Zeus.

The objection may be raised that God is believed in as the God of love and that this faith is essential to our religious consciousness; but how can the God of love be at the same time the God of egoism? Love means integration, union, harmony, and these mean self-subordination, self-sacrifice, the primacy of others. Is it not inconsistent, then, to say that the principle of love is also the principle of individuality? For even apart from the tendency to cruelty which individuality in its lower forms involves, and even when we take account only of its most highly moralized developments, individuality stands for self-assertion. A man may be ready to sacrifice everything to his moral principles; he may bestow all his goods to feed the poor and he may give his body to be burned, yet it is all self, and something radically different, even in its benevolence, from love. This is the mystery with which Ibsen's *Brand* concludes: can the God of the moral will and the God of love be One? *

But does not the concept of an all-embracing self supply a sufficient solution? Selfhood means integration, union, harmony, and therefore, *as between element and element in it*, love. But it also means personality, egoism, self-assertion. It is creation which drives these principles

* Ibsen is here, surely, by no means calling in question the principles set forth in his play. He there states the thesis; in its last sentence ("God is a God of love") the antithesis; the reader must find the synthesis.

apart, as lines of magnetic force repel one another although they are not inconsistent with one another. In God all is One, and He is thus the ground alike of all self-renouncing love and of all self-positing egoism.

(iii) *Chance.*—Chance means unpurposed happenings, unpurposed collocations of events that affect human or animal fortunes. By chance an earthquake occurs or a dam bursts and widespread suffering and death result. By chance a child is born with defective glands and suffers in consequence in body, mind, character and fortune. To such cases should be added the unintentional effects of deliberate human action so far as these are due to negative causes such as lack of knowledge, deafness, or the like. That such misfortunes are not willed by Providence is here assumed, at least in some cases. Our question is as to whether a world in which chance to a large extent holds sway is incompatible with the creation of the world by God. Such a world will abound in good luck and bad luck. Is a world of luck a proof that God does not exist?

There will be many who will feel that chance is an excellent system for a world, and that the game of life is far preferable to an arranged display in which there are no victories and no defeats. But this is a judgement of approval, and as such is objectively neither more valid nor invalid than its opposite. Rather we would ask: If creation is a self-caused change within the Absolute, and if that change is initiated through an act of surrender of controlling selfhood, what else could one expect but a world of chance? Providence may supervene upon chance as the world returns to God, but in aphelion chance alone will rule.

Whether, therefore, evil affords an argument for or against the existence of God must depend upon our metaphysical theories. In conjunction with deism it constitutes a grave difficulty; in conjunction with theomonism a verification of faith.

Supplementary to this causal, or genetic, point of view

is the teleological, and we have to ask how we can think at once teleologically and objectively. Some system of higher ends must be given as a fact, and we must interpret the purposiveness of creation in the light of ends actually being realized. That means that terrestrial life collectively must be fairly intelligible as a teleological system independently of any faith which we may have in a Hereafter. If the *telos* of collective Life is not merely to exist, but to develop divine capacities as yet unrealized, that which is evil relatively to the individual, or to an imperfect order of society, may be purposive relative to the ultimate end of the whole. Thus Fichte's "Elysian Age" presupposes the age of "complete sinfulness" when society is the product of competitive individualism and the State bears the character of a *Notstaat*.*

If we take account of the considerations urged in the section on Personal Ethics on the subject of relativity we must conclude that there is far less moral evil in the world than appears at first sight to be the case. There is imperfection everywhere, but for that very reason there is not so much that can be classed as subjectively wicked—*i.e.* wicked for the particular person in question to do. What an amount of evil of all kinds arises through war and through the pursuit of money! Yet if these things are necessary for the self-expression of imperfectly developed human beings at a certain stage of human evolution, and if they are not *felt* to be evil, can they, even with the massacres, destitution and the like incidental to them, be called evil without qualification? In primitive times the only alternatives for mankind were either disharmony, disunion, making for the development of individuality, or harmony and union (perhaps on the lines of the caste and joint-family systems of India), making for the depression of it. Not only, therefore, may it be said that strife and discord are the inevitable consequences of divine creation, but also that, so far as we can see, a measure of

* Windelband, *History of Philosophy*, p. 606.

discord possesses a relative justification as contrasted with the only rationally conceivable alternative to it. And further, most virtues, genetically considered, are reactions against specific forms of evil. Honesty, honour, chastity, for instance, are essentially repudiations of possible courses of conduct and could not come into existence were those courses not possible, natural, and common. A sinless world would be a saintless world; it is sinful that it may be saintly.

The purposes immanent in a world so created will spring from very different levels and will constitute no ordered hierarchy. Among them will be the purposes of emergent Spirit, but we shall not expect them so to control the unconscious depths of the Absolute as to obviate there the presence of evil, even were this not (as it is) a self-contradiction. The sphere of their perfect realization is the realm of the Ideal.

(d) *The Realm of the Ideal*

The difficulty will suggest itself that practically everything in Nature is here being explained by reference to the subconscious, or unconscious, mind of the Absolute, the personality of God coming in only to explain the characteristics of those subconscious elements. Is that enough? If there is a personal God must there not be an ideal realm which is the realization of His conscious thought? Where else can God find scope for personal interest and action? What evidence have we that any such realm exists?

The conception of a transcendental realm of the ideal is certainly one to which it is hard to give any definite content. It seems to comprise two distinct and different ideas. One of these is the idea of heaven—*i.e.* of a part of the universe in which everything is ideally good and in which there are blissfully happy social relations between God and His creatures. Such a heaven would be the counterpart of Nature. It is as though there were three

main types of relationship between God and the world. There is no social relationship between God and Nature, and the events which occur in the latter do not express particular divine volitions or bear the stamp of the divine character. Heaven is the exact antithesis of this. Between the two stands the higher life of man. And since heaven is so inadequately realized upon earth a special tract for it is assumed elsewhere and good people go there when they die.

The other conception of the ideal is that of the substantive reality of that which for mundane experience is only unactualized potentiality. The ideal is a side of all existent individuals, a side as real in its way as the side realized in commonplace experience. Every person has a vast number of potentialities of goodness, of power and of happiness that will never be realized. Something else in their psychical or physical constitution or in their environment prevents it, whether positively, by antagonism, or negatively through absence of the conditions requisite to their development. But that perfected selfhood somehow exists as a fact. The place, order of things, or system of relations in which it exists is the supernatural world. Such perfected selfhood is relative to actual potentialities, or germinal elements in the empirical self, and therefore is in a sense real. There is a great difference between the idea of one's actual nature brought to perfect realization, on the one hand, and a totally imaginary kind of perfection, such as devout Catholics attribute to the Virgin Mary, on the other. The former is a conception of the "All I could never be" as actually being; the latter is the hanging of some abstract and artificial ideal on to a personality which serves as a mere peg. We think of the former as having a reality relative to the universe, but inaccessible to empirical observation: "that was I worth to God" even though necessarily ignored by men. What is thus transcendentally real and of worth is not possibilities or germinal elements as such, but these in their perfected

development as our "true self." We may look upon this true self as destined to be realized hereafter and say "Non quales sumus sed quales futuri sumus nos tractat et amat omnipotens Deus." But we may leave this time-aspect out of account and distinguish rather between the reality which we have as parts of Nature and the reality which we have for God—God, here, being the ground and principle of the ideal order.

This view of the ideal must be limited to persons. It is difficult to imagine such a thing as an ideal order of human society existing in transcendent actuality but empirical unreality. I admit that this seems to be the idea of the Kingdom of God. But we can hardly even discuss such a view until we have thought out the idea of double-sided personality in virtue of which a man's higher self can be real relatively to one pole of the universe but unreal relatively to the other, real for God but unreal for Nature. The true self of this or that person, however depraved, can be held to possess a substantive, though unapparent, existence, and the realm of the ideal could be defined as the system of true selves. It is a difficult conception, but a possible one. But we can hardly speak of the right solution of political and economic problems as possessing a kind of transcendental existence.

To recapitulate: The idea of a personal God seems to imply a sphere of conscious action for Him and a world of conscious interests other than Nature and history. Therefore if the idea of God is true there must be such a realm, which should perhaps be conceived as the system of all true selves. There is some little evidence for the existence of this realm, as we saw especially when discussing the subjects of mysticism, providence, and healing. But dare we go so far as to say of any creatures that in heaven their angels (the spiritual part of themselves) do always behold the face of a Father which is in heaven?

It will not make any practical difference whether we start from the idea of Nature (including history), infer

that it has its immediate, though not ultimate, source in a demiurgic world-soul and argue that God Himself must have a non-ego other than Nature; or whether we start with the idea of an all-good God as the immediate creator of Nature and urge that mechanics and occasional stock-breeding are insufficient activities for Him, and that there must therefore be a heaven in which His higher interests can find more permanent and adequate expression; or whether, thirdly, we start from the thought of Beauty, Goodness, Love and Truth as constituting the essence of the spiritual world, show that these are so constituted as to be inexplicable upon a purely naturalistic basis, infer that they derive their character from a God whose attributes they are, and then argue that, since each of them, even Beauty, when analysed, reveals a duality of subject and object, a world of beauty must exist in which these divine attributes reach a fuller manifestation than here on earth. For if we maintain the sufficiency of Nature as the object of divine interest on the ground that its imperfections are only apparent and relative to our finite standpoint we make Truth, Beauty and Goodness, as we know them, as revelations of God, illusory, no less than the evil by which they are here conditioned. Thus in any case we reach the idea of another world. If the hypothesis be assumed of latent higher selves destined to become conscious hereafter upon some heavenly plane, even if earthly memories are lost, our theoretical difficulties would be comparatively few, however sadly our human hopes might be tinged. The idea of astral bodies reacting to ether-waves other than those to which our present senses respond is a legitimate hypothesis resting upon some slight evidence. Otherwise we seem led to the conception of a God who is but a quasi-personal formation within the Absolute, functioning in the creation of spiritual life, but never awaking to self-consciousness. In this uncertainty our faith in spiritual values urges an overbelief without which half their validity is lost.

§ 3. The Knowledge of God

The knowledge of God, real or illusory as in any instance the case may be, is of several kinds. There is, first, knowledge of the truth of theism—theoretical, or metaphysical, knowledge; secondly, there is a direct apprehension of God analogous to perception; thirdly, there is consciousness of personal relations with Him; and fourthly, a practical knowledge of God. Although the second, third and fourth could all be called "personal" as opposed to "theoretical" they represent somewhat different ideas. We will therefore treat these separately as the theoretical, intuitive, personal and practical knowledge of God respectively.

(a) *The Theoretical Knowledge of God*

(i) *The use of Analogy.*—The theoretical knowledge of God consists of the logical proof, or of reasoning approximating to logical proof, that God is a cosmic fact. This idea takes shape as a hypothesis through the help of analogies, and we have to ask what kind of analogies are likely to be true and what kind are probably false. Two main classes of analogies may, for theological purposes, be distinguished. We may call them constitutional analogies and relational analogies. Constitutional analogies are drawn from the constitution of the human mind or of other elements in Nature. Relational analogies are based upon human relations, such as those of a king to his subjects. The validity of the former rests upon the view that the nature and constitution of the Whole are, in varying degrees, reflected in the nature and constitution of the parts. The higher the product of Nature the more perfectly will it reproduce the nature and constitution of ultimate reality. Man, more truly than anything else, is the microcosm, the little universe, while the universe itself is the macranthropos, the large-scale man. There is thus a presumption that analogies

of this kind will have an element of truth in them. Relational analogies are more doubtful, but not necessarily false if independent reasons can be adduced for supposing that somewhat similar relations may exist between God and his creatures. Independent reasons must, however, be insisted upon and the analogy must not be treated as a sufficient first principle. Some relational analogies, such as that contained in the metaphor of a shepherd, are derived from feelings and activities in man which seem to him the highest and best that he knows, and he attributes them to God. Others reflect man's feelings as a subject of a king or as an accused prisoner; they are not attributed to God, but a suitable idea of God is conceived in order to find support for them. This third class of analogies is the most open to suspicion.

(ii) *The theoretical Knowableness of God.*—In the days of man's innocence philosophers used to try to understand the universe and to explain what they thought about it. Kant miscalled this natural proceeding "dogmatism," a word which means something quite different. Its principles might be roughly stated as follows: That which seems to be true must be assumed to be true until good reasons can be adduced for doubting it. In the words of Prof. Stout: "If the essential conditions of error are absent, what is taken for real must be real." * And as Martineau says, "What is inevitably thought is in accord with what really is." †

This doctrine is only a starting point and guiding principle. It may be developed in one direction into realism, in another into speculative idealism. But in all cases we proceed by trusting appearance, correcting partial appearances by their synthesis, and refusing to admit that any subject of thought is in principle unknowable. Many things may be undiscoverable through lack of evidence.

* *Personal Idealism*, p. 35.

† *A Study of Religion*, I. p. 128. See also, in addition to the whole of Book I., Preface, pp. xi. and xii.

But an initial scepticism as to the capacity of the human mind to deal, *e.g.* with the objects of religious thought is not justified. We do not know what we can know till we try.

Theological scepticism really rests upon the condition "*If* all knowledge be the product of such and such processes." *If* all knowledge merely illustrates how the categories deal with the impressions of sense, then you cannot say anything about matters unamenable to this treatment. *If* all knowledge consists of generalizations from particulars and deductions from these generalizations, then a thing (such as God) which is not a particular phenomenon discoverable by sense-perception cannot be knowable. But then this "all" is just the point at issue. The sceptic who wishes to avoid carrying his scepticism to extremes accepts certain kinds of knowledge as a datum. He gives an account of their principles and then argues that, since other (*i.e.* religious or metaphysical) kinds of knowledge are not based upon those principles, therefore they cannot be knowledge at all. This is merely to beg the question.

Let us suppose that it were a known fact that at the beginning of this planet's history the whole earth was a Garden of Eden. It was the time of the Golden Age. Everyone was happy, good and immortal. When the earth became over-populated the planet Mars suddenly sprang into existence, with a service of asteroids plying between it and the earth for the use of colonists. Would the doctrine of creation now be a rational one? If so, the present difficulty with regard to it is due merely to the nature of the evidence, and not to any epistemological principle. If the evidence were better than it is, the doctrine of creation would become a logical probability in spite of the limitations of our faculties.

Now let us suppose the evidence to be as it is, but that the Zoroastrian hypothesis (that a good spirit created some of the creatures in the world while his enemy, a

bad spirit, created the others) and Martineau's theory of creation are the only alternatives which have been formulated. Can we say that the Zoroastrian view is no more improbable than Martineau's? If we do not really believe that we are ourselves passing judgements about creation. The real fact is that we have all got impressions as to the nature of transcendental things and resort to unknowables in order to avoid the necessity of arguing the matter out. Of course our conclusions in the end will only be probable and not demonstrable. But the subject can be rationally dealt with.

The negations of a Kantian or Comtian scepticism, by whatever attractive names this latter may be called, and however carefully it may be confined to selected classes of facts, are at bottom dogmatism. They close a troublesome enquiry which promises to be interminable by a *Machtspruch*.

The term "agnosticism" seems to have come to mean something rather different. It now thinks to itself thus: "Whatever may be the latent capacities of the mind for drawing inferences about God, and whatever line of thought may hereafter crop up which may throw light on such questions, for the present, at any rate, any knowledge of God is a practical impossibility." In other words, agnosticism is an inference from a present state of things as regards evidence or instruments of enquiry, and not, like scepticism, from the constitution of the mind or of the universe. "It is manifestly impossible," says the agnostic, for us to find our way across the unknown mountains in the dark. Whether or not some day explorers may light on a track to a land beyond who can tell? For us, our work lies here." Sometimes this attitude may result merely from a virtual disbelief which does not want to be bothered with having to face the difficulties inherent in its own world-view. But often it comes from hope deferred, and many of us to-day are Christians and agnostics at the same time.

(iii) *The criteria of truth in metaphysical theology.*—

Assuming that epistemological scepticism is logically fallacious we may recognize three tests, belonging to the sphere of intellect, by which a theoretical knowledge of God may be rendered probable. These are the logical, the cosmological, and the ontological criterion respectively.

The Logical criterion is this : In proportion as theology follows methods similar to those of science in dealing with a similar subject-matter its inferences are objective and its conclusions probably true.

The Cosmological criterion is as follows : In proportion as a doctrine of theology is compatible with, co-ordinates, and illuminates all classes of known and suspected fact that doctrine is probably true.

The Ontological criterion may be formulated thus : If the idea of God is more independently conceivable than any other definitely formulated conception of a First Principle it is probably true.

Two instances will, I hope, justify the Logical criterion and also the use of the word " similar " used in it. We may compare, first, the method of theology with that of psychology. The method of psychology is primarily introspection. We are in the sphere of possible idiosyncrasy from the very first. Then, even in academic psychology, comes much that in the first instance appears arbitrary until it gains authority from the fact that it gets repeated on the authority of its first author. McDougall's official catalogue of the instincts, for example. But the most interesting, exciting and romantic branch of psychology is medical psychology. Here we find ourselves at once in the presence of hypotheses which read like fairy-stories. I do not dispute them; I merely cite them as examples of scientific inference.

Now take an instance from physics. When we compare Organic Theism, as above outlined, with, for instance, the theory of the ether, we note first their logical similarity. Both represent hypotheses as to conditions and events not accessible to observation. Both are assumptions made to account for things which at first sight do

not seem to suggest them in the least. The proof in both cases is that, it is pleaded by believers in them, they are both found on further consideration to fit the facts. In both cases there remains the logical possibility that these facts may be accounted for otherwise; in both the conclusion as to their truth is held in spite of difficulties and in the absence of any more convincing alternative. In both a modification of the details is from time to time suggested in order to make them more adequate. The method aimed at in the two cases is not essentially different.

In default of the exactness of the natural sciences and of their verification one of another, metaphysical theology must depend upon other methods of gaining concreteness, objectivity and verifiability in order that its conclusions may constitute knowledge. The first of these methods is close attention to every class of facts. If fact after fact taken first from one sphere and then from another is found to be most intelligible when viewed in the light of the theistic hypothesis this will constitute a kind of internal verification comparable with the verification of one science by another. The second chief method is examination of the degree of self-sufficiency, self-evidence, or harmoniousness, of the concepts in which this world-view expresses itself.

The first of these methods is that of coherent synthesis. Science and common experience speak of such things as space, matter, life, mind, clairvoyance, precognition, and so on. Well, what kind of a Whole can that be which comprises such heterogeneous elements as these? What can the ultimate nature of reality be in view of *the whole* of experience? The unity of the universe, the tension of the ether, the self-organization of plant and animal life, the mind of man, good and evil, disease and remedy, religion, beauty, love—everything, in fact, in the world is a manifestation of some great First Principle, or of its failure to manifest itself. A true world-view will there-

fore have to be such as to harmonize with everything. Metaphysics means thinking in wholes, with all presuppositions made explicit, as opposed to science, which is thinking from point to point within a given system. But the universe is a concrete thing, a whole consisting of parts of definite character, and the character of any given element in the universe—*e.g.* an ass—must be taken into account in our view of the Whole.

Such a synthesis is cosmology. The second method of metaphysical enquiry is connected with the difficulty of an infinite regression. Whatever explanation of the ground of the universe we put forward will itself demand explanation. How comes it to be there? Shall we not find that we can discover no ultimate ground or, in loose language, "first cause"? Even if we could find such an ultimate ground, how should we be able to recognize it as such?

The answer must be that in proportion as we approximate to a true conception the ontological argument will be found to work. The ontological argument is the perception that a right conception of reality will be one which can give rise to no further demand for explanation. The concept of the *ens realissimum* will be such that it may very well be true. It will be an idea so harmonious that it will involve no contradictions with itself or with the nature of the mind. It will bear no apparent marks of a secondary, derivative character. Thus, as Spinoza says, if a thing is to be thought of as self-subsistent the conception of it must not imply any reference to anything else.* And if, for such reasons, an idea *may* be true and if there is no alternative to it similarly qualified it probably is true, there being no adequate ground for rejecting it.

To exhibit the nature of this reasoning let us take the case of materialism, and in order to simplify matters let us leave out of account the existence of mind and all the inexplicable marvels of biology and the refinements of

* *Ethics*, Defs. I. and II., and Prop. I. 7.

physics. Let us suppose that a universe is said to consist of two solid particles revolving round one another in space. Would such a thing be credible *as an ultimate fact?* On the contrary, it would be a most indigestible idea. How come those two particles to be related to one another and to follow identical laws? We should not really have two particles but a system, and the laws of motion would be those of the system. We should begin enquiring into the existence of a medium and its relation to the system. Thus we should soon find that the idea that two revolving particles could be ultimate fact was ontologically impossible.*

It may be urged that this test is fatal to theism as well as to materialism. Does not personality require an environment in which it can interest itself and with which it can interact? The answer is that personality does not necessarily presuppose that its environment is externally given, although in the case of developing imperfect personalities this must be the case. A creator produces his own environment, and since we are assuming that creation is an eternal or a timeless process we need not concern ourselves with questions as to anything prior to creation.

The cosmological criterion has reference to the kind of facts to be explained; the ontological deals with the thinkableness of this or that as a possible ultimate principle for *any* kind of universe. Thus an indeterminate first principle is an ontological impossibility, whatever the world may be like. Nothing could result from such an ultimate reality; no world could spring from it. (Hegel emphasized this point in his criticism of Spinoza.) On this ground all amorphous deities, vaguely spiritual principles, conceptions of force-in-general, or vitality-in-general, *as ultimate facts* are ontologically unsatisfactory. On the other hand it is the cosmological criterion which

* There are of course other forms of the ontological argument; I am not expounding Anselm.

rules deism out of court; the particular facts of life are not such as they would be, were deism true.

These considerations must suffice as a discussion of the possibility of a theoretical knowledge of God. Theoretical knowledge is thought tested and approved. It does not matter how the original hypothesis arose, the logical question is whether it can be approved upon application of the criteria of truth. A few criteria of metaphysical truth have been cited and it remains a question for logic rather than for epistemology to decide whether they have been complied with satisfactorily. As just stated, it does not matter what has led to the hypothesis from which a theory is elaborated. Hopes, fears, illusions, legends—anything may suggest an hypothesis. If the hypothesis is false and if a critical and objective attitude be maintained in the testing of it by logical methods its falsity will become apparent. It is by no means necessary that a critically objective attitude of mind should have been present when the originator of the hypothesis first thought of it. Scientific theories are quite normally framed and defended under the influence of very strong feeling.

(b) *The Intuition of God*

How is an intuition—that is to say, a perception, or immediate apprehension—of God possible? No theory of any kind of perception is complete until one has indicated the probable constitution of things in virtue of which such perception is a conceivable possibility. And this is equally true whether what we perceive is physically real things in real space, or whether it is God, or the motives of our neighbours. How comes it, then, that God can be apprehended? And when we have got an impression of something apparently divine how can we know that it really is God and not some product of Nature that we are dimly conscious of, such as an infantile father-imago, and think that it is God?

There are at least three kinds of fact involved in the intuition of God. We may call these its exciting cause, its predisposing cause, and its ultimate ground. The ultimate ground of the apprehension of God will be that constitution of things in virtue of which, when a predisposing and exciting cause is present, God is really apprehended.

Anything may be an exciting cause of the knowledge of God. A gardener once said to a relative of mine, "When I look at the flowers I cannot think how anyone can be an atheist." The flowers revealed God to him. They excited a consciousness of God within him.

The person of Christ, or other persons; the teaching of the Church, or other teaching; the Bible, or other literature; an apparently providential occurrence; "a chorus-ending from Euripides," natural phenomena, ghosts, deceased celebrities—all these, so far as they produce any impression upon us at all in a theistic direction, are exciting causes of a belief in God, but only exciting causes. There must also be some cause of man's reaction to these stimuli, and we may call that cause the predisposing cause of a belief in God—such belief being an element in a real perception of him. A father-complex, or a yearning for a lost lover, are examples of possible predisposing causes of an apprehension of the reality of an Infinite Being.

The question, therefore, whether this or that authority affords us the best guide to the knowledge of God is not one that can take us very deep. The most effective exciting cause is that which elicits the fullest response, and that depends upon psychological conditions. We reach the crucial question when we ask whether the predisposing causes, taken together and along with all circumstances which could serve as exciting causes, constitute the sufficient and entire cause of the knowledge of God, or whether in addition an ultimate ground is logically implied. Let us assume that in some given case the

predisposing cause is a father-complex and the exciting cause the recitation of the Lord's Prayer. Have we now got a sufficient explanation of that person's belief in God? If so, and if all personal knowledge is of a generically similar kind, religion is illusory. A theistic metaphysic will still be possible, but not a religion. For religion is the interaction of the soul with God, and, as thus explained, God will be merely the idealized image of one's father projected upon the clouds, and religion the sum of our reactions to this image. "Merely," because we are supposing that the above explanation is sufficient. The opposite assumption will be that this, or any other, predisposing cause and this, or any other, exciting cause are not of themselves in all cases sufficient to account for man's apparent consciousness of God but that some further ultimate cause of a different kind is also, at least in some cases, operative.

Now it can, I think, be shown that the explanation of religion as grounded in a father-complex is not sufficient, though in this or that particular case it may be true so far as it goes. Religion, as opposed to mere idolatry, is found, upon analysis, to involve certain attitudes and tendencies which we have called (chap. iii. § 1 (b) vi). "the Godward trend." This trend is substantially the same in those cases in which a father-complex may hypothetically be assumed and in those in which this assumption would be quite gratuitous. Even in the former class of cases something has metamorphosed the father-image almost beyond recognition. The image projected upon the clouds is not merely a father-image idealized in infantile fashion but a father-image which has been spiritualized and transformed upon lines which do not seem to correspond with natural impulse and experience. This spiritualization must have its ground in some principle in the individual psyche. Even if we assume that this process of spiritualization is operative even in infancy it implies such a principle none the less. When real religion

is compared with other products of the father-complex, such as monarchism, patriotism, or the tendency to be attracted to persons resembling one's father, it becomes obvious that this explanation takes very inadequate account of the specific characteristics of religion. The craving, for instance, on the part of men, as well as of women, for mystic union with God—what loyal subject ever craves for mystic union with King George?—the urge towards an absolute purity as the primary condition of such union, the tendency towards sacrifice amounting almost to self-immolation, the impulse to love everything and everybody, the difference between adoration and admiration, between reverence and respect, the connexion between religion and metaphysics or religion and literary, musical, or architectural taste, the absence of any inclination to be jealous of God, the frequent connexion between religion and moral judgements not very characteristic of one's father, the stimulation of the religious reaction by the sight of such a thing as a flower—such facts show how little the theory of the sufficiency of a father-complex to explain religion will bear scrutiny.

And so of all other similar hypotheses. It seems to be entirely untrue that from the idea of God you can legitimately infer either some particular infantile disposition or a definitely theistic tradition. Just as all roads are said to lead to Rome, so from quite a number of different psychological starting-points, and under the influence of quite different educational environments, there is a moderately well-marked tendency for man to arrive at a practically theistic place of rest. But if this is a fact what is the explanation of it?

Let us suppose that ten different people wrote down ten different series of figures at random, some series containing more figures than others. Then let us suppose that when the figures were added up it was found that each series came to one hundred. This could not be explained by reference to anything *in* each, or any, of

the series. Some cause prior to all the series would have to be assumed. The number one hundred would seem to function as a transcendental controlling cause—*i.e.* as a controlling cause which was not itself in the series. In the same way it is, in all probability, incorrect to say that religion is necessarily the result of such and such particular psychical and cultural causes. It may at times arise in the way indicated, but it may at other times emerge under quite other conditions. What, then, is this presupposed fact, or ultimate ground, of the intuition of God? Can we say that it is the divine omniscience?

The consciousness of God may itself be but the focus of an apprehension as wide as the universe. This universal apprehending is not really the omniscience of God, but seems to be of the nature of an unconscious apprehension, and should rather be called the omniscience of the Absolute. It is difficult to see how perception, or any kind of intuition of reality, is possible except on the assumption of such a background of omniscience. The psycho-physical organism seems to be, as James has argued, an apparatus for letting through, or transmitting, elements of consciousness in the form of percepts. When the requisite physical conditions are fulfilled an organization is set in motion which transmits a portion of the universal object to the finite subject. Perception, that is to say, is a restriction of telæsthesia, or clairvoyance. And the telæsthesia of the finite subject is a reproduction, or partial particularization, of the omniscience of a universal subject, or world-soul.

Can we apply this view to the case of the apprehension of God? A difficulty here at once presents itself in that the object of universal or particular clairvoyance is the world of finite objects. That is to say, the data from which we are reasoning are evidence only of that.

The ultimate term of our thought is not the world-soul, but the Absolute. The Absolute is subject and object. As subject it is an unconscious apprehension of everything

in existence. It apprehends everything because it *is* everything. Thus any given molecule or electron is itself an element in the life of the Soul, and the apprehension of it is part of its very being. All apprehension is thus ultimately self-consciousness, or rather, if such a term may be used, self-subconsciousness. The Absolute knows the world because the world is the Absolute in objective form. In knowing it It knows itself. This particular function of the Absolute I have called the world-soul. I am here calling it the Absolute to emphasize the fact that subjectivity is not a peculiarity of a particular thing called the world-soul, but is a function of the Absolute, whether in its lower form as world-soul and Nature, or in its higher self-conscious form as God and the Ideal. Not that there is a subjectivity of the Absolute other than God and the world-soul, but that all subjectivities are functions of one supreme subject. The world-knower (or world-soul) and the heaven-knower (or God) are activities of the absolute knower; they are the modes in which it exists; except as the basis of these the Absolute is only an abstraction. We are therefore justified in trying to get beyond the idea of a world-subject and world-object. In sharing the world-knowledge of the Absolute we incidentally partake of something of its self-consciousness. But its self-conscious personality is divine, is God. And that self-consciousness will be reproduced in man in the form of intuitions of God.

I have expressed myself in this passage as though God and the world-soul were co-ordinate functions of the Absolute in order to avoid the implication that the particular point under discussion, namely, the intuition of God—were dependent upon the idea of creation, according to which the world-soul, and therewith the world, is derived from God. But it will not make any difference to the argument whether we accept the doctrine of creation or not so long as the monistic standpoint is maintained. For in any case the world-soul and God are not two

separate and distinct entities, but two modes, organizations, functions, or activities of the One, and that One is essentially self-conscious. Moreover its self-consciousness is that of itself as a self, and so of itself as God.

What we are concerned with, therefore, is not intuitions of the Absolute, but intuitions of God who is Spirit, Love, the Adorable, the Helper, the Ground of all values. These intuitions occur mainly in connexion with the apprehension of the ideal, and with the fortunes of the individual. Altogether they give us the idea of a God of the Ideal and of Salvation. We cannot therefore for the idea of God substitute that of the Absolute so long as we are thinking upon the basis supplied by the intuitions. Our evidence is evidence for *God*. So, for this among other reasons, we have to assume a God not identical with the unconscious universal subject but a focus, or consciousness, within it which is directed, not towards the actual, but towards the Ideal—*i.e.* towards the World Purpose as expressive of the divine character and towards all individuals in so far as they reproduce and embody it.

The self-intuition of God may thus be the basis of all those intuitions of God sketched above (chap. iii. § 1) which do not rest upon the experience of definite happenings, and perhaps also of these. It will be that which ultimately supplies the idea of God. But each intuition will have a specific character of its own according to the nature of the psychic material through which it has risen to consciousness. Thus the idea of the Adorable is formed from a union of this divine self-consciousness with libidinal elements in man. In some cases it may be built up upon the basis of love for some definite love-object in idealized form; in others it may be uninvested love seeking its object. The human libido reproduces the spiritual energy of God and converts most of it into mundane interests in accordance with the whole method of creation. But some remains over and expresses itself in the intuitions of the religious consciousness, and this unconverted, uninvested

libido seems to contain a cognitive element which has preserved something of its original transcendental content.

It is hardly desirable to go through the various intuitions of God enumerated above with a view to discriminating the psychological elements which they contain, for it is not so much these varied elements as the divine self-consciousness embodied in them that interests us here.

(c) *The Experience of God*

How is a personal experience of God possible? The term " experience " is used so vaguely in religious literature that it is necessary to explain what one means when one uses it. To appeal to experience, without saying *what* experience, is like the procedure of an advocate who demands the conviction or acquittal of a prisoner on the ground of the evidence which he possesses, but which he fears to cite.* Experience which is not described is not evidence, and experience which is not more or less describable is not experience at all. Sometimes the word " experience " means the occurrence of states of feeling associated with religious beliefs and the moral or consoling influence which they seem to exercise. But to use the

* This loose appeal to unspecified experience gives the reader the impression of a lawyer's trick rather than of a scientist's method of inference. It is noticeable in Mr. Webb's *Personality in God.* He goes so far as to say that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is based upon experience, although he avoids giving too sharp a formulation to his position. Indeed, the whole argument of the book, if I have understood it, is that personality means interpersonal relations; that Christians have experience of such relations with God; and that the doctrines of the Church are essentially formulations of such experience. But although he seems to base his whole position upon experience he neither cites, describes, analyses or critically estimates it. I do not, of course, for a moment mean that his reference to experience was *intended* as a rhetorical device. But if this appeal to undefined experience becomes common it will very soon degenerate into a rhetorical device unworthy of a lover of truth. If I remember rightly it was characteristic of a certain orthodox antagonist of Dr. Sanday's in a controversy with him, and it is likely to become, for a short time, the substitute for the obsolescent doctrine of divinely imparted information. Similar play is made with an unanalysed, unillustrated, use of the word " values."

word in this sense is almost fraudulent. For the implication of the expression is that such feeling and influence is a kind of empirical evidence of the truth of those beliefs, whereas it is really nothing of the kind. An idea may be moralizing, encouraging, and inspiring without its being true.

But "experience" may mean certain definite happenings, whether of an external (*i.e.* providential) or internal character.* An experience is an event which may or may not result from an idea, but which is not itself resolvable into the influence of an idea. Mere influence is not experience. An inward illumination whereby God is revealed is, when sufficiently strong and sufficiently definite in time and place, an experience, but this type of experience has already been discussed in the last subsection. We are now speaking rather of the experience of apparent intercourse between God and man and of clearly indicated dealings of God with man.

Religious experience is of two kinds. The first occurs in cases of interaction between the ego and a highly developed theoid centre, a theoid centre being a secondary personality of divine character and functions. If the experience of happenings so originated is to be believed in as an experience of God such centres must be in some way a modality of God Himself. An experience of God is possible if the God of the individual is substantially identical with the God of the universe. This, I admit, I cannot prove, but the assumption is not gratuitous. It is what has always seemed self-evident to believers, whether Christian or other. The God within is Himself the Lord of all. And we can at least appeal to the principle that the apparent must be held to be real until reasons can be shown for thinking otherwise.

It is quite clear that theoid utterances cannot be treated

* For instance, the (Avetoom) Famine Children and the "Give me thy father" cases already quoted, as examples of external and internal experience respectively.

without more ado as the words of God. Both words and visions bear too often the marks of the limitations and idiosyncrasies of the human subject. But it is not a question of "either . . . or," either God or Nature. It is rather one as to how much of God there is in these experiences, and in particular as to whether there is in them enough of God to warrant our regarding them as a source of a real knowledge of God. Something is experienced and known in them and that something is relatively divine, whether that be an inward audition, such as those quoted from St. Paul or St. Kate above, or whether it be the sense of an inward presence, or the consciousness of impulses seemingly other, and far higher, than anything which we feel ourselves to own. The fact that the mechanism of, *e.g.*, interior audition *may* sometimes become the organ for elements in the psyche which are by no means especially divine proves nothing which we have not assumed throughout. Such mechanism is a piece of Nature, and we are assuming that the divine emerges in and through Nature. And further, the divine power is to be exercised in the service of any legitimate ideal, such as the expulsion of the English from France by St. Joan of Arc, and not only for more purely religious ends. Admitting, then, that the experience of God may be mixed with Nature; may be acquired through means which may on other occasions or in other persons be the organs for the expression of undivine elements; and may be relative to mundane, and even to military and political activities; yet all this is quite consistent with the view that in the apparent experience of God an experience of relatively pure divinity may be involved. It is consistent with the facts and with metaphysical possibilities. And it has in its favour the overwhelmingly strong impression of the divine so often accompanying these experiences. The actual proof that the relatively divine and apparently divine Spirit thus experienced really is absolute divinity and transcendent godhead is impossible. God, in His second and third modalities

is known through experience; in His first, He is known speculatively and theoretically; the God of experience and the God of metaphysics correspond to one another, and the experience of the one is accompanied by the strong impression that He is also the other—the God of all existence. Is not this enough?

The experience of God most prominent in records of conversion is that of a state of love, joy, peace, experienced as a single whole, and involving an apparent intuition of an object which is, indeed, not merely loving but love itself. St. Kate habitually speaks of God as "Love" and this intuition is expressed in such utterances of hers as "Love is God Himself," "The Divine Love is the very God, infused by His own immense goodness into our hearts." This is the intuition of a love *shared by* the experiencing subject; the sense of God as love *for* the experiencing subject accompanies it, and in some cases is the more prominent element of the two. It finds its commonest symbol in the metaphor of a father. The chief characteristics of that love which is identified with God are its all-embracing universality, its close association with compassion, and the consciousness that the primary object of it is our "true selves." God may or may not perform miracles, but the chief thing that He does is to impart Himself to those who are able to receive Him. They themselves find that to be action enough; it includes everything.

We need not discuss that other kind of experience of God's dealings with man which consists of events to all appearance providentially brought about. For the only problem as regards such events is as to whether they occur and how they should be interpreted—not as to how they can be known.

(d) *The Practical and Symbolical Knowledge of God*

There can be no real knowledge without conviction. The feeling that what we know is absolutely true is itself

part of knowledge. Knowledge is the conscious appreciation of truth. In addition to the logically approved ideas which we call truth there must be a feeling that by means of them one has penetrated the object of thought and by one's interest in it and understanding of it has made it one's own possession. For unless the heart go out to a thing it cannot really be known, and then there must come action, organizations, institutions embodying and expressing that knowledge and those interests. Such is the nature of the knowledge of God aimed at in the tradition of the community. It is a knowledge in which the conditions for the more subjective element in knowledge—the faith, the hope, the interest, the sense of practical importance—are fostered. The theology provided has but little to do with truth; it is a mental apparatus designed to enable the subject to find the object, and having found it to appreciate it. And so in all religions a devout obscurantist often does seem to arrive at spiritual reality while the thoughtful and enlightened miss it. It weakens the efficiency of that apparatus if we admit that it does not matter, for this kind of knowledge of God, what the doctrine is which he accepts, provided that he does accept it and react to it. But it is true. For this kind of knowledge of God is not a matter of the correspondence of idea with fact; it is a matter of incorporating, realizing, living out of God, so that if the man's theology enables him the better to envisage and respond to the idea of God and to make God an operative principle in his life, it is for him a means of knowing God. There must be some set of ideas to awaken the response to God. When that response thus comes, God is found and known. Perhaps the man's theology has told him that Shiva is the one true God who drank the poison which else would have destroyed humanity—the Lord who, of His grace and love for His poor beast, delivers him by an inward enlightenment from the fetters of ignorance and carnal desire. Or it may be of a Hebrew or Christian type. But just

because this kind of knowledge is not theoretical knowledge it does not consist of ideas at all, but of something realized with the help of ideas. Its truth consists in the extent to which the type of life stimulated by those ideas is one which, both in form and matter (personality and goodness), approximates to the life of God. Such knowledge as this is essentially a function of the whole self rather than of any one faculty. It is not emotion, or thought, or action separately, or in succession; it is the response of the whole soul.

This is not quite the same thing as what some passages in the Hebrew prophets (*e.g.* Jer. xxii. 16) seem to imply; namely, that righteousness, and especially social righteousness, was *ipso facto* a knowledge of God. I rather mean that the practical knowledge of God is a felt state of enlightenment, liberation, enhanced powers, consequent upon a response to an idea of God, and that if it be asked whether *all* such response to ideas of God, or of gods, constitutes a knowledge of God, the answer is No. You must respond to your ideas of God in such a way as to put you in tune with the real God immanent in the world. Response to a theology which promoted fanaticism, selfishness, or debauchery would not be a practical knowledge of God, for God is the all-good Person immanent in the universe. The practical knowledge of Him consists in being thus in tune with Him, in being dominated by Him, in assimilating Him, in expressing Him in life, and in having withal some set of ideas which assure you that this is indeed true. For this purpose a mythological type of theology will serve best, provided that the person in question has not, even unconsciously, outgrown it: and therewith a part in the corporate life of a religious community is also needed. The man who needs religion at all probably needs either the mythology of the community or some substitute for it. We are presupposing, however, that the literal acceptance of popular dogma and mythology is impossible, or at least that a wilful attempt to

return to them would be false religion after any glimpse of a higher truth has been gained. But a point may be reached by an individual when he feels that any further clarification of the idea of God is for him impossible; that if he goes on querying and speculating he will merely develop the passion of negativism—the passion for pulling to pieces all that faith builds up.* He must then accept some picture of God as the most adequate which he can frame and as a symbol for all those higher truths which have eluded his mental grasp, and he must react to this symbol religiously, and uncritically. Therefore a man must conceive the helpfulness, the ideal aspect of things, the unfathomed possibilities, that are in the universe by means of some idea of God which shall symbolize them all. Somehow or other grounded, and realizable on some lines as yet undiscovered by him, there exists a realm of amazing possibilities which will become real if we react to it positively, affirmatively, with faith and enthusiasm. Let a man's world-view symbolize those things and it will harmonize him to them. Such a world-view will be a system of faith. The object of faith may be undefinable, except in terms of symbols lacking, or deficient, in the characteristics of scientific concepts. Yet these will represent the deepest metaphysical and scientific truth already reached by that person plus an acceptance in principle of truth not yet actually reached, and a willingness to welcome it and respond to it in faith before it is known to thought. Such is the symbolical knowledge of God which is the end of the journey—the vision of distant lands beyond the furthest point which we ourselves have reached. Or perhaps not really distant.

Thus, strangely enough, a purely scientific and universal theology is blind until it borrows eyes from the tradition of the community, from popular superstition, and from

* Faith and negativism seem to constitute an ambivalency, the same fundamental tendency but with opposite signs. Rationalism is not so much a devotion to logic as a craving for, and faith in, the opposite of religious faith.

individual idiosyncrasy. It presupposes attitudes, values, and ideas, and these presuppose the authoritative community. For man can be a moral and religious being only under social conditions. His capacities for moral conduct and for religion can be realized only in communities in which certain moral and religious principles are recognized. How often does it not happen that a man starts out in the pursuit of Truth in the sacred hope of at last reaching the Real, and in the course of that pursuit discards belief after belief, first the relatively unimportant, then the more "essential." And yet when he comes to compare his own barren concepts with the living faith of the Christian Church he may well feel that there must be something in the creed which he rejects, something which he cannot understand. And so he does not feel satisfied that he has got the whole truth. He still believes, in a certain sense, in the doctrines which he rejects. He recognizes them as representing a higher truth which has eluded his reasoning. Yet he cannot accept them literally as they stand. So he takes them as standing for, representing, symbolizing, a higher truth, but does not believe that the formulated doctrine really gets at and expresses that truth. He both believes and disbelieves. He accepts the formula, not as being true in the sense meant by those who drew it up, but as standing for all that in the ancient doctrine which proves its reality in feeling, will, and life, but which yet appears to the mind as contradictory, or as in conflict with other known truth.

We may be able to appreciate the case better if we take an example from days gone by. When we read of the opposition of the Church in those days towards new scientific propositions, such as the Copernican theory, we tend to regard it as the result of mere spiritual failure on the part of the former. The devotion to truth seems non-existent; in its place we seem to find a blind clinging to inherited ideas simply as such. We look upon it as an

example of the inertia of mental habit and of antipathy to new truth simply because it is new and at variance with accepted ideas. But a little consideration soon convinces us that that is not a true account of the case. The proposition "The earth moves round the sun" was hated, not for its mere novelty, but for what was rightly or wrongly felt to be involved in it—the cosmic insignificance of man and therewith the impossibility of faith in the divine scheme of salvation. "If," said Cardinal Bellarmine, one of the foremost champions of the Ptolemaic theory on religious grounds, "the earth is merely an insignificant star—one amongst many, which are probably all inhabited—it becomes incredible that God should have died for man." * What was proclaimed as the necessary outcome of modern science as regards our general view of existence by Professor Haeckel in his *Riddle of the Universe* was scented by the orthodox Christians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. "Nothing seems to me," he writes, "better adapted than this magnificent cosmological perspective to give us the proper standard and the broad outlook which we need in the solution of the vast enigmas that surround us. It not only clearly indicates the true place of man in Nature, but it dissipates the prevalent illusion of man's supreme importance, and the arrogance with which he sets himself apart from the illimitable universe, and exalts himself to the position of its most valuable element."

It was these ideas, vaguely suspected or clearly foreseen, that Cardinal Bellarmine and the Roman Church so energetically fought. As opposed to them the Ptolemaic theory was no mere astronomical hypothesis; it was the theory that stood for the religious view of the world—for Christianity—for the value and possible triumph of the human soul. When the truth of the Copernican theory then began to appear evident, one of two things could happen: either the Ptolemaic view might be

* Mallock, *Reconstruction of Belief*, p. 28.

abandoned together with the religious faith with which it was associated, or the doubt might arise as to whether the astronomy and the religion were really as vitally connected as had been imagined. It came to be seen—*e.g.* by Pascal—that these impressions of physical bigness and littleness, central or non-central locality, did not logically involve the consequences which Cardinal Bellarmine, and later Professor Haeckel, supposed. But as soon as the bare scientific fact becomes in some measure dissociated from what at first were felt to be its implications a state of double truth arises. On the one hand there is the judgement about the solar system, on the other a sphere of religious conviction symbolized by the discarded scientific doctrine.

A symbol, in this sense of the word, is a doctrine or a term which stands for an impression which one cannot clearly think out or put into precise language—an impression which we cannot reach as isolated individuals, but which is mediated through the life and thought of a religious community to which we belong. A symbol gets its meaning from life—from the consciousness of something really operative within one, though one could not define it. Sometimes it is more a matter of ideas, sometimes of feelings, sometimes of principles of action, sometimes of intuitions, perceptions, half caught but lost again. But in the community all that life comes to tangible expression, and its creed is the symbol for it. Perhaps one might even say that a symbol is an idea genuinely entertained by the whole community, but by none of the individual members of it. The life may go out of a symbol and it may die, but it can never be refuted.

The knowledge of God includes all these forms of knowledge. For our present purposes we have to insist most upon a theoretical and objective knowledge of Him, for without this there will inevitably be a relapse into idolatry and empty sentimentality, upon the one hand, and into scepticism upon the other. But a full knowledge of God

is not reached until it is transcended through love. "Though I understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and though I have all faith so that I could remove mountains, and have not love," I cannot really know God. The way thereto lies through the most difficult and important of all the problems of religion—the secret of redemption.

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